



Contents

| | |
|---|----|
| Glossary | 2 |
| I. Introduction | 3 |
| II. Methodology | 5 |
| III. Context and Trends | 6 |
| Geography | 6 |
| Population | 7 |
| Political Structure | 7 |
| Economy | 8 |
| Demographics | 10 |
| IV. Cross-Cutting Themes | 12 |
| People, Planet, Prosperity, Peace and Partnerships | 20 |
| V. People | 20 |
| Poverty (SDG 1) | 20 |
| Inequalities (SDG 10) | 21 |
| Nutrition and Food Security (SDG 2) | 23 |
| Health (SDG 3) | 24 |
| Education (SDG 4) | 27 |
| Gender Equality (SDG 5) | 30 |
| Water, Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH) (SDG 6) | 33 |
| Decent Work (SDG 8) | 35 |
| VI. Planet | 37 |
| Energy (SDG 7) | 38 |
| Sustainable Consumption and Production Patterns (SDG 12) | 39 |
| Terrestrial Ecosystems (SDG 15) | 41 |
| Climate Change (SDG 13) | 43 |
| Naturally Induced Disasters | 45 |
| VII. Prosperity | 46 |
| Sustained, Inclusive Growth and Employment (SDG 8) | 46 |
| Infrastructure, Industrialisation and Innovation (SDG 9) | 50 |
| Urbanisation (SDG 11) | 51 |
| VIII. Peaceful and Resilient Society | 52 |
| Social Trends, Movements and Tolerance (SDG 16) | 52 |
| Peaceful and Inclusive Societies for Sustainable Development, Access to Justice, and Effective, Accountable and Inclusive Institutions (SDG 16) | 53 |
| Human Induced Disasters | 57 |
| IX. Partnerships and National Capacity | 60 |
| Government Income and Expenditures (SDG 17) | 60 |
| Government and Other Data (SDG 17) | 61 |
| Global Partnerships (SDG 17) | 62 |
| Annex I: Focus Group Discussions CCA 2016 Consolidated Report | 67 |
| Annex 2: Analysis of UN Pakistan Futurescaper Surveys | 71 |
| Annex 3: Common Country Assessment Meta-Analysis (separate document) | |



Glossary

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| CCA | Common Country Assessment |
| ADB | Asian Development Bank |
| CCA | Common Country Assessment |
| CEDAW | Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women |
| CRC | Convention on the Rights of the Child |
| DRM/DRR | Disaster Risk Management/Disaster Risk Reduction |
| DRtD | Declaration on the Right to Development |
| FAO | Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations |
| FATA | Federally Administered Tribal Areas |
| GDP | Gross Domestic Product |
| HIV/AIDS | Human Immunodeficiency Virus/Acquired Immune-Deficiency Syndrome |
| ICCPR | International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights |
| ICESCR | International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights |
| ICT | Islamabad Capital Territory |
| ILO | International Labour Organization |
| IMF | International Monetary Fund |
| IOM | International Organization for Migration |
| KP | Khyber Pakhtunkhwa |
| MDGs | Millennium Development Goals |
| MDTF | Multi-Donor Trust Fund |
| MMR | Maternal Mortality Ratio |
| NOC | No Objection Certificate |
| ODA | Official Development Assistance |
| OHCHR | Office of the High Commission for Human Rights |
| OPII/OPIII | United Nations One Programme II/One Programme III |
| PAK | Pakistan Administered Kashmir |
| PDHS | Pakistan Demographic and Health Survey |
| PML-N | Pakistan Muslim League - Nawaz |
| PPP | Pakistan People's Party |
| PSLM | Pakistan Social and Living Standards Measurement |
| SDGs | Sustainable Development Goals |
| SME | Small and Medium Enterprise |
| UAE | United Arab Emirates |
| UDHR | Universal Declaration on Human Rights |
| UNPPF | United Nations Pakistan Partnership Framework |
| UNCT | United Nations Country Team |
| UNDG | United Nations Development Group |
| UNDP | United Nations Development Programme |
| UNESCO | United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization |
| UNFPA | United Nations Population Fund |
| UNICEF | United Nations Children's Fund |
| UNHABITAT | United Nations Human Settlements Programme |
| UNHCR | United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees |
| WASH | Water, Sanitation and Hygiene |
| WFP | United Nations World Food Programme |

