

**The United Nations Development Assistance Framework  
In Lebanon 2010-2014  
An External Assessment**

**July 2013**

**Josie Lianna Kaye and Marc Jacquand  
Independent Consultants**

## **Acknowledgements**

The consultants would like to sincerely thank all those who took the time to share their insights in the context of this assessment. We would also like to thank the RCO for its support during this process, especially Hagop Kouyoumdjian, Agnese Spiazzi, Mirna Sabbagh and Toni Ayrouth. A special thanks is due to Laure-Maissa Fargelat for her excellent work to assist the consultants with the assessment.

## Acronyms

CAS	Central Administration of Statistics
CCA	Common Country Assessment
CDR	Council for Development and Reconstruction
CSA	Country Strategic Analysis
ESCWA	Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia
EU	European Union
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization
FENASOL	Fédération Nationale des Syndicats des Ouvriers et des Employés au Liban
GoL	Government of Lebanon
ILO	International Labour Organization
ISF	Integrated Strategic Framework
IWG	Integrated Working Group
LPDC	Lebanese Palestinian Dialogue Committee
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MDGF	Millennium Development Goals Fund
NCLW	National Commission for Lebanese Women
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
OHCHR	Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
PAU	Policy Advisory Unit
PCM	Presidency of the Council of Ministers
RC	Resident Coordinator
UN	United Nations
UNCT	United Nations Country Team
UNDAF	United Nations Development Assistance Framework
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNESCO	United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNFPA	United Nations Population Fund

UN-HABITAT	United Nations Human Settlements Programme
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNIDO	United Nations Industrial Development Organization
UNODC	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
UNRCO	United Nations Resident Coordinator's Office
UNRWA	United Nations Relief and Works Agency
UNSCOL	United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon
USAID	US Agency for International Development
WHO	World Health Organization

## Contents Page

<b>A. Executive Summary.....</b>	<b>Page 6</b>
<b>B. Introduction.....</b>	<b>Page 9</b>
<b>C. Methodology.....</b>	<b>Page 9</b>
<b>D. Background: UNDAF 2010-2014.....</b>	<b>Page 10</b>
<b>E. General Observations: High appreciation for the UNDAF concept.....</b>	<b>Page 10</b>
<b>F. Underpinnings: An era of optimism.....</b>	<b>Page 11</b>
<b>G. Articulating the UNDAF: A process of co-creation?.....</b>	<b>Page 12</b>
<b>H. Content: A project menu.....</b>	<b>Page 13</b>
<b>I. A closer look at the document: A systems-approach to development?.....</b>	<b>Page 14</b>
<b>J. UNDAF Coordination Architectures: In Theory and in Practice.....</b>	<b>Page 16</b>
<b>K. “UNDAF Implementation”: General observations.....</b>	<b>Page 18</b>
<b>L. UNDAF M&amp;E: How to measure impact?.....</b>	<b>Page 20</b>
<b>M. Conclusions.....</b>	<b>Page 21</b>
<b>N. Recommendations.....</b>	<b>Page 23</b>
<b>O. Annexes.....</b>	<b>Page 26</b>
<b>a. Annex One: Consultation process</b>	
<b>b. Annex Two: Summary comparison of the UNDAF pre and post Mid-Term Review</b>	
<b>c. Annex Three: UNDAF Coordination architecture (a diagram)</b>	
<b>d. Annex Four: Detailed comparison of the UNDAF pre and post Mid-Term Review</b>	
<b>e. Annex Five: Comparison between UNDAF 2002-2006 and UNDAF 2010-2014</b>	

## A. Executive Summary

The United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) is the common strategic framework for the development activities of the UN system at country level. This assessment focuses on the 2010-2014 UNDAF in Lebanon and seeks to understand the extent to which the formulation and implementation of the UNDAF process and document enhanced the coherence, efficiency and effectiveness of development assistance in Lebanon. It is essential to underscore that this report serves neither as an evaluation of the UN in Lebanon nor as an overview of development assistance. It serves solely as an assessment of the *value-added* of the UNDAF as an instrument for articulating priorities, enhancing coordination and improving coherence and effectiveness of development activities.

The consultants undertook this report within a highly limited timeframe of 12 days. Nonetheless, a significant effort was made to be as inclusive as possible. In this spirit, over fifty individuals were interviewed, including representatives the Government of Lebanon, the UN system, donors, and NGOs (a complete list is provided in the report and in the annex).

It is important to note that this particular UNDAF was completed against the backdrop of an acute political and security crisis, stabilised only following the Doha Agreement of May 2008. The structure of the UN reflects the on-going complexity of the Lebanon context: UN Country Team (UNCT), Peacekeeping Operation and Special Political Mission co-exist in Lebanon. Following the UN Secretary-General's decision on Integration in 2008, the UNDAF formed part of an important process that has gradually brought together the UN's political, peacekeeping and development actors.

The main **findings** of the assessment include:

- While there is a strong appreciation of the UNDAF concept in theory (for articulating strategic priorities), in practice the document was neither widely distributed, nor broadly used – either as a reference document or planning tool..
- While the UNDAF planning process was quite inclusive, it was inundated with challenges that affected the outcome: participants were of unequal levels and function, and largely 'Beirut-centric'; participation from civil society was weak, and participation from academia and private sector absent.
- The UNDAF suffered from a lack of clarity concerning the objective of the process and the purpose of the tool (what is it for? what should go in it?), which led to the creation of a document criticised for looking like a “menu” of options, with little or no strategic character. Agencies approached the UNDAF process largely with pre-planned projects which had secured funding, and outcomes were articulated in a broad fashion in order to encapsulate all sorts of projects.
- While the document is well-organised and comprehensive, the broad outcome areas – designed in sectoral fashion – reflect a traditional, ‘siloed’ approach to development. It is questionable whether a multi-month process is required to know which actors are going to work on governance, environment and socio-economic development, for example.
- The UNDAF failed to create an incentive for collaboration.. The burden for coordinating the Working Groups, created in 2011 for each of the outcome areas, was not shared equally across the UN agencies and, since the rationale for the UNDAF process as a whole was weak, the Working Groups became little more than information-sharing entities.

- Despite the engagement of the CDR in the UNDAF process, collaboration with the Government on the UNDAF is limited. This UNDAF remained a largely UN-driven process.
- The Monitoring and Evaluation framework needs to undergo significant improvements. The UNDAF articulated a burdensome 150 indicators, revised only to 98 in the context of the Mid-Term review. Most importantly, however, there are insufficient baselines and no indicators at the outcome level, which makes it almost impossible to measure impact.

In light of these findings and others that are presented in the report, **recommendations** have been organised around seven key themes:

#### **Timing:**

1. In light of the absence of a Government, a decision needs to be made by the UNCT as soon as possible regarding the **timing** of the preparation process for the next UNDAF/ISF.

#### **Articulating Focus and Priorities:**

2. The UNCT should engage in a discussion that seeks clear answers to the following questions: What do we want out of our UNDAF and how would it be useful?
3. The next UNDAF should not be too concerned about the exact number of specific outcomes, but rather ensure that the number emerges from a genuine analytical process where the UN seriously articulates an added-value in each area.
4. Strategic focus areas should be articulated in a non-sectoral/cross-cutting way and reflect real choices not just on what the UN does, but on *how* the UN engages in Lebanon and with whom, in light of Lebanon's critical peace and development challenges..

#### **Engaging National Counterparts**

5. The UNCT should engage with the Government following the next elections to discuss the appropriate structure for a light but pro-active UNDAF/ISF Advisory Committee, able to withstand potential Ministerial changes.
6. The UNCT should make a concerted effort to reach out to a broader set of national actors in the preparation of the next UNDAF. This includes NGOs, private sector actors, academia and regional organisations. Criteria for engagement in the context of the UNDAF should be formulated in advance of such an outreach process.

#### **Coordination**

7. Modalities for engagement and respective expectations of the RC and Agencies should be formulated.
8. Working Groups should serve as problem-solving entities, with clear deliverables.
9. No agency should lead more than one Working Group. The lead agency need not be the agency doing most of the work, since all agencies are working towards common goals.
10. The UNCT should use its position as a reliable, impartial actor to improve donor coordination. Donor coordination – as well as internal UN coordination – would be greatly facilitated by a clear and concise mapping of which actors are doing what and where.

## **M&E Processes**

11. The UNCT should make a significant commitment to developing baselines for each of the key strategic focus areas, including *at the outcome level*. The UNCT should improve the availability of reliable data through comprehensive support of the CAS.
12. The Monitoring and Evaluation process of the UNDAF should be made as simple – and transparent – as possible. Each outcome should have only two or three indicators, which should be constructed in a non self-referential way i.e. capable of measuring *impact*.

## **Communication modalities**

13. The UNDAF document should be as short, concise and “high-level” as possible, and flexible enough to be able to adapt to changing circumstances. A two- to four-page summary should be made available and widely distributed amongst national counterparts, donors, private sector actors, etc.
14. The UNCT should make a more concerted effort to communicate its activities to the people; it can use the UNDAF as a platform to communicate its development approach and achievements by engaging more proactively with the media (including new media).

## **Peace, Security and Development Nexus**

15. We would strongly urge the UN in Lebanon to use the next UNDAF as an opportunity to explore how the UN creates links between peace and development issues and how the UN is going to navigate these links and advance all three agendas in a productive way. One concern driven from similar exercises in other countries is to ensure that peace and security dimension of the UN’s planning does not absorb the UNDAF flaws, but only its advantages; i.e. that it be based on solid analytical foundations (which the UNDAF process usually offers), but focuses the UN’s attention, resources, and communication around critical challenges that will make or break the country’s future and where the UN collectively really has something meaningful to offer (which the UNDAF at times fails to articulate).



## B. Introduction

1. The United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) is the common strategic framework for the development activities of the UN system at country level. This assessment focuses on the 2010-2014 UNDAF in Lebanon and seeks to understand the extent to which the formulation, implementation and outcomes of the UNDAF process and document enhanced the coherence, efficiency and effectiveness of development assistance in Lebanon. The objective is to articulate lessons learnt and best practices for formulation of the next UNDAF, due to start later this year.

2. It is important to underscore what this assessment is not: it is not an evaluation of the *UN in Lebanon* broadly speaking, nor it is a reflection of the efficiency and effectiveness of *UN development assistance* more specifically. The study assesses the UNDAF as an instrument, focusing on: the formulation/consultation process for identifying and aligning with government priorities; the coordination architecture that oversees – and monitors - the implementation of the UNDAF; and, the choice of results (outcomes and outputs) reflected in the document itself. The focus, therefore, is on the value-added of the UNDAF as both a process and a document: did the UNDAF help the UN system in Lebanon to be more than the sums of its parts? Did it enable the UN System to strategically position itself in a complex environment? Did it influence programmatic choices, and allocation of resources? And, had the UNDAF not existed, what would have been different?

3. The UNDAF is a time-consuming process and if the costs outweigh the benefits, significant changes need to be made. The preparation of the UNDAF, and its monitoring and evaluation put significant pressure on the UN system, at a time when resources are scarce: it cannot afford to use these precious resources in a way that does not improve its ability to serve the people of Lebanon. But if those resources can be catalysed to compound and, in fact, multiply the impact that the UN system is able to have by working together—enabling it to go beyond what each entity can do with its own planning tools, then the UNDAF benefits outweigh the costs. The essence of this assessment, therefore, is to focus on what worked, what didn't and why, and, most importantly, what can be improved for the next UNDAF cycle.

## C. Methodology

4. This assessment has been produced under significant time constraints. The consultants were given only 12 days to complete the entire assessment, including the desk review, consultation phase, analysis and write-up of these findings. However, given the broad nature of the UNDAF process, the consultants insisted on a highly inclusive consultation phase. In this spirit, over fifty individuals were interviewed, including representatives from: the Government of Lebanon, including from the Prime Minister's Office, the Council for Development and Reconstruction (CDR), line ministries, the Central Administration of Statistics (CAS), and consultative/advisory bodies and commissions; from the UN system, including: FAO, ILO, OHCHR, UNDP, UNESCO, UNFPA, UN-HABITAT, UNHCR, UNICEF, UNIDO, UNIFIL, UNODC, UNRCO, UNSCOL, and WHO; a selection of donors, including the Italian Cooperation, the EU and USAID; and, lastly, a selection of NGOs, including, the Arab NGO's Network/Amel, KAFA, and the syndicate, Fenasol.

5. All the interviews were conducted anonymously, and therefore, while individuals' names are listed in the Annex of this document, no statements will be attributed to any individual specifically in the context of this report.

6. This assessment could not and did not undertake an outcome-by-outcome, nor project-by-project analysis. The time limit, combined with the fact that this assessment takes place in 2013– 18 months before the end of the UNDAF cycle - mean that such an analysis is simply beyond the scope of this assignment. There are, furthermore, constraints which affect the ability to determine the extent to which the UN contributed to the realisation of the UNDAF outcomes; these constraints will be detailed later in this document, but it should be highlighted that the way in which this UNDAF was formulated and implemented limits the ability to conduct an assessment which focuses on impact.