I. Introduction

Overview

The dawn of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) offers an auspicious moment to take stock of the development trends at play in Pakistan. This Common Country Assessment (**2016 CCA**) complements the more detailed *Meta-Analysis* of research on the country's current development situation. It offers an analytical synopsis of the information provided by the Meta-Analysis, through the lens of the SDGs. It is, therefore, a shorter, more succinct assessment which explores the development situation, root causes and trends evident in Pakistan. Specifically, it focuses on three aspects:

- a. A review of Pakistan's status with respect to the UN Secretary-General's grouping of the SDGs (People, Planet, Prosperity, Peace and Partnerships);
- b. The human rights norms, standards and instruments related to the SDGs; and
- c. A review of Pakistan's existing and required capacity to achieve the SDGs by 2030.

For this reason, the present document is entitled "**Pakistan: An SDG Baseline Analysis**".

The overarching **objective** of the **2016 CCA** is to provide an analytical basis for the forthcoming definition of UN priorities and outcome areas for the 2018-2022 *UN Pakistan Partnership Framework* (UNPPF). The overall Common Country Assessment (CCA) process – outlined at length in the "Methodology" section below – is intended to inform the UN's discussions with the Government of Pakistan, identifying key outcomes to which UN agencies can contribute in support of Pakistan's SDG commitments.

Broader Context

To effectively pursue the Sustainable Development Goals during the UN planning period of 2018-2022 – and to ultimately achieve the SDGs in Pakistan by 2030 – several factors, risks and opportunities must be taken into account throughout the planning process. As Pakistan enters the SDG era, it faces a two-fold challenge. On the one hand, it must address its insufficient progress on the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). Not only must Pakistan aspire to achieve the "unfinished business" of the MDGs, but, on the other hand, it must simultaneously strive to meet the even more challenging objectives and targets of the SDGs.

Alongside specific challenges in several sectors, the country is beset by significant overall gaps in financial resources, technical capacity, human capital, socio-economic structures, and national – and disaggregated – data. Its predicament is made even more challenging by the fact that the current situation is not static; Pakistan faces a host of rapidly evolving problems linked to rapid population growth, climate change, declining agricultural output and urbanisation. The complexities of this context are compounded by the possibility of unpredictable shocks, including natural disasters, external economic shocks and the effects of geopolitical tensions.

All of these factors will further complicate the achievement of the SDGs unless planning, resources and capacities are strengthened – at all levels, and in all sectors. In tandem, it will be imperative to ensure an enabling environment for those who are systemically excluded, thereby unleashing the untapped potential of women, youth and other vulnerable groups.

Overall Approach

Each step in the CCA process has been guided by a Human Rights-Based Approach (HRBA). While the **Meta-Analysis** looks at rights holders and duty bearers in some detail, the **2016 CCA** explicitly takes into account key programming principles: human rights; gender equality and empowerment; sustainability and resilience; leaving no one behind; and accountability.

This document also looks at linkages between the SDGs in Pakistan and international human rights norms, standards and obligations. In line with the UNDG's **Interim United Nations Development Assistance Framework Guidance**, based on the UN Secretary-General's 2016 Report, whenever the CCA makes reference to groups affected by inequalities and discrimination, they are taken to include:

“Children and adolescents, human rights defenders, indigenous peoples, internally displaced persons, migrants, LGBT, minorities, peasants, persons deprived of liberty, persons of African descent, persons with albinism, persons with disabilities, persons with HIV/AIDS, stateless persons, the poor, union leaders, victims of trafficking, women, youth, and other groups of persons identified by UN human rights norms and principles.”

Similarly, when the **2016 CCA** refers to disaggregated data, this denotes: *“data disaggregation that goes beyond gender, geography and age, to include all grounds of discrimination prohibited under international law.”*

The present document further takes note of Pakistan's commitments to international human rights instruments and standards. The standards and norms related to each SDG are discussed in the “Cross-Cutting Themes” section, which assesses their current status in Pakistan. This should be seen as a preliminary overview, to be further developed and expanded via the UN's inputs to the *2017 Universal Periodic Review of Pakistan* by the UN Human Rights Council.