#### **D. Background: UNDAF 2010-2014**

7. The preparation phase for this UNDAF began in 2007, against the complex backdrop of the acute political and security crisis, which stabilised only following the Doha Agreement of May 2008. The UNDAF builds on the 2007 Common Country Assessment (CCA) and was aligned with key national milestones and planning references, including the Taef Accord (1989), the amended Constitution (1990), the Doha agreement (2008) and the Government declaration of 2008. Most importantly, it is also aligned with the Government Reform Programme presented at the International Conference in Support of Lebanon – Paris III, in January 2007. And, lastly, it also builds upon a “White Paper” prepared in 2006, which laid the foundation for articulating the UNDAF priorities. Alignment with these processes meant that the five UNDAF outcomes were also deemed to be priorities for the government. The outcomes for 2010-2014 included: democratic governance and institutional development; socio-economic development and regional disparities reduction; environmental sustainability; human rights; and gender.

8. The structure of the UN system in Lebanon reflects the complex history of the country and the ever-evolving regional dynamics. A UN Country Team (UNCT), Peacekeeping Operation and Special Political Mission co-exist in Lebanon. In 2008, the UN Secretary-General issued a decision requiring that the UNCT and Peacekeeping or Special Political Missions working together in conflict or post-conflict environments adopt an integrated strategic approach. The UNDAF therefore formed part of a process that has gradually brought together political, peacekeeping and development actors. The effort to bring these actors together was reflected in the ISF, developed in 2010 and endorsed by the UNCT in March 2011, which includes UNDAF elements as well as other joint priorities between UNSCOL and the UNCT such as Palestinian rights, borders and elections.

#### **E. General Observations: High appreciation for the UNDAF concept**

9. Amongst Government, UN and civil society representatives alike, there is a strong appreciation for what the UNDAF concept seeks to achieve. Government representatives indicated that the document gives credibility and impartiality to the development agenda, and provides a source of consensus, especially useful during times of political instability. Many from the Government also found it useful to have one document that provides an overview of UN activities, given that their interactions with the UN are multiple and numerous. UN actors almost unanimously recognise the benefits of the UNDAF concept, insisting that it is an “excellent tool”, which “creates a platform for us to look ahead,

creating synergies and enabling us to look at and do things differently”. It was widely recognised as an essential strategic tool, which brings the disparate UN entities together, enabling them to go above and beyond the specific concerns of their own entity to see the broader whole. Many felt that the UNDAF concept presents a rare opportunity to remove agency hats and to ask: “As a development practitioner, what do I believe Lebanon needs most?” It could, many underlined, also be used as a highly effective fundraising tool with donors, and presents similarly a much-needed opportunity to communicate with the public. Lastly, civil society actors seemed genuinely interested in the process and eager to participate in the next iteration.

10. Understanding of the UNDAF concept – outside of the UN and its direct counterpart, the CDR and some individuals in the Prime Minister’s Office – however, remained purely theoretical. Neither line Ministries, including those at the Director-General level, nor donors, nor civil society actors were aware of the UNDAF process in practice and many in the context of the interview were seeing the UNDAF document for the first time. Several, if not all, of those actors interviewed feature explicitly in the context of the UNDAF, either as a partner or implementing agency for specific outputs or projects, and yet seemed unaware that they were part of a broader, and - in principle - more strategic process; it appears, therefore, that agencies did not fulfil their responsibility to “sell” the UNDAF to their GOL counterparts/line ministries. Once the concept had been explained to them, they fully appreciated the need for such a tool in Lebanon, and many expressed regret that they had not been kept abreast of the process and its outcome.

11. On the UN side, despite an overwhelmingly positive appreciation of the concept, all those interviewed expressed disappointment with the reality of this UNDAF. The criticisms were wide-ranging: some felt it was over-ambitious, too “heavy”, or lacking in focus; many underscored the fact that the UNDAF is just a tool, its effectiveness depends on where and how it is used; others questioned the relevance of a five-year strategic planning tool in such an unstable and ever-changing national and regional context. Furthermore, everyone insists that they would like the UNDAF to be “strategic” but there appears to be little agreement on what a “strategic UNDAF” would actually look like. Regardless of the specific criticisms of this UNDAF – which we will analyse in closer detail during the course of this document – the gap between staff hopes for the UNDAF and the realities of the process is stark. The majority of staff expressed their strong desire and willingness to make sure the next UNDAF seizes the opportunities that may have been missed by this one.

## **F. Underpinnings: An Era of Optimism**

12. The UNDAF 2010-2014, formulated in 2007-2009 was an extremely different period to the one we are witnessing now. Those who participated in this formulation period underscored the optimism of the moment: firstly, many felt the end of the 2006 war marked a turning point and that a new era of security could be envisioned; second, the 2007 Paris III package of international financial support for fiscal stability and institutional reform meant that funding for development activities was much higher than it is now; and lastly, there was a strong hope that the new government would usher in a period of political stability, potentially leading to the approval of a new Government budget, allowing for more predictable planning and coordination.

13. This optimism is reflected in the content of the UNDAF document on many levels. The sheer scope of the report, the number and scale of projects reflect a high anticipation of

what could be achieved in that time; furthermore, the estimated resource requirements and availability both remained high at \$190,685,000 US dollars, translating into an annual budget of \$36 million US dollars for UN development activities (NB: this figure does not include UN development activities outside the UNDAF nor humanitarian, UNSCOL and UNIFIL's assessed budgets). These figures had to be revised down by 20% in the course of the mid-term review in 2012.<sup>1</sup> Lastly, the executive summary of the UNDAF underscores the assumptions on which the UNDAF was built: “an essential condition for undertaking the UNDAF”, it says, “is the prevalence of a peaceful and secure operating environment and of political stability”<sup>2</sup>.

14. Even between the finalisation of the UNDAF document in 2008 and the beginning of the UNDAF cycle, it is questionable to what extent the “priorities” articulated in the document remained relevant (raising important issues about the time-lag inherent to the UNDAF process, as well as the time the process takes in general). The optimism of the planning stage of the UNDAF, furthermore, has since dissipated. Since 2010, Lebanon has had multiple changes of government, and two periods of interim government, one which still continues today; the Syrian crisis is re-shaping the socio-economic, political context and security, exposing long-standing structural inequalities and deficiencies, and triggering a humanitarian, development and political crisis. The national budget - which would provide a framework for national prioritisation –has not been approved since 2005; there is no national development strategy and, many of those interviewed felt that sectoral plans/ministry frameworks remain vulnerable to changes in cabinet portfolios.

15. Evidently, not all of these dynamics could have been anticipated; and, an UNDAF in any case should remain adaptable to changing circumstances. However, reflection upon the assumptions underlying the UNDAF is warranted. In a context which has both a peacekeeping mission and a special political mission, as well as a UNCT, it is questionable whether an anticipation of stability was justified: the integrated UN presence indicates a level of instability, as a result of national, regional and international dynamics. One UN official stated that “the UNDAF reads as if we are in Switzerland”, while another echoed that “we seemed to forget that we were planning in a fragile state”. Many of those interviewed, however, reinforce the assumptions of the UNDAF when explaining why many of the outputs or outcomes could not have been achieved: due to political instability.

16. No one questions the fact that it is extremely challenging to work in Lebanon; however, the UN needs to plan in such a way that it takes into account the very challenge it seeks to address, rather than planning (and hoping) that the problem will no longer be present. This means, furthermore, a greater degree of scenario planning, so that a strategic five-year document can be more than a reflection of the particular moment in time at which it is written.

## **G. Articulating the UNDAF: A process of co-creation?**

17. The process of articulating the UNDAF was relatively inclusive. The CDR participated during the CCA process and in the thematic working groups, as well as during the review of the outcomes, as did some NGOs and all UN entities. Individuals from the Government felt this was “a stimulating, capacity-building exercise, which effectively opened up dialogue

---

<sup>1</sup>Please see Annex Two for a comparison of the UNDAF pre and post the Mid-Term Review in terms of indicators and funding, and Annex Four for a comparison between the content of the UNDAF before and after the Mid-Term Review.

<sup>2</sup>UNDAF, 2010-2014, page 3

between different stakeholders”. Many from the Government and UN entities alike appreciated the workshops held on Human Right-Based programming and on selecting thematic priorities, which helped increase general understanding and appreciation for the process. During the drafting phase, there was broad agreement on the priority areas, and participants found the dialogue to be relatively stimulating. Some of those who participated from the Government side felt that the process gave them additional clarity on their own work plans, and allowed them to re-align to the broad strategic priorities identified in the UNDAF.

18. There were, however, five main challenges during this process. First, a vast diversity of individuals participated in the process, both from the UN and the Government: some sent their more senior staff, while others sent technical or even administrative staff. The Ministries emphasized that no indication was made in the invitations they received about *who* specifically from the Ministry and at what level should be engaged in the process. Second, participants were “Beirut-centric” and little effort was made by any of the agencies or ministries participating to include representatives from the regions, municipalities or “the field”. Third, participation from civil society was weak, and participation from the private sector and academia was entirely lacking; many felt this was a missed opportunity. Fourth, participants were given mixed instructions on *how* to engage in the process, especially with regards to drafting and filling out matrices. The UNDAF guidelines were at that time being revised, and the most up to date information was not available. The lack of clarity surrounding the process resulted in significant confusion during the elaboration and drafting phases, leading to the necessity to hire two consultants to review and consolidate the different products of each working group. Fifth, and most importantly, perhaps, there was insufficient clarity around *what* should go into, and what should be left out of, the draft UNDAF document.

## **H. Content: A Project Menu**

19. Clarity and leadership around what the UNDAF is for, and, indeed, what should and should not go into an UNDAF is probably the singularly most important contributing factor to success or failure of the entire process; experience from other UNDAF processes specifically, as well as strategic planning processes broadly, indicate that clarity and leadership are the starting points for an effective plan. While it may be stating the obvious, failure to forcefully articulate the objective and purpose (and nature of the process and document) has a domino effect on the rest of the five-year process. If there is no clarity in the objective of the process and what the tool is meant to do, then the document itself ceases to be a usefully authoritative reference in making programmatic decisions. When that is the case, the working groups lose their rationale for meeting; if the working groups lose their rationale for meeting, monitoring and evaluation of the impact becomes problematic; if monitoring and evaluation of the process is weak or absent, measuring impact becomes almost impossible. When measuring impact becomes impossible, it is incredibly difficult to articulate the value of the process. If the process is not seen to have value, it becomes a burden – and nothing more. But even without the domino effect: if the document does not inform programming and resource allocation decisions, it simply becomes an exercise of ‘ticking the box’ for the benefit of UNHQ.

20. It seems the process for articulating the 2010-2014 UNDAF was turned on its head. Agencies arrived at the process with pre-planned programmes, many of which had already been approved by the relevant Ministry, and had been granted the necessary funding.

Outcomes were therefore deliberately “made broad enough to be able to encompass a very wide selection of outputs”. Thematic groups’ main task was then to insert the projects of each of the agencies into the respective output and outcome, filling out the matrix with the corresponding line ministries, and other partners. Most agencies were not selective about the projects they inserted, and, as such, the UNDAF is a representation of projects most agencies intended to undertake anyway. Different sized agencies had different incentives for engaging in this process: many of the larger agencies wanted to make sure that their entire programme was reflected in the UNDAF; whereas some of the smaller agencies wanted to use the UNDAF to get funding for projects they had planned, but which were not yet secured. The result was a document with: 5 outcomes, 14 sub outcomes, 63 outputs and 150 indicators.

21. Many interviewees described the result of this process as an “UNDAF Christmas tree”, a “menu of options”, a “shopping list” or indeed “a soup”. No one described the UNDAF as a strategic process or document, understood as a tool that informs or guides choices, and/or a document that clearly articulates UN positions on development issues in the Lebanon. The UNDAF process and the limits of the UN System are *in part* to blame. First, many agencies had already completed and sought approval for their country programme plan, as underscored by the fact that only the ExCom agencies programme planning cycles actually align with the UNDAF<sup>3</sup>. Second, the UNDAF process attempts to coordinate so many UN agencies, Government entities and civil society actors, that it is an inherently ‘messy’ and complex process. Third, in the absence of multi-year funding, predictability of resources is weak; consequently, five year planning is problematic as agencies, funds and programmes specifically are forced to follow funding (a constraints missions, for example, do not face). Fourth, Excom agencies are obliged by HQ to show compliance with the UNDAF process, and non-Excom agencies are “encouraged” to do so. Consequently, some agencies, which might otherwise not participate in the UNDAF, end up vying to have a place within it. Fifth, the presumed mutual accountability aspect of the UNDAF between the UN and national counterparts creates a dynamic whereby agencies do not want to take the risk to articulate projects that may not get funding, thereby creating a risk-averse UNDAF in an environment where risk-taking and creativity may actually be what is needed<sup>4</sup>. And lastly, there are no repercussions in any case for actually following or not what is in the UNDAF.