2016 CCA Structure

Following a brief explanation of the methodology employed by the Common Country Assessment process, this **2016 CCA** outlines Pakistan's development situation and national context. The document then proceeds to review the country's status with respect to each of the five groups of SDGs. Within each group, it summarises the analysis, root causes, trends and risks relevant to each SDG.

The assessment concludes by sketching out some of the UN's comparative advantages, both from the perspective of UN agencies themselves, as well as from the viewpoint of the Government of Pakistan and other stakeholders at the national and sub-national levels.



II. Methodology

1. The **2016 CCA** process began by updating the data and analysis provided in the comprehensive **2011 Common Country Assessment**. The 12 week-long desk review involved returning to the sources used in 2011, obtaining newer data from the same sources, or from alternative sources wherever necessary. The analysis for 2016 was updated in accordance with this new data. Thereafter, Working Groups for each of the 2012-2017 UNDAF Strategic Priority Areas reviewed the draft CCA, providing additional data sources and analytical input.

This process yielded the detailed **2016 CCA Meta-Analysis**, the source of the information and analysis presented in this summary. The 2016 CCA process also entailed online surveys and focus group discussions with key stakeholders. Part of the findings from these participatory activities are included in the present document. The rest will feed into the preparation of the *2018-2022 UN Pakistan Partnership Framework* (UNPPF), also referred to as the *One UN Programme III* (OPIII).

2. The **2016 CCA** should be read in conjunction with the **2016 Meta-Analysis**, as it offers an analytical review of the data presented by this Meta-Analysis through the lens of the SDGs. This document is further complemented by specially commissioned papers on a host of issues – ranging from Pakistan's political context to an anthropological analysis of the country's socio-political conditions. In addition, the CCA is supplemented by online surveys and focus group discussions. These have ascertained stakeholders' views of pressing issues facing Pakistan, how these are related to the SDGs, and what the UN's comparative advantages are in terms of addressing these concerns.

3. The **2016 CCA's** preparation also coincided with a number of national and provincial consultations on specific SDGs. Carried out with the support and participation of various UN agencies, these discussions produced further relevant analyses of Pakistan's current development situation, root causes and trends. A number of these insights have been incorporated into the present document.

4. Overall, the **2016 CCA** is a shorter, more succinct assessment which does not contain all of the data and analysis provided by these other sources (included as Annexes to this document). Instead, the 2016 CCA focuses on exploring Pakistan's current situation, its root causes and prevailing trends, while reviewing international human rights norms and standards related to each SDG. Its overarching aim is to provide an analytical basis for the forthcoming definition of UN priorities and outcome areas for the 2018-2022 UNPPF.

5. Both the **2016 Meta-Analysis** and the **2016 CCA** were developed in parallel with "Situation Analyses" undertaken by several UN agencies, most notably UNDP, UNFPA and UNICEF. Their elaboration also coincided with analyses conducted by other UN organisations to inform their future programmes of work, including FAO, WFP, UNHABITAT and IOM. When a UN agency carried out a Situation Analysis or similar review of Pakistan's context, this fed into and, in turn, benefited from the overall CCA process. The **2016 Meta-Analysis**, for instance, offers an overview of the country's context from the perspective of rights holders and duty bearers.

6. The selection of data sources proved a critical issue during the CCA process. For example, the question of whether the analysis should use data from Government sources, academic sources or from international organisations. The United Nations Country Team (UNCT) chose to use national data sources whenever these are available. This decision was taken to ensure consistency between the CCA and other formal UN documents related to the UNPPF, such as Country Programme documents. Nevertheless, a range of sources – including Government, UN and other sources – are cited in the **2016 Meta-Analysis**. Where national sources are not available, UN or international estimates are used.