22. These constraints, however, highlight important questions that need to be answered at the outset of such a process: what is the UNDAF for? It does not need to be a detailed work plan, unless the UNCT wants it to be; it does not need to go down to the project level, unless the UNCT sees a value in doing so. It can, however, be used to prioritise, to mobilise funds, to communicate with the public, and to position the UN effectively in line with its comparative advantage. Lastly, it should be noted that high-level officials from the Government would not likely participate in a process when they know most of the projects have been approved already. This would undermine national ownership of the process and makes clear why “the UNDAF is seen unanimously as a UN process and a UN document”.

## **I. A closer look at the document: A systems-approach to development?**

---

<sup>3</sup>There appears to be a contradiction in the way in which other, non-ExCom agencies align with the UNDAF. They are encouraged to align substantively, but their planning structures do not really allow for this. While beyond the scope of this current assessment, alignment should be considered for future UNDAF processes.

<sup>4</sup> Some projects that did not yet have funding were included in the UNDAF; these projects, however, were removed in 2012 as part of the Mid-Term Review. Regardless, agencies never used the UNDAF as a resource mobilization tool.

23. A closer look at the document reveals that a vast amount of effort has gone into producing it. The document is well organized, with succinct descriptions of the outcomes and outputs, comprehensive results matrices, and an ambitious M&E matrix<sup>5</sup>. The document details which working group is leading which activity, the agency taking the lead, the role of partners and resource mobilization targets per outputs. The document looks highly professional and donors and line ministries who had a chance to peruse it during the context of interviews commended the UN for the comprehensive and useful nature of the report, although some requested whether a less sophisticated, simpler summary of the document was (or could be) available. Donors, furthermore, questioned why the UN was not making more of its strategic positioning as an impartial actor, and this comprehensive document to help coordinate activities and funding between UN agencies, donors and line ministries.

24. If we look again at the outcome areas detailed within the document, however, we see that they are too broad to be especially useful. There is a trade-off to be made between having a broad outcome area which is flexible enough to take into account changing circumstances over a five year period, and having an outcome narrow enough to be able to measure UN contributions to achieving it. The problem with broad outcomes (besides the difficulty of measuring, for example, “human rights” or “the environment”), is the fact that often such broad terms mean different things to different people i.e. what is “democratic governance” as an outcome area? How will it be measured?

25. Putting the issue of breadth to one side, the consultants believe that the sectoral design of the UNDAF – with a separate focus on governance, education, etc.-reflects a largely traditional approach and goes against reform efforts of the UN to move away from a ‘siloed’ approach to development. Furthermore, a sectoral approach does not require such an extensive planning process; the UN in Lebanon, and elsewhere, does not need a multi-month process to know that it will prioritize education, for example. What is more important is *how* the UN is going to go about addressing education and whether the UN system as a whole can work together to reach education related goals, in a manner that takes into account Lebanon’s peace and security context. In the opinion of the consultants, a strategic UNDAF would be one which galvanizes UN actors along non-traditional lines, bringing them to work together to achieve a common objective such as decentralization, or improved public-private sector engagements, for example - which would still be in line with the priority areas identified by national counterparts, but articulated and addressed differently. Such outcomes provide a platform for agencies to think through how to create the effective governance environment, how to empower and develop local regions, while also mainstreaming issues such as gender and human rights, and improving socio-economic development.

26. Lastly, it should be noted that the decision to include human rights and gender as outcomes in their own right was a strategic one, according to those individuals who participated in the planning process. The idea was to ensure that “mainstreaming” did not equal “forgetting”, and that making it an area of its own should be *in addition to* mainstreaming these areas. However, as many of the concerned stakeholders pointed out, more effort could have been made to ensure that gender and human rights were reflected across all programming.

---

<sup>5</sup>We will return to this later in the assessment.

## J. UNDAF Coordination Architectures: In Theory and in Practice

27. In order to be effective, the UNDAF process requires coordination structures that help maintain the life of the document after it has been sent to print. For the UN, this means coordinating a large number of agencies and other relevant stakeholders, which have different operational cultures and working methods. For the Government, this means coordinating between the main UNDAF focal point – the CDR and the Prime Minister’s Office, and the respective line ministries. Lastly, for the NGOs concerned (although the weak participation by NGOs in this UNDAF makes this largely irrelevant), this means normally coordinating with the NGOs working under their umbrella. In other contexts, these coordination structures often come under the supervision and leadership of an umbrella mechanism, normally under the guise of a ‘Steering Committee’, which is helpful for mobilising joint UN and government leadership around the UNDAF.

28. In theory, coordination structures on the UN side were relatively well established<sup>6</sup>. In 2011, five working groups were established for each of the outcomes<sup>7</sup>, and an additional working group was established for monitoring and evaluation<sup>8</sup>. In practice, the coordination structure, however, was not well maintained across the board and quickly lost steam. Three out of the five working groups were effectively “led” by UNDP, as even though the Working Group on Governance was chaired by UNSCOL, the lion’s share of the work was done by UNDP. On the one hand, this put additional pressure on UNDP to act as focal points in the context of a burdensome process, while simultaneously giving the impression to the other agencies that they were somehow “less part of the UNDAF” or that the “UNDAF process was owned by UNDP”. While the UNDAF process is led by the RC, the process cannot survive on the goodwill of the RC alone: it is highly dependent on the motivation and collective leadership of all the agencies. By condensing responsibility for three-fifths of the UNDAF in the hands of one agency, the collective nature of the process was undermined. Consequently, the Working Group on Governance, for example was disbanded in 2012.

29. Other working groups struggled in different measures to find their own rationale and many failed to come up with comprehensive working agendas: given that the logic for their cooperation was not inherent to the UNDAF process (which was, after all a collection of individual projects), the Working Groups become largely a forum for information-sharing. While useful in itself, this rationale did not prove strong enough to stimulate a global appreciation of the effectiveness of the Working Groups. Many expressed frustration at the absence of interest in the Working Groups, and lamented the lack of agency leadership around these structures. However, it must be acknowledged that a meeting must have substance to have meaning. Furthermore, the RC can exercise leadership but cannot dictate: agencies need to be proactive for coordination structures and processes to succeed. Those Working Groups that were more effective, succeeded in spite of, not because of the UNDAF

---

<sup>6</sup>Please see Annex Threeo for a visual overview of the UN integrated coordination structures for the UNDAF.

<sup>7</sup>Outcome one: governance chaired by UNSCOL; with UNDP, UNESCO, UNFPA, UNICEF, ESCWA, UNRWA, OHCHR, ILO, UNODC, UN-HABITAT; Outcome two: human rights, chaired by OHCHR with UNDP, UNHCR, UNICEF, UNESCO, UNFPA, UNRWA, OHCHR, ILO, UNODC, UNSCOL, IOM; Outcome three, gender: chaired by UNFPA with UNDP, ILO, UNIDO, UHCHR, UNICEF, UNESCO, UNODC, NLCW; Outcome 4: Socio-economic development and regional disparities chaired by UNDP with WHO, UNICEF, UNESCO, UNFPA, ILO, UNIDO, FAO, UNRWA, ESCWA, UN-HBITAT, IOM; and, Outcome 5, environment, chaired by UNDP with UNICEF, UNESCO, FAO, UNIDO, UNEP, WHO.

<sup>8</sup> Analysis of the M&E Working Group is covered in the last section of this report before the conclusion.



or its coordination architecture, usually it seems by force of personality and a strong desire to cooperate (notably the Human Rights Working Group). Collaboration has also been strongest when it has been issue driven, as demonstrated by the in-depth collective engagement of multiple agencies around the question of Palestinian rights. But overall, the UNDAF instrument itself failed to create the incentives for sustained collaboration.

30. The ‘government side’ of the UNDAF process is also quite complex. The CDR is the institution charged with following the UNDAF on the government side and creating a platform for continuity during rapidly changing political times. The CDR, however, is not the equivalent of a planning ministry, and any major decision has to be approved by the Council of Ministers: the CDR has no power over the Ministries; this status further complicates its efforts to act as coordinating body amongst and between line ministries on development assistance. The UNDAF process has remained largely marginal rather than integral to the work of the Ministries.

31. While many UN counterparts insisted that coordination around the UNDAF was hampered by the absence of a strong (read, powerful) government counterpart, others insisted this was simply an excuse. Critics of this position insisted that even in interim governments, Ministers may change, but the essence of the work of the Ministries does not change, the Director-General stays, the technical people stay, and the Ministerial declaration only ever outlines the macro contours for the Ministry in any case. With the exception of work on governance - which is evidently hampered to some degree by changing governments - many from the UN and government alike insisted that change on the Government should not serve as a reason not to push forward with the implementation of development assistance, nor as an excuse not to keep the government more fully engaged in the process where possible.

32. In terms of coordination *between* the UN and the Government on the UNDAF: In the absence of an Inter-Ministerial Committee on the Government side, or in the absence of a Government at all, it is difficult to conceive a creative process for consistently engaging the Government on matters related to the UNDAF, but one must be found. Government counterparts lament that they were involved in the elaboration of the UNDAF and in the Mid-Term Review but utterly forgotten – if not excluded – in between. None of the Working Groups engaged Government entities, for example. Much work could also be done on the UN side to improve and harmonise modalities for engagement with line ministries on matters which fall under the UNDAF. There are currently no agreed mechanisms for UN-government interactions, such that each agency has its own relationships and works accordingly, largely in isolation from and not privy to any other UN agencies. This creates multiple opportunities for exploitation of the lack of UN coordination, and compounds the perception that the UN is working in a un-strategic manner. Having formal structures in place that facilitate coordination would be helpful; but again, these structures will make no difference to the effectiveness of the process if the meetings that take place within them have no meaning.

33. Putting these criticisms aside, one area in particular where the UN has excelled in Lebanon at improving collaboration is certainly between the development and peace and security actors. Despite initial fears that the presence of the Mission would undermine and politicize the development work of the UNCT, it appears to be well understood that Lebanon does not allow for ‘development as usual’, making integration an imperative rather than an option. The UNDAF has, in many ways, provided the opportunity for such

collaboration, creating a platform for UNSCOL to play an advocacy and advisory role on development activities, and allowing UNIFIL to turn to the UNCT for development-related advice. The willingness to work together is evident, and effort will need to be sustained to translate that willingness into action, and into greater information sharing between the UNCT, UNSCOL and UNIFIL. In light of the highly politicized Syrian crisis, there appears to an appreciation of the need for collaboration amongst these actors now more than ever<sup>9</sup>. It is unclear if the UNDAF, *per se*, would have driven collaboration of these three entities; the decision to merge the UNDAF and the ISF should provide further opportunities for greater synergies.

## K. “UNDAF Implementation”: General observations

34. Given the nature of this particular UNDAF, which was largely a collection of agency projects, one cannot speak about the *implementation of the UNDAF per se*, and given the nature of this UNDAF it is unclear what UNDAF implementation means beyond implementing individual projects that would have been implemented regardless of the UNDAF process. As such, we will aim to make a few pertinent, general observations about the projects and approaches that were implemented in the context of the UNDAF, paying particular attention to consistent messages that arose in the context of the interviews, or to notable finding that came up during the course of the desk review.

35. Dialogue around the UNDAF was not sustained during the “implementation” phase; as such, far from being a live document, the UNDAF found its place on the shelves of UN representatives, and barely made it out of the four walls of the CDR. Once the process was completed, most of the participants went back to their own operating environments and continued largely as if the process had never taken place at all. The overwhelming perception of the UNDAF process especially from the government side is that it ended in 2010 and will begin again in 2014. Changes in the context did not trigger, for example, a revision of the UNDAF prompting many to conclude that “the document was not relevant to project implementation”, and while changes to the context resulted in a change in programming, it was not one reflected in the UNDAF. On the one hand this means that the UNDAF at least did not constrain the UN, but its irrelevance during the implementation phase sustained a non-strategic approach to development assistance. That is certainly *not* to say the UN and line ministries did not work together: there appears to be a strong and close collaboration between the UN and the Government, one largely appreciated on all fronts. However, this collaboration was not enhanced or made more strategic by the presence of the UNDAF. It is important to note, furthermore, that while the Mid-Term Review led to a consolidation of indicators and outputs, it was not used – as it could have been – as a moment to seek clarity on the underlying purpose and objective of the UNDAF process.

36. While civil society actors did not play a prominent role in the UNDAF process, we know they have a very large role to play in implementation of projects. Two main issues arose with respect to engagement with NGOs: some interviewees expressed concern at the absence of a selection process for working with NGOs, insisting that many are politicized and without real agenda. There is no way for the consultants to substantiate these claims within the short timeframe of this assessment, but regardless of whether some NGOs are politicized or not, selection criteria seems like a wise idea. Second, civil society and some government representatives felt that, rather than supporting the NGOs to do their work, in

---

<sup>9</sup>With the concerns of the humanitarian actors about the politicization of humanitarian aid fully appreciated and taken on board.

several instances the UN was “doing work that could be otherwise undertaken by NGOs” and competing for the same funds. These interviewees voiced concern about such an approach that, rather than seeking to strengthen capacity, creates a parallel process which bypasses state and civil society structures.