III. Context and Trends

Geography

7. Pakistan stretches from the littoral of the Indian Ocean to the Himalayas in the northeast, and from the Indus flood plains in the east to arid mountains in the west. It is bordered by India to the east, China to the northeast, Afghanistan to the north and Iran to the west. Only 3% of Pakistan is forested, and only 30% of its territory is comprised of arable land. The country is almost completely dependent on the Indus river system for water, originating largely from glacial melt in its northern mountain ranges. This dependence on a single water source – one which is at serious risk from climate change – will likely be a major geopolitical and social concern in the coming decades.

Pakistan is particularly vulnerable to climate change, partly due to its limited water resources, but also due to frequent floods and droughts which accentuate the tribulations of a vastly arid environment. Severe storms often threaten its coastal regions, which are likely to become more common and severe as climate change gains pace.

Situated on geologically active fault lines, the country is prone to major earthquakes which have historically caused grave damage and immense loss of life – as in the case of the 1935 Quetta Earthquake and the 2005 Hindu Kush Earthquake. Earthquake risks abound for many large population centres, including Pakistan's largest city, Karachi, a port with a population variously estimated at 13-20 million inhabitants.



Population

8. Pakistan has an estimated population of between 180 and 202 million, making it the sixth most populous country in the world. Upon gaining independence in 1947, the country witnessed a tremendous outflow of Hindus and Sikhs to India – particularly from Sindh and Punjab – and an influx of Muslims from India, the vast majority of whom settled in urban centres like Karachi. The largest proportion of Pakistan’s population is Punjabi, most of whom reside in the province of Punjab. With a population of nearly 100 million, Punjab accounts for roughly 50% of Pakistan’s population. Other ethnic groups include the Sindhi, principally concentrated in Sindh, a province with a population of some 61 million; the Pashtun in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) and northern Balochistan; the Baloch in Balochistan; the Kashmiri in Pakistan Administered Kashmir (PAK), a territory also claimed by India; and peoples of Central Asian origin in the northern administrative area of Gilgit-Baltistan (GB). While Balochistan, KP, GB, PAK and FATA represent some 60% of Pakistan’s territory, they account for some 20-25% of the country’s total population.

Over 96% of Pakistan’s population is Muslim. While the majority are Sunni, some 7% are Shia. The remaining 4% includes Christians, Hindus, Ahmadis, and members of “scheduled castes” – the accepted term for various historically disadvantaged groups in the Indian subcontinent. Linguistically, the country is a patchwork, with most ethnic groups speaking their own languages. Only 8% of its citizens are native speakers of Urdu, the official national language.

Political Structure

9. The Islamic Republic of Pakistan is a federal state, whose national Government and federal institutions are based in Islamabad Capital Territory (ICT). Its four provinces – Punjab, Sindh, Balochistan and KP – each have elected local governments, councils and representation in the National Assembly. In addition, the country’s four “administrative areas” – Pakistan Administered Kashmir, Gilgit-Baltistan, the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and Islamabad Capital Territory – have varying degrees of local governance and representation in the National Assembly.

In 2010, Pakistan’s National Assembly approved the seminal 18th Amendment to the Constitution, which devolved administrative and budgetary authority to the country’s provincial governments. However, the associated establishment of local authorities at the district-level is still in progress. Issues of overall institutional capacity, especially at the sub-national level, are becoming increasingly critical in the wake of decentralisation. Despite devolution, the local government system continues to be weak. For instance, many newly elected members of local governments remained without offices or power in 2016.

The political arena at the national level is dominated by a range of political parties, some of which have geographic, ethnic or religious bases. The military continues to play a central role in Pakistan, having seized power several times in the nation’s history, often in response to the perceived corruption of civilian governments. In light of the army’s institutional strength and prevailing geopolitical tensions – particularly with India and Afghanistan – it is likely that Pakistan’s armed forces will continue to play an important role in the country.

Economy

10. Pakistan's current economic situation was aptly summed up by the Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), Christine Lagarde, speaking in Islamabad on the 24th of October, 2016: *"Just three years ago, the country was on the brink of an economic crisis. Today, and thanks to the authorities' home-grown programme of reforms [...] the economy is on a much stronger footing. Public finances have improved considerably, external reserve buffers have been rebuilt, and growth has been gradually strengthening. These are very encouraging developments. [...] Having achieved such difficult reforms, the economy has come a long way. Now, with a more resilient economy and growth picking up, Pakistan has reached a moment of opportunity. It can now embark on the next generation of reforms to generate higher and more inclusive growth, and tap into the dynamism of emerging economies."*

I. Progress on macro-economic indicators: Pakistan has made notable progress in stabilising macro-economic growth; undertaking tax reforms; reducing inefficient subsidies; and enforcing a host of related measures. As a result, it is expected to experience GDP growth of 4.5% during the 2016/2017 fiscal year. In 2016, the country had a positive balance of payments and cash reserves of US\$ 27 billion. However, far more needs to be done to accelerate growth. This is particularly important as growth over the past 15 years has not been well-distributed, tending to benefit landowners and other well-off sectors.

Economic progress in recent years is partly related to Pakistan's recovery from the cataclysmic floods that beset the country in 2010-2011. It is also linked to lower oil prices and the growth of remittances from Pakistanis working overseas, particularly in the Arab states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). These contributors to growth have outweighed the contribution from Pakistan's economy. This has been the case despite extensive government investment, particularly in infrastructure projects largely financed by foreign investment.

As a result, Pakistan's economy remains highly vulnerable to external shocks, as well as to entrenched internal systems which benefit relatively few individuals, the bulk of whom are elites. Economic progress has been uneven within the country, chiefly benefiting urban areas and thereby contributing to rural-urban migration. In some cases, dislocation prompted by infrastructure projects has spurred an exodus of inhabitants from rural areas. For example, the construction of the Mangla Dam prompted significant migration to the United Kingdom from the district of Mirpur, PAK.

II. Modest growth outlook in the short-term: According to the World Bank, Pakistan's growth outlook for the 2016/2017 fiscal year is modest. GDP growth is expected to increase slightly to 4.5%, up from 4.2% during the 2015 fiscal year. Both services and large-scale manufacturing will be the key "supply-side" drivers of growth. Services are expected to grow by over 5% in the coming fiscal year, while large-scale manufacturing – benefiting from low global commodity prices – is projected to grow between 4% and 4.5%.

In terms of demand, consumption is also driving growth. Consumption, in turn, is fuelled by rising remittances and a loose monetary stance – whereby the supply of money is expanded and easily accessible to citizens in order to encourage economic growth. Exports fell by 11.1% in the first half of 2016 due to lower global demand and domestic bottlenecks. It is clear that internal bottlenecks constrain export growth – for example, port charges in Karachi are nine times higher than those in Dubai and Singapore, while shipping container "dwelling times" are three times longer than in East Asia. The costly supply of electricity is another pressing challenge, with high transmission and distribution losses affecting its reliability.



III. Important sectors lagging behind: While most of Pakistan's economic sectors have experienced moderate growth, the critical agricultural sector is lagging behind. The sector's growth rate declined from 2.53% in 2015 to negative growth of 0.19% in the 2016 fiscal year. This was largely as a result of a 27.8% decline in the production of cotton. Within the agricultural sector as a whole, growth in crops declined by 6.25%, while other sub-components experienced positive growth. For instance, livestock, with a contribution of 58.5%, experienced growth of 3.63%; forestry, with a 2% contribution, witnessed growth of 8.84%; and fishing, with a 2% contribution, experienced growth of 3.25%.

IV. Employment and the labour market: Pakistan boasts a labour force of 61 million, 94% of whom are employed. Young women comprise the majority of its unemployed workers. The country's female labour force participation rate is 25% – encompassing women over the age of 15 – while the rate for men is 83% (World Bank). Most women continue to work in the agricultural sector, and remain engaged as unpaid family workers, throughout their lives. Self-employed workers constitute an estimated 36% of the workforce.

Employment is concentrated in the agricultural and services sectors, which accounted for 43.5% and 34%, respectively, of total employment in 2014. Industry, by contrast, employs 22.5% of the work force (*Labour Force Survey 2013/2014*). Most of Pakistan's labour force works in rural areas, where agriculture is the dominant activity. The informal sector accounts for 30-40% of the economy, employing 70% of the work force. This informal economy tends not to be factored into calculations of national GDP, and informal workers do not pay taxes. In fact, only some 19,000 Pakistanis pay individual income taxes, although many small- and medium-sized businesses do pay taxes.