37. This criticism was echoed with regards to UN programming at the Government level. The use of UN Staff within government is largely lamented as being unsustainable and undesirable: government counterparts and donors felt very strongly that it was “abnormal and wrong” to have so many UN staff working within the government, especially on a full-time basis; one donor described this approach to development as an “unforgiveable sin”. The major concern is that the use of consultants within the government is creating parallel structures that, far from helping, are actually undermining statebuilding processes. While the consultants acknowledge that the UNCT is well aware of the criticisms around the use of Policy Advisory and Support Units, especially following the PAU evaluation in 2011, the continued absence of an exit strategy combined with the forceful criticisms of the modality, obliged the consultants to include this point nonetheless. We believe that the forthcoming UNDAF process presents a much-needed opportunity to discuss these issues, and to discuss not just what the UN will do, but also *how* the UN will support national priorities.

38. On a related note, many criticisms were raised concerning the policy/government focus of the UNDAF broadly speaking. At a time when the “Arab Spring” has highlighted the disconnect between many Arab governments and their people, especially the youth, across the region, many have expressed deep concern that the UN does not appear to sufficiently reach out to actors beyond the Government. These criticisms should inform the next UNDAF, including the nature of the discussions to be held during its preparation, and the choices that the document should reflect.

39. While joint programming was not an integral part of the UNDAF, joint programming did take place during the 2010-2014 cycle as a result of pooled funding mechanisms that were made available after the design of the UNDAF. Joint programmes have received mixed reviews. One of the joint programmes funded in the context of the PBF, for example, - entitled “Empowerment of youth at risk through job creation programs in areas of tension in Lebanon” received a positive review in the context of the mid-term evaluation<sup>10</sup> as positively contributing to the socio-economic opportunities available to Palestinians. Coordination between partners, however, was negatively critique. In general, the mid-term review of this project was perceived in a negative light by the partners, despite its largely positive prospects for the project<sup>11</sup>. The programme, entitled “Conflict Prevention and Peace Building in North Lebanon” is criticized for its high transaction costs, the minimal levels of actual joint work, and the low profile of the project. A broadly appreciated project which falls outside of the pooled funding mechanism is the National Youth Policy project, in the context of which UNESCO, UNICEF, UNDP, ILO and UNFPA voluntary pooled funding in order to work together to address this issue. Lastly, the inter-agency youth task was revitalized in 2012 and appears to be playing an important role; the task force aims to support and advise the UNCT and other working groups on youth-related issues in a coherent and coordinated manner.

---

<sup>10</sup>Peacebuilding Fund – mid term evaluation, final report, Empowerment of youth at risk through job creation programs in areas of tension in Lebanon, 2013

<sup>11</sup>Final evaluation of the Joint Programme – Conflict Prevention and Peace Building in North Lebanon (MDG-F 1976), Carlos Carravilla and Nasser Yassin.

40. Joint programs, planning and implementation are subject to well-known challenges. The day-to-day issues prove to be the most time consuming, such as sharing information, decision-making processes, and clearance procedures prove to be some of the major stumbling blocks. Lessons from these processes appear to be: limiting the number of agencies to two or three, maximum four agencies for a big programme; deciding on roles and responsibilities in line with precise agency mandates early on in the process; and, a lead agency needs to be vested with some decision-making power (even if agencies are equal) in order for stumbling blocks to be overcome. The reality is, however, that joint programmes were not informed by the UNDAF, but arose ‘opportunistically’ as a result of emerging needs and/or new funding sources.

41. Regardless of the project, joint or individual, the quality of staff will make or break the quality of the project. Some concerns were raised concerning hiring processes and the accountability of staff: more effort should be made to ensure project staff – especially those on the “front line” interacting with communities are the most capable and motivated staff available. The ability to identify problems and engage in problem-solving processes should either be a required skill, or more skills training in problem solving should be made available.

#### **L. UNDAF M&E: How to measure impact?**

42. The Monitoring and Evaluation of the UNDAF proved to be a complex and somewhat contentious issue. The M&E framework set out in the original UNDAF details 150 indicators, a startling number which made the task of monitoring almost impossible. This number was revised to 98 indicators in the context of the mid-term review, but this remains an unrealistic task from a tracking perspective. From the summary of baselines presented to the consultants for the purpose of the review there appeared to be: no sufficient baselines available for outcome one on governance; no sufficient baselines available for outcome two on human rights; four out of seven baselines are available for outcome three on women (largely because the indicator is a case of yes or no/exists or does not exist); only one indicator exists for outcome four on socio-economic development since the other baselines pre-date the UNDAF; and one out of three sufficient baselines exist for outcome five on natural resources and environment.

43. The original M&E Group, constructed in the context of the original UNDAF architecture which met twice a year, was largely disbanded following a lack of interest and participation from the agencies. In 2012, the M&E group was revived by placing two senior representatives – a Deputy from UNICEF and UNDP – at its head. Following the work of a specialised consultant, an M&E framework was constructed and made available on-line, enabling each agency to access the indicators in real time. While agencies appear to prefer this system to meeting to discuss M&E, few staff take the time to actually fill out the matrix to such an extent that it could not provide a reliable form of identifying progress for the purposes of this assessment. It is hardly surprising that agencies do not feel compelled to complete the UNDAF M&E framework since it is a duplication of their work: the UNDAF after all is a collection of projects and not an identification of outcomes which help agencies to go beyond their own domain of work (or see how their own work contributes or not to broader goals). If the incentive for monitoring progress is not there because of the inherent logic of the process, the question has to be asked: who are we monitoring this for?

44. Process issues related to the M&E framework aside, there appear to be much deeper issues at hand related to both monitoring and evaluation. First, the indicators are constructed so as to record activities, but remain largely self-referential and detached from impact (an indicator which measures whether a project has been completed or not is not an indicator which measures impact). Second, there appears to be a disconnect between the projects and the outputs on the one hand, and the outputs and the outcomes on the other. It is *assumed* that if all the projects are completed then this will lead to the achievement of the output, and that if the outputs are achieved, then this will contribute to the achievement of the outcome. There is, however, no way to substantiate this theory due to the lack of baseline data, and the absence of indicators at the outcome level. It is therefore difficult to determine whether the activities in the context of the UNDAF are the right ones or not, and whether the sum of these activities is actually helping the UN to make a significant contribution to achieving the outcomes. There are no real indicators at the outcome level i.e. in order to measure the UN's contribution to macro factors such as governance, the environment, etc.: we are not therefore measuring "democratic governance", we are measuring whether a specific activity met its specific indicators, and hoping that this has an impact *overall* on the levels of democratic governance in the country. M&E therefore should use indicators, data, etc. as a basis for a much more important discussion about UN choices in Lebanon, the assumptions made, its positioning/leverage/impact, the theory of change which underpins its presence and its requests of funds from donors.

45. This leaves the UN System to work somewhat in a vacuum. And it appears this situation could have been avoided. It should be noted that statistics and indicators are a problem in many countries, and that this issue is not specific to the UN nor to Lebanon. However, in the context of the UNDAF preparation a significant push was made to give significant support to the Central Administration for Statistics (CAS). Following on from the advocacy work in favour of CAS, a Statistical Master Plan was developed in collaboration with the World Bank and, by all accounts, many of the agencies intended to support CAS with the implementation of this Master plan. The program was then dropped,.

## **M. Conclusions**

46. If we take a moment to assess the UNDAF according to the OECD/DAC evaluation criteria adapted to post conflict/fragile contexts, we are faced with the following conclusions:

- *Relevance.* How did the UNDAF respond to the needs of the broader context? The UNDAF responded broadly to the needs of Lebanon as articulated at the time of its writing in 2008 (alignment in theory, but assumptions were overly optimistic); these needs have since changed given rapidly evolving dynamics on the ground. But UNDAF did not help the UN (re)position itself, nor did it evolve with situation
- *Effectiveness.* Has the UNDAF reached its objectives? Since the objectives of this particular UNDAF were not clearly articulated, it is difficult to state whether it reached its objectives or not. However, if the UNDAF is meant to help the UN System be more than the sum of its parts, then the UNDAF was not particularly effective.
- *Impact.* What are the short- and long-term effects of the UNDAF? What is the evidence to attribute such effects to the UNDAF? Given the absence of baselines and reliable indicators, it is not possible to ascertain the extent of the impact of the

UNDAF. However, since the UNDAF was a collection of the activities of individual agencies, the overall impact these activities could be ascertained at the end of 2014 by assessing each of the agencies country programme evaluations. This impact, however, cannot be seriously attributed to the UNDAF since the activities would have been implemented in the absence of the UNDAF.

- *Sustainability.* Will the benefits of the UNDAF continue? How so? Very few benefits have been highlighted in the context of this UNDAF; however, one of the most positive aspects of the UNDAF i.e. the beginning of a fruitful collaboration between development, peace and security actors will be sustained thanks to the UNDAF process which, in the next cycle will be a fully integrated UNDAF/ISF process.
- *Efficiency.* How do the costs (to be defined) of the UNDAF relate to its benefits? The costs associated with process of articulating the UNDAF, coordinating actors around it during implementation, monitoring and evaluating it, etc. – with the exception of the limited benefits of information sharing and the aforementioned benefits related to the peace-development nexus –far outweighed any of benefits associated with this UNDAF.
- *Coherence (and co-ordination).* Was the UNDAF consistent with the larger context in which it was implemented? At the time that the UNDAF was written, it was largely consistent with the context. However, the context in Lebanon – economically, politically, socially on both national and regional levels - has changed dramatically since then. The UNDAF was a static rather than a “live” document, and as such, these extensive changes, such as the increasing impact of the Syrian crisis on development outcomes for example, are not reflected in the context of the UNDAF document or processes, even if agencies themselves are responding to the new needs on the ground.
- *Linkages.* Did the UNDAF link with activities and policies in other sectors? To the knowledge of the consultants, no significant effort was made to link with Bretton Woods Institutions, the private sector, academia or regional organisations in the context of the UNDAF.
- *Coverage.* Did the UNDAF cover a broad range of stakeholders, issues and regions? The UNDAF is criticised for being too “upstream” and overly “Beirut-focused”; however, the activities detailed within the context of the UNDAF appear to cover the regions and stakeholders appropriately.
- *Consistency with values.* Was the UNDAF consistent (in its design and implementation) with the norms and values of the international community, donors or implementing agencies? The UNDAF does include a number of recognised principles, including human rights, gender and Results-Based Management. However, one major criticism was not a nationally-owned or nationally-led process: it is a UN process and a UN document. With all the challenges of engaging with the government taken on board, in order for this process to be more in line with some of the essential principles, norms and values of the international community creative ways for engaging with the government structures irrespective of these changes will need to be found.

47. The current context in Lebanon presents significant challenges and opportunities for the elaboration of the next UNDAF. The Syrian crisis will require a combination of short- term

urgent mitigating measures with a medium, if not long-term, approach that focuses on the significant inter-linkages between political, development and humanitarian spheres. Every effort should be made to address the underlying structural issues that the crisis has revealed with a conflict-sensitive/conflict prevention lens: for example, an effective approach to the Syrian crisis will require close and careful coordination between peace and development actors, in consultation with humanitarian actors where required. Similarly, the potential to exploit oil and gas reserves currently being explored offshore presents a vast opportunity to transform Lebanon's economy, while simultaneously addressing some of the significant disparities that persist between Beirut and the regions. The extractive industries, however, pose well-known risks which must not be underestimated in Lebanon's fragile political context..

## N. Recommendations

### Timing

16. Given that Lebanon still has an interim Government, a decision needs to be made by the UNCT as soon as possible regarding the **timing** of the preparation process for the next UNDAF. As part of the upcoming strategic planning retreat, this should form a key element of discussions: how we elaborate the sequencing and the timeframe for engaging with the government should be one of the key agenda items at the next retreat.

### Articulating Focus and Priorities

17. The UNCT should engage in a discussion that seeks clear answers to the following questions: What do we want out of our UNDAF and would it be useful? There are different options: Should the UNDAF represent all the development activities of all of the UN agencies working on development, or only those that contribute to joint strategic priorities? Or should the UNDAF only present results requiring joint action between two or more entities? Or should it include only cross cutting issues? Or should it set rules for how to achieve priorities/the emphasis being more on the *how* than the *what*? Depending on the answer to these questions, some of the following recommendations may or may not be relevant.
18. While we all agree that the UNDAF should reflect priorities and while many colleagues have called for only two or three outcome areas, the experience with UNDAF processes throughout the world shows that an exclusive focus on agreeing on a small number of outcome areas usually results in generic outcome statements that are of little help in informing joint action. Therefore the next UNDAF should not be too concerned about the exact number of specific outcomes, but rather that the number emerges from a genuine analytical process where the UN seriously articulates an added-value in each area.
19. Strategic focus areas should be articulated in a **non-sectoral/cross-cutting way and reflect real choices on how the UN engages in Lebanon**. The focus areas should not fall within the traditional UN sectors (development, peace and security, humanitarian, law, etc.) Some examples include: increased decentralisation, private-public sector partnerships, etc. This would either allow for joint action in specific areas, or would inform *how* they go about implementing that mandate.

## Engaging National Counterparts

20. The UNCT should engage with the Government following the next elections to discuss the appropriate structure for a **light but pro-active UNDAF Advisory Committee**, able to withstand potential Ministerial changes. Positions on the Committee should be reserved for high-level national counterparts, the UNCT and civil society. The Committee should have at least two set meetings a year, and the possibility for events on the ground to trigger *ad hoc* meetings as and where necessary to revise the approach articulated in the UNDAF.
21. The UNCT should make a concerted effort to reach out to a **broad set of national actors** in the preparation of the next UNDAF. This includes NGOs, private sector actors, academia and regional organisations. Criteria for engagement in the context of the UNDAF should be formulated in advance of such an outreach process.

## Coordination

22. If the UNCT expects the RC to play a significant coordination/leadership role in the context of the UNDAF, agencies need to **confer on the RC a certain amount of authority**. Modalities for engagement and respective expectations of the RC and Agencies should be formulated, signed and used as a basis for moving forward in the context of the next UNDAF.
23. Working Groups should serve as **problem-solving entities**, and not just information sharing meetings. Each Working Group session must have clear deliverables. The expectations of the Working Groups should be formulated in clear terms of reference. The internal working groups should focus, among other things, not just on information-sharing but agreeing on the most effective way to engage with government (who, when, how), as a way to reduce transaction costs for government, but also to increase internal coherence and discipline.
24. **No agency should lead more than one Working Group.** Agency leads should represent the agency performing the coordination role, and the agency responsible for liaising with the RCO on development and any pressing issues. The lead agency need not be the agency doing the majority of the work, since all agencies are working towards common goals.
25. The UNCT should use its position as a reliable, impartial actor to improve **donor coordination**. UN facilitated forums for donor coordination - involving UN entities, government line ministries and civil society actors - would be very well received by the donor community. Donor coordination – as well as internal UN coordination – would be greatly facilitated by a clear and concise mapping of which actors are doing what and where.

## M&E Processes



26. The UNCT should make a significant commitment to **developing baselines** for each of the key strategic focus areas, *at the outcome level*. The need for reliable statistical data should, therefore, be made an essential component of each of the strategic outcome areas (rather than an area in of itself). The UNCT should improve the availability of reliable data through comprehensive support to the CAS.
27. The Monitoring and Evaluation process of the UNDAF should be made as simple – and transparent – as possible. Each outcome should have only two or three indicators, which should be constructed in a non self-referential way i.e. capable of measuring **impact**. Clarity should be sought on *what* the UNCT is monitoring and for what purpose it is monitoring results: national counterparts should be an inherent part of the M&E process in order to reinforce mutual accountability.

### Communication modalities

28. The UNDAF document should be as **short, concise and “high-level”** as possible, and flexible enough to be able to adapt to changing circumstances. A two- to four-page summary should be made available and widely distributed amongst national counterparts, donors, private sector actors, etc. All agencies, UN counterparts and NGOs should make the document available on their websites in English and in Arabic.
29. The UNCT should make a more concerted effort to communicate its activities to the people; it can use the UNDAF as a platform to communicate its development approach and achievements by **engaging more proactively with the media** (including new media).

### Peace, Security and Development Nexus.

30. We would strongly urge the UN in Lebanon to use this as an opportunity to explore how the UN creates links between peace and development issues, but more important than stating generic objectives in the key areas, the priority is how the UN is going to navigate these links and help others understand the dynamics between development, peace and security, and advance all three agendas in a productive way. One concern driven from similar exercises in other countries is to ensure that the peace and security dimension of UN planning does not absorb the UNDAF flaws, but only its advantages; i.e. that it be based on solid analytical foundations (which the UNDAF process usually offers), but focuses the UN's attention, resources, and communication around critical challenges that will make or break the country's future and where the UN collectively really has something meaningful to offer (which the UNDAF does not always articulate).

## Annexes

### Annex One: Consultation process

The following were consulted in the context of the UNDAF assessment:

Abdallah, Castro	President - Fédération Nationale des Syndicats des ouvriers et des employés au Liban
Abdul Kader, Racha	Information Management and Communications Assistant - UNRCO
Abi Habib, Nathalie	Assistant to UNIDO Representative - UNIDO
Adam,Albagir	Head of Civil Affairs - UNIFIL
Al Nashif, Nada	Regional Director - ILO Regional Office for Arab States
Assi, Raghd	Programme Manager, Socio- economic and local development - UNDP
Benevento, Guido	Italian Cooperation Attaché - Italian Cooperation
Boladian,Sossi	National Commission for Lebanese Women
Calestini, Luciano	Deputy Representative - UNICEF
Camargo, Felipe	Emergency Coordinator - UNHCR
Chahrour, Ibrahim	Head of Planning and Programming Division - Council for Development and Reconstruction
Charrafeddine Wafa	Director of Funding Division - Council for Development and Reconstruction
Costy, Alexander	Former Head of the RCO - n/a
Darwazeh, Nada	Human Rights Officer - OHCHR
Davies, Nicola	Political Officer - UNSCOL
Day, Adam	UNSCOL
Eagleton, Mary Louise	Chief, Social Policy, Planning and M&E - UNICEF
El Din, Zafeer	Human Rights Officer - OHCHR
El Sayegh, Ziad	National Policy Advisor/Minister of Labor Team Leader - Ministry of Labour/ILO
El-Abd,Azza	Mission Director - USAID
El-CharifKhalidoun	Head of Lebanese Palestinian Dialogue Committee - Lebanese Palestinian Dialogue Committee
Escalona-Paturel, Diego	First Secretary - Head of Cooperation Section - EU

Gedeon,Dany	DG Ministry of Industry (MOI) - Ministry of Industry
Gedeon, Rony	M&E Officer, Joint Programmes - UNRCO
Jondi, Shaza	Programme Analyst (UN Reform, Green Jobs) - ILO
Karaki, Amal	Head of Social and Economic Planning Unit - Council for Development and Reconstruction
Karam, Fady	Secretary General - National Commission for Lebanese Women
Karame, Joumana	Senior Programme Assistant - ILO Regional Office for Arab States
Kibranian, Gaelle	Programme Officer - UNDP, Governance
Klein, Jean-Francois	Chief, Regional Programming Services - ILO
Kouyoumdjian, Hagop	UNRCO Acting Head of Office - Coordination Officer - UNSCOL/ UNRCO
Kurdahi, Asma	Assistant Representative - UNFPA
Le Clerq, Chris	Advisor to the minister/Former Head of the RCO - Ministry of Finance (MoF)
MattaSaade, Solange	Assistant FAO representative (Programme) - FAO
Mohanna,Kamel	General Coordinator /President - Arab NGO's Network / Amel
Moufarrege, Joumana	Administrative Director - National Commission for Lebanese Women
Msefer Berrada, Rajae	Former Deputy Representative - UNICEF
Naaman,Ramzi	Director - National Poverty Targeting Program for Social Safety Nets - Prime Minister's Office
Nasr, Walid	Former Programme Coordinator at the UN Resident Coordinator's Office
Naya Jose, Antonio	Regional Manager - ICU (Istituto per la Cooperazione Universitaria)
Osseiran, Tarek	Officer In Charge - UN-Habitat
O'Toole, Denise	Education, Democracy (Rights and Governance Office) - USAID
Rady, Alissar	Senior National Programme Officer - WHO
Renda, Luca	Country Director - UNDP
Rouhana, Zoya	Director - KAFA (Enough) Violence and Exploitation
Sabbagh, Mirna	UN Coordination Specialist - UNRCO
Sabbagh, Renee	National Programme Officer - UNODC
Sabra, Nada	National Programme Coordinator - UNIDO

Salibi, Amal	Head of Economic Studies - Ministry of Agriculture
Sassine, Vivian	Head of Department of Chemical Safety, Service of Environmental Technology - Directorate General of Environment, Ministry of Environment
Seoud, Jihane	National Programme Officer, Environment - UNDP
Sharp, Shombi	Deputy Country Director - UNDP
Spiazzi, Agnese	Programme Analyst (UN system coordination) - UNRCO
Sugita, Seiko	Programme Specialist - UNESCO
Wannis, Hrayr	M&E Officer - UNICEF
Yaacoub, Najwa	Statistician - Acting Head of the Department of Coordination and National Accounts – Central Administration of Statistics

## Annex Two: Summary comparison of UNDAF Pre- and Post- Mid-Term Review

### UNDAF Results Matrix

	Before MTR	After MTR
<b>Outcome 1: Governance</b>		
No. of sub-outcomes	2	2
No. of outputs	14	10
No. of indicators	21	19
<b>Outcome 1: Human Rights</b>		
No. of sub-outcomes	3	3
No. of outputs	14	7
No. of indicators	32	15
<b>Outcome 1: Gender</b>		
No. of sub-outcomes	2	2
No. of outputs	5	4
No. of indicators	22	12
<b>Outcome 1: Socio Economic Dev</b>		
No. of sub-outcomes	4	4
No. of outputs	15	11
No. of indicators	49	28
<b>Outcome 1: Environment</b>		
No. of sub-outcomes	3	3
No. of outputs	15	8
No. of indicators	26	24
<b>Summary</b>		
No. of sub-outcomes	14	<b>14 (=)</b>
Total no. of outputs	63	<b>40 (&lt;)</b>
No. of indicators	150	<b>98 (&lt;)</b>

## UNDAF Budget


### BEFORE MTR

Areas	Requirement	2010 spent	2011 spent	Balance for 2012-14
Governance	65,555,000	14,098,494	11,599,993	39,856,513
Human Rights	8,610,000	916,000	1,886,000	5,808,000
Gender	7,070,000	658,612	880,000	5,531,388
Socio - economy	71,280,000	14,525,977	9,412,283	47,341,740
Environment	38,170,000	7,640,500	8,600,500	21,929,000
<b>Total</b>	<b>190,685,000</b>	<b>37,839,583</b>	<b>32,378,776</b>	<b>120,466,641</b> <i>(equal to 40,155,547 / Year)</i>

### AFTER MTR

Areas	Requirement	2011 spent USD	Balance for 2012 USD
Governance	65,555,000	11,344,993	14,234,292 (<)
Human Rights	8,610,000	1,285,400	2,141,865 (<)
Gender	7,070,000	880,000	1,035,000 (<)
Socio - economy	71,280,000	9,954,283	8,716,977 (<)
Environment	38,170,000	6,890,000	7,373,345 (<)
<b>Total</b>	<b>190,685,000</b>	<b>30,354,676</b>	<b>33,501,479 (&lt;)</b>

### Annex Three: UN Coordination Architecture for the UNDAF (with ISF components)



(Convener, frequency)

## Annex Four: Comparison between the UNDAF 2010-2014 and following the Mid-Term Review

### UNDAF 2010-2014

Agencies Outcomes	Outputs	Partners	UN agencies
Democratic Governance and Institutional Development			
National Priority or goals: National reconciliation achieved and adequate institutional capacity to implement reforms developed, including increased inclusive participation and accountability UNDAF Outcome 1: By 2014, good governance reforms and practices, with specific focus on national dialogue and inclusive participation, and government effectiveness and accountability, are institutionalized at different levels			
Agencies outcome 1.1			
National reconciliation and peace building promoted through increased inclusive participation	1.1.1		
	Mechanism in place and skills developed to support national dialogue process, policy development and communication at the Presidency of the Republic	Presidency of the Republic	UNDP, UNSCOL
		Directorate General	
		Studies Bureau	
		Press Office	
	1.1.2		
	Technical capacity of election management body increased for free and fair parliamentary and municipal elections	Ministry of Interior and Municipalities	UNDP, UNSCOL
	1.1.3		
	Disaster management system developed and capacity of staff of relevant public entities strengthened and increased	Presidency of the Council of Ministers (PMO)	UNDP
		High Relief Committee	
		Ministry of Interior and Municipalities	

### UNDAF MTR 2012

Agencies Outcomes	Outputs	Partners	UN agencies
Democratic Governance and Institutional Development			
National Priority or goals: National reconciliation achieved and adequate institutional capacity to implement reforms developed, including increased inclusive participation and accountability UNDAF Outcome 1: By 2014, good governance reforms and practices, with specific focus on national dialogue and inclusive participation, and government effectiveness and accountability, are institutionalized at different levels			
Agencies outcome 1.1			
National reconciliation and peace building promoted through increased inclusive participation	1.1.1		
	Culture of dialogue strengthened to contribute to national reconciliation and peace	Common Space Initiative	UNDP, UNESCO, ESCWA, UNICEF, UNSCOL
		Civil society organizations and relevant public institutions	
		Lebanese Council for Audio-Visual Media	
		Academia	
	1.1.2		
	Technical capacity of election management body increased for free and fair parliamentary and municipal elections	Ministry of Interior and municipalities, CSOs, Supervisory Commission on Electoral Campaigns, Constitutional Court, woman organizations and other relevant stakeholders	UNDP, UNSCOL
	1.1.3		
	Disaster management system developed and capacity of staff of relevant public entities strengthened and increased	Presidency of the Council of Ministers (PMO)	UNDP, UNICEF
		High Relief Committee	



		Civil Defense	
	1.1.4		
Capacity of civil society groups strengthened for fostering peace, reconciliation, and conflict prevention	Civil Society Organizations	UNDP, UN-ESCWA, UNESCO, UNFPA, UNICEF	
	Lebanese Council for Audio-Visual Media		
	1.1.5		
A platform for promoting national dialogue on citizen-state relationship is established and contributes efficiently to national reconciliation and peace	Academia	UNDP, UNESCO	
	Ministry of Culture		
	Council for Development and Reconstruction		
	1.1.6		
Lebanese-Palestinian Dialogue Committee and its staff have the managerial and technical skills to develop and implement a comprehensive policy on the Palestinian refugee issues	Lebanese-Palestinian Dialogue Committee	UNDP, UNRWA, UNOHCHR, UNSCOL	
	1.1.7		
Relevant ministries and youth organisations have improved capacity to design and implement a national youth policy	Ministry of Youth and Sports	UNESCO, UNDP, UNICEF, ILO, UNFPA	
	1.1.8		
National mine action management is institutionalized and technical expertise developed	Ministry of Defense	UNDP, UNMAG, NGOs, UNICEF	
	Lebanese Mine Action Centre		
Agencies outcome 1.2			
Effective and	1.2.1		

	1.1.4		
	Lebanese-Palestinian Dialogue Committee and its staff have the managerial and technical skills to develop and implement a comprehensive policy on the Palestinian refugee issues	Lebanese-Palestinian Dialogue Committee	UNDP, UNRWA, OHCHR, UNSCOL
	1.1.5		
	Relevant ministries and youth organizations have improved capacity to design and implement a national youth policy	Ministry of Youth and Sports	UNESCO, UNDP, UNICEF, ILO, UNFPA
	1.1.6		
National mine action management is institutionalized and technical expertise developed	Ministry of Defense	UNDP	
	Lebanese Mine Action Centre		
Agencies outcome 1.2			
Effective and	1.2.1		

accountable governance of state institutions and public administrations is improved	Legislators and staff have improved skills to draft and propose legislation - Improved parliamentary oversight mechanism is drafted	Parliament	UNDP, UNODC, UNSCOL, UNICEF, UNOHCHR
	1.2.2		
	Capacity of Ministry of Justice developed to promote access to and efficient administration of justice	Ministry of Justice	UNDP, UNODC
		Judicial Institute and courts	
	1.2.3		
	National anti-corruption strategy developed and drug and border controls enhanced	Ministry of Interior and Municipalities	UNDP, UNODC
		Office of the Minister for Administrative Reform (OMSAR)	
		Lebanese Transparency Association	
	1.2.4		
	Capacity of key public institutions enhanced for coordination, formulation and implementation of economic and financial policies and of reform programme	Presidency of Council of Ministers (PMO)	UNDP
		Ministry of Finance	
		Ministry of Economy and Trade	
Investment Authority of Lebanon			
1.2.5			
Strengthened management and technical capacity of central and local authorities for policy and	Office of the Minister for Administrative Reform (OMSAR)	UNDP, UNICEF, ILO, UNESCO, UN HABITAT	

accountable governance of state institutions and public administration is improved	Legislators and staff have improved skills to draft and propose legislation and Improved parliamentary oversight mechanism including anti-corruption measures	Parliament	UNDP, UNODC, UNSCOL, UNICEF, OHCHR
	1.2.2		
	Capacity of Ministry of Justice developed to promote access to and efficient administration of justice	Ministry of Justice	UNDP, UNODC, UNICEF
		Judicial Institute and courts	
	1.2.3		
	Capacity of key public institutions enhanced for coordination, formulation and implementation of economic and financial policies and of reform programme, including the statistical capacities	Presidency of Council of Ministers (PMO)	UNDP, UNICEF
		Ministry of Finance	
Ministry of Economy and Trade			
IDAL			
Ministry of Social Affairs			
	Central Bank		
	Central Administration of Statistics		
1.2.4			
Strengthened management and technical capacity in central and local authorities for policy and	Office of the Minister for Administrative Reform (OMSAR)	UNDP, UNICEF, ILO, UNESCO, UN-HABITAT, UNFPA	

programme development, including decentralization policy and planning	Council for Development and Reconstruction	
	Ministry of Labor	
	Ministry of Culture, Directorate General of Antiquities	
	Ministry of Public Works and Transport, Urban Planning Directorate	
	Ministry of Interior and Municipalities	
	1.2.6	
Capacity is developed for the implementation of the Statistical Master Plan, including the development of a functional Integrated information system (with due attention to gender and regional disaggregation for policy development, planning, and monitoring	Presidency of Council of Ministers (PMO)	UNDP, ILO, UNICEF, UNFPA
	Central Administration of Statistics	
	Ministry of Finance	
	Ministry of Economy and Trade	
	Ministry of Social Affairs	
	Central Bank	

programme development, including decentralization policy and planning	Ministry of Labor
	Ministry of Culture, Directorate General of Antiquities
	Ministry of Public Works and Transport, Urban Planning Directorate
	Ministry of Interior and Municipalities
	Ministry of Social Affairs

Human Rights			
National Priority or goals: To strengthen the rule of law and protection of human rights <b>UNDAF Outcome 2: By 2014, enhanced monitoring and accountability enable the effective implementation of human rights obligations and enjoyment of human rights</b>			
Agencies outcome 2.1			
National capacity enhanced for government effectively meeting human rights obligations	2.1.1		
	Gaps in Lebanese legislative implementation of human rights obligations are identified	Parliamentary Committee for Human Rights	UNOHCHR, UNDP, UNICEF, ILO, UNODC, UNSCOL, UNESCO, UNHCR
		Ministry of Justice	
	2.1.2		

Human Rights			
National Priority or goals: To strengthen the rule of law and protection of human rights <b>UNDAF Outcome 2: By 2014, enhanced monitoring and accountability are in place for the effective implementation of human rights obligations and enjoyment of human rights</b>			
Agencies outcome 2.1			
National capacity enhanced for government effectively meeting human rights obligations (OHCHR, UNDP, UNICEF, ILO)			
	2.1.1		

A national plan of action for human rights is formulated taking duly into account international human rights obligations at the national level	Parliamentary Committee for Human Rights	UNOHCHR,UNDP, UNSCOL, UNESCO
	Civil society	
2.1.3		
Timely and systematic reporting on human rights obligations under international human rights treaties and instruments is established and strengthened	Presidency of the Council of Ministers (PMO)	UNOHCHR, UNDP, UNFPA, UNHCR, ILO, UNRWA
	Ministry of Foreign Affairs	
2.1.4		
The “shadow” monitoring facility is effectively used by civil society organizations to contribute to the decision-making process	Civil society	UNOHCHR, UNDP, UNICEF, UNFPA
	Municipalities	
	NGOs	
2.1.5		
Child protection laws and practices a reviewed and improved	Ministry of Public Health	UNICEF
	Ministry of Education and Higher Education	
	Ministry of Social Affairs	
	Higher Council for Childhood	
2.1.6		
The Internal Security Forces Human Rights Department and the Ministry of Interior have the managerial and technical capability to apply comprehensive monitoring, reporting and accountability mechanisms for the protection of human rights refugee issues	Ministry of Interior	UNOHCHR, UNDP, UNODC, UNICEF, UNHCR, UNSCOL, UNRWA
	Ministry of Justice	
	Internal Security Forces	
2.1.7		
Human rights perspective is systematically mainstreamed in the national development frameworks	Presidency of the Council of Ministers	UNOHCHR, UNICEF, UNSCOL
	Line Ministries in cooperation with Beirut and Tripoli Bar Associations	
Agencies outcome 2.2		

	A national plan of action for human rights is formulated taking duly into account international human rights obligations at the national level	Parliamentary Committee for Human Rights	OHCHR, UNDP, UNSCOL, UNESCO, UNHCR, UNICEF
		Civil society	
	2.1.2		
	Capacity of Government and Civil Society to submit timely and systematic reports related to human rights obligations is strengthened	Presidency of the Council of Ministers (PMO)	OHCHR, UNDP, UNFPA, UNHCR, ILO, UNICEF, UNESCO, UNSCOL
		Ministry of Foreign Affairs	
		Ministry of Labor	
		HCC	
		Civil society	
		Municipalities	
Agencies outcome 2.2			

Increased level of enjoyment of human rights by vulnerable and marginalized groups	2.2.1		
	Alternative legal measures are activated and protection networks are established and tested in targeted areas for children in conflict with the law, children without parental support, victims of violence or abuse and child labourers	Ministry of Justice	UNICEF, UNOHCHR, UNODC, ILO, IOM
		Ministry of Interior	
		Internal Security Forces	
		Ministry of Social Affairs	
		Ministry of Labor	
	2.2.2		
	Protection mechanisms for women migrant domestic workers in Lebanon are established	Ministry of Labor	ILO, UNOHCHR
		Parliament	
	2.2.3		
Monitoring mechanisms are in place for legal protection of the rights of Palestinian refugees and for promotion of harmonious relations between Palestinian refugees and surrounding communities	Lebanese-Palestinian Dialogue Committee	UNRWA, UNOHCHR, UNDP, ILO, UNSCOL	
2.2.4			
Mechanisms for protection of human rights of non-Palestinian refugees are improved and enhanced	Parliamentary Committee for Human Rights	UNHCR, UNOHCHR, UNSCOL	
	Beirut and Tripoli Bar Association		
Agencies outcome 2.3			
Increased awareness and support for the protection of human rights in Lebanon	2.3.1		
	A concerted national human rights awareness raising/education campaign is developed and implemented	Presidency of the Council of Ministers (PMO	UNHCR, UNDP, UNICEF, ILO, IOM
		NGOs	
	2.3.2		

Increased level of enjoyment of Human Rights by vulnerable and marginalized groups (OHCHR, UNICEF, UNDP, ILO, UNIFEM, UNHCR)	2.2.1		
	Improved legal framework and protection mechanisms for vulnerable children.	Ministry of Justice	UNICEF, UNODC, OHCHR, , ILO, IOM, UNHCR
		Ministry of Interior	
		Internal Security Forces	
		Ministry of Social Affairs	
		Ministry of Labor	
	2.2.2		
	Protection mechanisms for women migrant domestic workers in Lebanon are established	Ministry of Labour	ILO, OHCHR
		Employers organizations, Workers organizations	
		Civil society organizations	
		Private recruitment agencies	
	2.2.3		
	The level of enjoyment of human rights by Palestinian refugees is improved.	Lebanese-Palestinian Dialogue Committee	UNRWA, UNICEF, OHCHR, UNDP, ILO, UNSCOL
		Committee of the Employment of Palestinians	
	2.2.4		
	The level of enjoyment of human rights by non-Palestinian refugees is improved.	Parliamentary Committee for Human Rights	UNHCR, UNICEF, OHCHR, UNSCOL, UNDP
Agencies outcome 2.3			
Support for the protection of human rights in Lebanon is increased (OHCHR)	2.3.1		
	Measures for human rights awareness raising/education are developed and implemented	Ministry of Education and Higher Education	OHCHR, UNDP, UNICEF, UNESCO, ILO, IOM
		Public and private schools	
		UNESCO NATCOM	

	Public service officials increasingly apply human rights perspective in the performance of their functions	Office of the Minister for Administrative Reform (OMSAR)	UNOHCHR, UNDP, UNICEF and all UN agencies
		Civil Service Board	
	2.3.3		
	Human rights education components are integrated in civic education curricula in public and private schools	Ministry of Education	UNESCO, UNICEF, UNOHCHR, UNDP
		Public and Private Schools	

		Ministry of Culture	
		AMNESTY	
		ASALA Publishing	

Gender			
National Priority or goals: To promote gender equality and women participation towards sustainable development			
UNDAF Outcome 3: By 2014, women are increasingly empowered to equally access the social, political, economic and legal spheres towards realization of their rights			
Agencies outcome 3.1			
Gender equality and human rights of women and adolescent girls integrated in pertinent national and sector laws, policies, strategies and plans.	3.1.1	National Commission for Lebanese Women (NCLW) Council of Ministries Line Ministries Council for Development and Reconstruction Media Institutions Human Rights Council Workers organizations Employers Organizations	
	Technical and institutional capacities of women machineries (NCLW) and gender focal points and civil society are enhanced		ILO, UNFPA, UNIDO, UNDP, and UNRWA
	3.1.2		
	Awareness, evidence-based advocacy and policy dialogue among decision makers and general public on gender equality and human rights of women and girls are increased		ILO, UNFPA, UNESCO, UNDP, UNRWA and UNICEF
Agencies outcome 3.2			
Prevention and	3.2.1	Civil society, including	

Gender			
National Priority or goals: To promote gender equality and women participation towards sustainable development			
UNDAF Outcome 3: By 2014, women are increasingly empowered to equally access the social, political, economic and legal spheres towards realization of their rights			
Agencies outcome 3.1			
Gender equality and human rights of women and adolescent girls integrated in pertinent national and sector laws, policies, strategies and plans.	3.1.1	National Commission for Lebanese Women (NCLW) Council of Ministries Line Ministries Council for Development and Reconstruction Media Institutions Human Rights Council Workers organizations Employers Organizations	
	Technical and institutional capacities of women machineries (National Commission for Lebanese Women and gender focal points) and civil society are enhanced		UNDP, UNFPA, UNIDO, ILO, OHCHR
	3.1.2		
	Awareness, evidence-based advocacy and policy dialogue among decision makers and general public on gender equality and human rights of women and girls are increased		UNDP, UNFPA, UNESCO, ILO, UNICEF, OHCHR
Agencies outcome 3.2			
Prevention and	3.2.1	Civil society, including	

protection from, and response to, gender-based violence (GBV) improved at the national level	Awareness, evidence-based advocacy and policy dialogue to improve institutional and legal frameworks and systems that guarantee prevention of, protection from, and responding to GBV – including in the workplace, are increased	NGOs, grassroots organizations and faith-based organizations Parliament/parliamentary committees Academic and research institutes Media institutions Line ministries Council for Development and Reconstruction Municipalities	UNFPA, ILO, UNESCO, UNDP, UNICEF, UNODC
	3.2.2		
	Access to health, legal and psychosocial support services by survivors of gender-based violence and human trafficking is increased		UNFPA, ILO, UNODC and UNICEF
	3.2.3		
	GBV national, multi-sector action plan is upgraded, validated and operationalized through development and human rights perspectives, including in emergency and post-emergency situations		UNFPA, ILO, UNICEF

Protection of, and response to GBV improved at the national level	Awareness, evidence-based advocacy and policy dialogue to improve institutional and legal frameworks and systems that guarantee prevention of, protection from, and responding to GBV are increased	NGOs, grassroots organizations and faith-based organizations Parliament/parliamentary committees Academic and research institutes Media institutions Line ministries Council for Development and Reconstruction Municipalities	UNFPA, ILO, UNESCO, UNICEF, UNDP, UNODC, OHCHR
	3.2.2		
	Access to health, legal and psychosocial support services by survivors of gender-based violence, victims of human trafficking, women prisoners is increased		UNFPA, ILO, UNODC, UNICEF, UNHCR, OHCHR

Socio-Economic Development/Regional Disparities			
National Priority or goals: Increased growth performance and improvement of social indicators, including employment creation and reduction of regional inequalities <b>UNDAF Outcome 4: By 2014, the socio-economic status of vulnerable groups and their access to sustainable livelihood opportunities and quality basic social services are improved within a coherent policy framework of reduction of regional disparities</b>			
Agencies outcome 4.1			
Increased access to and	4.1.1	Ministry of Public Health	

Socio-Economic Development/Regional Disparities			
National Priority or goals: Increased growth performance and improvement of social indicators, including employment creation and reduction of regional inequalities <b>UNDAF Outcome 4: By 2014, the socio-economic status of vulnerable groups and their access to sustainable livelihood opportunities and quality basic social services are improved within a coherent policy framework of reduction of regional disparities</b>			
Agencies outcome 4.1			
Increased access to,	4.1.1	Ministry of Public Health	

utilization of quality health services, particularly in underserved areas and with focus on vulnerable groups	Quality health services are strengthened, in particular in poor and underserved regions	Ministry of Social Affairs Ministry of Education and Higher Education Ministry of Agriculture Ministry of Interior and Municipalities National AIDS Programme Central Administration of Statistics Civil Society including NGOs	UNFPA, WHO, UNICEF, UNRWA
	4.1.2		
	Health emergency preparedness - with emphasis on poor/ underserved regions - is strengthened		UNFPA, WHO, UNICEF, FAO
	4.1.3		
	Improved and expanded information on prevention of illnesses and services offered as part of the primary health care package		UNFPA, UNICEF, WHO
	4.1.4		
	Improved knowledge, information and services to young people and adolescents on their sexual and reproductive health and reproductive rights (RH/RR, including HIV/AIDS, and their participation, with special focus on society/ community mobilization and support at national level		UNFPA, WHO, UNESCO, UNICEF, UNRWA, UNDP
	4.1.5		
	Strengthened capacity for establishment of a comprehensive national health referral system		UNFPA, WHO, UNICEF
	4.1.6		
Enhanced capacity of relevant government institutions to develop health policies	WHO, UNICEF, UNFPA		
Agencies outcome 4.2			

and utilization of, quality health services, particularly in underserved areas and with focus on vulnerable groups	Quality health services are strengthened, in particular in poor and underserved regions	Ministry of Social Affairs Ministry of Education and Higher Education Ministry of Interior and Municipalities National AIDS Programme Central Administration of Statistics Civil Society including NGOs Council of Reconstruction and Development	WHO, UNFPA, UNICEF, UNDP
	4.1.2		
	Health emergency preparedness - with emphasis on poor and underserved regions - is strengthened		WHO, UNFPA, UNICEF, FAO
	4.1.3		
	Improved knowledge, information and services to young people and adolescents on their sexual and reproductive health and reproductive rights (RH/RR), including HIV/AIDS, and their participation , with special focus on society/community mobilization and support at national level		UNFPA, WHO, UNESCO, UNICEF, UNDP
	4.1.4		
Strengthened national capacity in developing health strategies and programmes		WHO, UNFPA, UNICEF	
Agencies outcome 4.2			



Improved access to and quality of education in line with targeted national standards, particularly in underserved areas	4.2.1	Ministry of Education & Higher Education/GDVTE Ministry of Labor National NGOs Private sector representatives	
	Enhanced capacity of the Ministry of Education and Higher Education to plan, implement and monitor educational reform		UNESCO, UNICEF, UNFPA
	4.2.2		
	Strengthened local and regional capacities to provide quality education		UNICEF, WHO, UNESCO
Agencies outcome 4.3			
Strengthened policy and institutional framework for elaborating and implementing strategies focused on poverty reduction and equitable economic development	4.3.1	Office of the Presidency of Council of Ministers (PMO) Inter-Ministerial Committees for Social Affairs and Economic Affairs (MoSA, Labor, Industry, Economy and Trade, Agriculture, National Employment Authority) NGOs Private sector Central Administration of Statistics	
	Strengthened national capacity to formulate and implement the National Social Strategy, including labour issues		ILO, UNDP, ESCWA, UNFPA, WHO
	4.3.2		
	National capacity is enhanced for the elaboration and implementation of economic policies, structural reforms and adaptation of regulatory frameworks to enhance competitiveness of relevant productive sectors		UNIDO, FAO, UNDP, ILO, ESCWA
Agencies outcome 4.4			
Improved access to sustainable livelihood and employment opportunities in underserved areas, with specific focus on vulnerable groups	4.4.1	Ministry of Social Affairs Ministry of Labour Ministry of Industry Ministry of Education and Higher Education Ministry of Interior and Municipalities Ministry of Public Health	
	Local capacity and institutional mechanisms for undertaking economic and industrial development initiatives are strengthened		UNDP, UNIDO, ILO, FAO, UNFPA

Improved quality of and access to education in line with targeted national standards, particularly in underserved areas	4.2.1	Ministry of Education & Higher Education/GDVTE Ministry of Labor Ministry of Social Affairs National NGOs Private sector representatives Council of Reconstruction and Development	
	Enhanced capacity of the Ministry of Education and Higher Education to plan, implement and monitor educational reform		UNESCO, UNICEF
	4.2.2		
	Strengthened local and regional capacities to provide quality education		UNESCO, UNICEF
Agencies outcome 4.3			
Strengthened policy and institutional framework for elaborating and implementing strategies focused on poverty reduction and equitable economic development	4.3.1	Office of the Presidency of Council of Ministers (PMO) Inter-Ministerial Committees for Social Affairs and Economic Affairs (MoSA, Labor, Industry, Economy and Trade, Agriculture, National Employment Authority) NGOs Private sector Central Administration of Statistics Council for Development and Reconstruction	
	Strengthened national capacity to formulate and implement the National Social Strategy, including labour issues		UNDP, ILO, UNDP, ESCWA, UNFPA, WHO, UNICEF
	4.3.2		
	National capacity is enhanced for the elaboration and implementation of economic policies, structural reforms and adaptation of regulatory frameworks to enhance competitiveness of relevant productive sectors		FAO, UNIDO, UNDP, ILO, ESCWA
Agencies outcome 4.4			
Improved access to sustainable livelihood and employment opportunities in underserved areas, with a specific focus on vulnerable groups.			

	4.4.2			4.4.1		
	Capacity of institutions and community groups is strengthened for effective formulation and implementation of regional and local development plans		UNDP, ILO, FAO, UN-HABITAT, UNFPA, UNIDO, UNICEF	Capacity of institutions and community groups is strengthened for effective formulation and implementation of regional and local development plans	Ministry of Social Affairs Ministry of Labour Ministry of Industry Ministry of Economy and Trade Ministry of Agriculture Ministry of Education and Higher Education Ministry of Interior and Municipalities Ministry of Public Health Council for Development and Reconstruction Private sector, including Chamber of Commerce, Lebanese Industrialists' Association Civil Society Municipalities	UNDP, ILO, FAO, UN-HABITAT, UNFPA, UNIDO, UNICEF
	4.4.3			4.4.2		
	Labour market intermediation services and vocational training institutions are strengthened to provide more employment oriented training and services		ILO, UNIDO, ESCWA, FAO, UNESCO, UNDP, WHO, IOM	Labour market intermediation services, targeting the Lebanese population and Palestinian refugees, established and strengthened and referrals to vocational training services, including apprenticeship schemes, enhanced.		ILO, UNIDO, ESCWA, UNRWA, UNICEF, UNESCO, IOM
	4.4.4			4.4.3		
	Availability of and access to financial and nonfinancial support services for the development of micro, small and medium enterprises, cooperatives and other underserved population improved		ILO, UNIDO, UNDP, FAO, UNRWA	Availability of and access to financial and non-financial support services for the development of micro, small and medium enterprises, and cooperatives is improved, and institutional mechanisms for economic development are strengthened.		UNDP, ILO, UNIDO, FAO, UNRWA, UNESCO, UNICEF
	4.4.5					
	Capacity for production and marketing of quality, safe, competitive industrial, agricultural and handicraft products is developed		UNDP, FAO, IOM, UNESCO, UNIDO, ILO			

Environmental Sustainability

Environmental Sustainability

National Priority or goals: To achieve environmental sustainability

**UNDAF Outcome 5: By 2014, improved accessibility to and management of natural resources and enhanced response to national and global environmental challenges**

Agencies outcome 5.1

Environmental considerations are mainstreamed in sector and local-level strategies and plans	5.1.1		
	Sector environmental action plans developed in concerned key ministries and public institutions	Ministry of Environment	UNDP, UNICEF
		Ministry of Agriculture (Lebanese Agricultural Research Institute)	
		Ministry of Industry (Industrial Research Institute)	
		Ministry of Energy and Water	
	5.1.2		
	Capacity of government to meet its obligations under international environmental conventions and protocols timely and adequately is strengthened	Ministry of Environment	UNDP, UNESCO
		Ministry of Agriculture	
	5.1.3		
	National forest strategy is developed and integrated forest management is initiated	Ministry of Agriculture	FAO, UNDP
5.1.4			
Capacity of Lebanese industries to adopt and implement environmental management systems and standards is enhanced	Ministry of Environment	UNIDO	
	Ministry of Industry		
5.1.5			
The capacity of Lebanese industries to develop sustainable hazardous waste management strategies is strengthened	Ministry of Environment	UNIDO	
	Ministry of Industry		

National Priority or goals: To achieve environmental sustainability

**UNDAF Outcome 5: By 2014, improved accessibility to and management of natural resources and enhanced response to national and global environmental challenges**

Agencies outcome 5.1

Environmental considerations are mainstreamed in sector and local-level strategies and plans	5.1.1		
	Sector environmental action plans developed in relevant key ministries and public institutions	Ministry of Environment	UNDP, UNESCO, FAO, UNEP
		Ministry of Agriculture (Lebanese Agricultural Research Institute)	
		Ministry of Industry (Industrial Research Institute)	
		Ministry of Energy and Water	
		Ministry of Education and Higher Education	
	5.1.2		
	Capacity of government to meet its obligations under international environmental conventions and protocols timely and adequately strengthened	Ministry of Environment	UNDP, UNIDO
		Ministry of Agriculture	
		Chamber of Commerce	
	5.1.3		
	Capacity of Lebanese Industries to develop and adopt Environmentally Sound Technologies and international environmental standards is strengthened	Ministry of Environment	UNIDO
		Ministry of Industry	

	5.1.6		
	National capacity to implement environmental education curricula is strengthened	Ministry of Environment	UNESCO, FAO
		Ministry of Agriculture	
		Ministry of Education and Higher Education	
	5.1.7		
Environmental quality monitoring programme developed and implemented	Ministry of Environment	UNEP	
	National Council for Scientific Research (CNRS) and Universities		
Agencies outcome 5.2			
Increased effective national response to climate change reflected in national programmes and external assistance programmes	5.2.1		
	National sustainable energy strategy to mitigate climate change is developed and adopted	Ministry of Energy and Water	UNDP
		Ministry of Finance	
	5.2.2		
	Vulnerability to climate change of key economic sectors is assessed	Ministry of Environment	UNDP, FAO
	5.2.3		
	Line ministries are sensitized to adaptation to climate change	Ministry of Environment	UNDP, UNIDO, FAO
	5.2.4		
	Awareness about the effects of climate change is increased among general public	Ministry of Environment	WHO, FAO, UNDP, UNESCO, UNIDO, UNEP and UNICEF
Ministry of Public Health			
Ministry of Education and Higher Education			
Agencies outcome 5.3			
Improved integrated water resources management, including sanitation, reflected in national decision-making	5.3.1		
	Capacity of the Ministry of Energy and Water and the regional water establishments is enhanced to supply improved drinking water and sanitation services, particularly to rural areas	Ministry of Energy and Water	UNICEF
		Regional water establishments	

	5.1.4		
	Environmental quality monitoring programme developed and implemented	Ministry of Environment Hellenic Aid (funding arm of Government of Greece, donor)	UNEP, UNDP
Agencies outcome 5.2			
Increased effective response to climate change reflected in national programmes and external assistance programmes	5.2.1		
	National sustainable energy strategy to mitigate climate change is developed and adopted	Ministry of Energy and Water	UNDP
		Ministry of Finance	
	5.2.2		
	Vulnerability to climate change assessed and national institutions sensitised to the need to adapt to climate change	Ministry of Environment	UNDP, FAO, WHO, UNESCO, UNIDO, UNEP
		Ministry of Public Health	
		Ministry of Education and Higher Education	
Agencies outcome 5.3			
Improved integrated water resources management, including sanitation, reflected in national decision-making			

5.3.2		
Knowledge of the national authorities and awareness of the general public about water quality and hygiene are increased	Ministry of Environment	WHO, UNICEF
	Ministry of Public Health	
	Ministry of Education and Higher Education	
5.3.3		
Water quality strategy, including waste water reuse, for agriculture is developed	Ministry of Agriculture	FAO
5.3.4		
Enhanced ecosystem functioning of Litani River watershed	Ministry of Environment	UNEP

5.3.1		
Knowledge of national authorities and awareness of general public about water quality and hygiene are increased	Ministry of Public Health	WHO
5.3.2		
Water quality strategy, including waste water re-use, for agriculture is developed	Ministry of Agriculture	FAO

## Annex Five: Comparison between UNDAF 2002-2006 and UNDAF 2010-2014

### UNDAF 2002-2006

Agencies Outcomes	Outputs/Indicators	Partners	UN agencies
<b>Enhanced National Decision-Making Capacity</b>			
To promote national commitment to a strategic development vision and its implementation	Platform/forum established	Civil society	
	Strategic vision for national development	Council of Ministers	
	Thematic/sector strategies	Line Ministries	

To strengthen the rule of law for increased transparency and accountability	Laws modernized/passed in areas that respond to public demand	Parliament	
	Reduced case delay in courts of law	Ministry of Justice, Courts of Justice	
	Legal recourse mechanisms	Council of Ministers	
	Compliance of prison conditions with international standards regarding juveniles deprived of liberty	National authorities in charge of juvenile justice issues	
	Anti-corruption strategy and action plan formulated and adopted	Office of the Minister of State for Administrative Reform (OMSAR)	
		Council of Ministers	
		Office of the Minister of State for Administrative Reform (OMSAR)	

### UNDAF 2010-2014

Agencies Outcomes	Outputs	Partners	UN agencies

To promote government effectiveness: Civil service reform: policy making and management capacity	An institutional development strategy for the public administration adopted and implemented	Office of the Minister of State for Administrative Reform (OMSAR)	
	Increased number of Women holding senior public office		
	Number of senior public sector employees with enhanced critical skills in key areas	Council of Ministers	
	Decreased average time required to complete transactions/formalities in a public office		
	Increased number of public entities having citizen information facilities, complaints desk, one-stop facility	Civil Service Board	
	E-government applications. Progress towards fullfledged network		

Agencies Outcome 1.2	1.2.5		
Effective and accountable governance of state institutions and public administrations is improved	Strengthened management and technical capacity of central and local authorities for policy and programme development, including decentralization policy and planning	Office of the Minister for Administrative Reform (OMSAR)	UNDP, UNICEF, UNESCO, UN H
		Council for Development and Reconstruction	
		Ministry of Labor	
		Ministry of Culture, Directorate General of Antiquities	
		Ministry of Public Works and Transport, Urban Planning Directorate	
		Ministry of Interior and Municipalities	

To promote government effectiveness: Readiness for globalization	Strategic privatization and competitiveness initiatives adopted (legal, regulatory, customer protection, etc.)	Ministry of Finance	
	Adoption of norms and standards	Council of Ministers	
	Improved social safety net: increased number of persons covered by social insurance	LIBNOR	
	Digital provide: ICT access and cost, personal and communal (PCs, Internet host, etc.)	Ministry of Social Affairs	
	Provisioning and management of global public goods:environment	Office of the Minister of State for Administrative Reform (OMSAR)	
		Ministry of Environment	

		CDR	
--	--	-----	--

To promote government effectiveness: Aid coordination and management support for increased Aid effectiveness	Comprehensive monitoring and tracking system of resources for development (elaborated, adopted and implemented)	CDR	UNDP
	Delivery ratio of aid managed by each government, NGOs, international organizations	Line Ministries	
	Proportion of development assistance directly allocated to civil society		

To expand access to and encourage use of gender-sensitive socioeconomic data and information for policy making and programme management in support of human development	Multipurpose household survey (completed)	Central Administration of Statistics	UNRCO
	National gender-sensitive statistical framework (institutionalized, developed and updated)		
	Approved, compiled and updated set of indicators (disaggregated by sex) that meet international criteria and standards measured by CAS and other public entities		
	Development database (available, expanded and updated annually)		
	Country global development gateway (established).		

Agencies outcome 1.2	1.2.6		
Effective and accountable governance of state institutions and public administrations is improved	Capacity is developed for the implementation of the Statistical Master Plan, including the development of a functional Integrated information system (with due attention to gender and regional disaggregation for policy development, planning, and monitoring	Presidency of Council of Ministers (PMO)	UNDP, ILO, UN UNFPA
		Central Administration of Statistics	
		Ministry of Finance	
		Ministry of Economy and Trade	
		Ministry of Social Affairs	
		Central Bank	

Rights-based approach to development promoted and implemented



To assess and monitor the discrepancies between the national law and international conventions / agreements at UN global conferences	Number of global conventions not ratified / and global conventions with reservations out of total number of ratified conventions	Ministry of Foreign Affairs	
	Development and adoption of a list of indicators (including targets) for each of the selected conventions and conferences		
	Regular reporting on implementation, enforcement and remedial action of international conventions and global conferences	Concerned line ministries	
	National trained to do reportings		

To clarify the core content of the basic human rights packages - education, health including reproductive health, employment and environment	Core content of the selected main rights clarified: health; education; employment; and, environment		
--	---	--	--

To improve efficiency in resource allocation and administration for human development	Government spending on the social sectors, total and basic, and on basic infrastructure in poor districts (percent)	Ministry of Finance	
---	---	---------------------	--

Agencies outcome 2.1	2.1.1		
National capacity enhanced for government effectively meeting human rights obligations	Gaps in Lebanese legislative implementation of human rights obligations are identified	Parliamentary Committee for Human Rights	UNOHCHR, UNICEF, ILO, UNSCOL, UNHCR
		Ministry of Justice	
	2.1.2		
	A national plan of action for human rights is formulated taking duly into account international human rights obligations at the national level	Parliamentary Committee for Human Rights	UNOHCHR, UNSCOL, UNES
		Civil society	
	2.1.3		
	Timely and systematic reporting on human rights obligations under international human rights treaties and instruments is established and strengthened	Presidency of the Council of Ministers (PMO)	UNOHCHR, UNFPA, UNHCR, UNRWA
Ministry of Foreign Affairs			

Agencies outcome 4.1
----------------------

	External assistance to public budget allocated to population, health, education and environment, total and basic (percent)	CDR		Increased access to and utilization of quality health services, particularly in underserved areas and with focus on vulnerable groups		Ministry of Public Health Ministry of Social Affairs Ministry of Education and Higher Education Ministry of Agriculture Ministry of Interior and Municipalities National AIDS Programme Central Administration of Statistics Civil Society including NGOs	UNFPA, WHO, UNRWA, FAO, UNDP
	Agencies outcome 4.2						
	Improved access to and quality of education in line with targeted national standards, particularly in underserved areas				Ministry of Education & Higher Education/GDVTE Ministry of Labor National NGOs Private sector representatives	UNESCO, UNICEF, UNFPA, WHO	
	Agencies outcome 4.3						
	Criteria for Government/NGO collaboration in social areas developed and implemented				Strengthened policy and institutional framework for elaborating and implementing strategies focused on poverty reduction and equitable economic development		Office of the Presidency of Council of Ministers (PMO) Inter-Ministerial Committees for Social Affairs and Economic Affairs (MoSA, Labor, Industry, Economy and Trade, Agriculture, National Employment Authority) NGOs Private sector Central Administration of Statistics

To improve democratic and participatory processes at all stages and all levels	Laws, procedures and/or practices that encourage decentralization of administrative and fiscal functions, namely revision of the law on municipalities	Parliament	
	Share of public revenues/spending handled at decentralized level (local government) and/or civil servants working in regional offices out of total number of civil servants (percent)	Ministry of Interior and Municipalities	
	Age for voting eligibility reduced to preferably 18 years.	Ministry of Finance	
	Participation of civil society in democratic processes through coalitions and networks for specific rights issues (number of achievements)		
	National youth policy	Civil society and human rights organizations	
	Decree for NGO registration modernized		

To foster equity and equality through legislative change, policy initiatives and action plans for disparity reduction	Existence of affirmative action policy statements on the right to health care; the right to basic education; the right to employment; and, the right to safe, clean environment	Concerned line ministries	
---	---	---------------------------	--

Agencies Outcome 1.2	1.2.5		
Effective and accountable governance of state institutions and public administrations is improved	Strengthened management and technical capacity of central and local authorities for policy and programme development, including decentralization policy and planning	Office of the Minister for Administrative Reform (OMSAR)	UNDP, UNICEF, UNESCO, UN H
		Council for Development and Reconstruction	
		Ministry of Labor	
		Ministry of Culture, Directorate General of Antiquities	
		Ministry of Public Works and Transport, Urban Planning Directorate	
		Ministry of Interior and Municipalities	
Agencies Outcome 1.1	1.1.7		
National reconciliation and peace building promoted through increased inclusive participation	Relevant ministries and youth organisations have improved capacity to design and implement a national youth policy	Ministry of Youth and Sports	UNESCO, UNDP, UNICEF, ILO, U

Agencies outcome 4.1			
----------------------	--	--	--

	Advocacy strategy on human rights and equity, specifically the rights to health care, basic education, and safe and clean environment	Parliament	
	Legislative action for persons with special needs and for very vulnerable groups	Ministry of Environment	
	Environmental action on implications of global issues at national level (number of programmes, disbursements)	CDR	
	Policy changes introduced to reduce regional disparities and gender disparities		
	National strategy for poverty alleviation		
	National approach and comprehensive national plan for underserved regions (disbursements by programme)		

Increased access to and utilization of quality health services, particularly in underserved areas and with focus on vulnerable groups		Ministry of Public Health Ministry of Social Affairs Ministry of Education and Higher Education Ministry of Agriculture Ministry of Interior and Municipalities National AIDS Programme Central Administration of Statistics Civil Society including NGOs	UNFPA, WHO, UNRWA, FAO, UNDP
Agencies outcome 4.2			
Improved access to and quality of education in line with targeted national standards, particularly in underserved areas		Ministry of Education & Higher Education/GDVTE Ministry of Labor National NGOs Private sector representatives	UNESCO, UNICEF, UNFPA, WHO
Agencies outcome 4.3			
Strengthened policy and institutional framework for elaborating and implementing strategies focused on poverty reduction and equitable economic development		Office of the Presidency of Council of Ministers (PMO) Inter-Ministerial Committees for Social Affairs and Economic Affairs (MoSA, Labor, Industry, Economy and Trade, Agriculture, National Employment Authority) NGOs Private sector Central Administration of Statistics	ILO, UNDP, ESCAP, UNFPA, WHO, FAO
Agencies outcome 5.2			
Increased effective national response to climate change reflected in national		Ministry of Energy and Water	WHO, FAO, UNICEF, UNESCO, UNIDEP and UNICEF
		Ministry of Finance	

				programmes and external assistance programmes		Ministry of Environment				
						Ministry of Public Health				
						Ministry of Education and Higher Education				
				Agencies outcome 5.3						
				Improved integrated water resources management, including sanitation, reflected in national decision-making		Ministry of Energy and Water	WHO, UNICEF, UNEP			
						Regional water establishments				
						Ministry of Environment				
						Ministry of Public Health				
						Ministry of Education and Higher Education				
						Ministry of Agriculture				