Young people are an exceptionally important segment of Pakistan's labour force. This is principally because the country is experiencing a demographic transition in which the share of its population who are of working age – especially the proportion of its "youth" – is increasing relative to other age brackets. Another key dimension of Pakistan's labour market relates to workers who seek employment outside the country. In 2015, an estimated 800,000 Pakistanis – over 99% of whom are men – moved abroad to secure employment, generally in member countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC).

V. Outlook: Higher growth and investment in pro-poor and social sectors will be critical to Pakistan's ability to achieve the SDGs. The annual population growth rate of approximately 2%, as discussed below, means that the current overall GDP growth rate of over 4% only translates into 2% growth in GDP per capita. In addition, corruption costs Pakistan around 2% of its GDP, while malnutrition reduces GDP by 6%. It is estimated that real GDP would need to grow by a minimum of 6% in order to absorb the additional 2-3 million youths – including young women – entering the labour force each year.

In light of these complex factors, GDP growth of 6-10% is virtually the minimum needed to make a significant impact on the SDG targets of decent employment and sustainable consumption. Such growth is possible in the medium-term, but would require far greater investment in the social sectors included within the SDGs. Above all, it will be imperative to engage significantly more women in productive economic activities.



Demographics

11. As the MDGs drew to a close, Pakistan remained far from reaching its **population-related targets**. The country's overall population growth rate is 2%, while its total fertility rate is 3.8 children per woman between the ages of 15 and 45. The Government has announced that a **National Census** will be undertaken in March 2017, with military forces deployed to ensure security. To address all aspects from the census, from policy to implementation, the UN will provide technical assistance to the Pakistan Bureau of Statistics. Holding a census is especially significant as Pakistan's last National Census dates from 1998, making it difficult to accurately state the size of the current total population. Estimates range from 180 million to over 200 million – specifically, estimated as 195 million by the Pakistan 2016 Economic Review and 202 million by the UN's Population Division. The country's high rate of population growth makes it likely that Pakistan's population will be 270-350 million by 2050, and may even reach one billion by the end of the century.

12. Pakistan faces three kinds of **demographic disadvantages** as a result of its delay in reducing fertility rates. First, a higher population growth rate requires significant expansion of infrastructure and services to serve a larger population. Second, a higher rate of growth of its school-aged population makes it harder to achieve education goals. Third, the country has a less favourable age structure for economic development, with a smaller share of its population of working-age compared to an increasing share of younger, dependent people aged 0-14. Moreover, the fairly low percentage of women in the workforce – estimated at between 22-26% – compounds the challenges posed by a smaller share of its population being of working-age.

13. Accurately determining the **rate of growth of Pakistan's urban population** is similarly fraught with uncertainty, due to the lack of a recent National Census. The national estimate holds that Pakistan's urban population represents approximately 38% of its total populace (Bureau of Statistics, 2015). However, the World Bank estimates this figure to be as high as 55%. Combined with uncertainties concerning the size of its total population, this implies that Pakistan's urban population may approach 70% of the total populace by 2050, if not before.

After years of steady migration from rural areas to urban centres, the principle factor now driving urban population growth is internal. This means that the growth of the country's urban population will likely continue at pace, even without further rural-urban migration. Thus, mega cities like Karachi – with an estimated population of between 13 and 20 million in 2015 – are set to grow significantly by 2030. It is increasingly probable that the city's population could reach 30 million in the coming decades. This poses tremendous challenges in terms of employment, social indicators and environmental degradation, issues compounded by a lack of urban planning or adequate physical and social infrastructure across Pakistan's major cities.

14. Pakistan is experiencing a monumental demographic transition – known as a “youth bulge” – that entails both challenges and opportunities. If it harnesses these opportunities, it will reap the substantial benefits of a **demographic dividend**. The fact that 64% of Pakistan's population is below the age of 30 offers the country a clear asset in terms of an increased labour force. However, it also implies significant risks for youth, who constitute the largest workforce in Pakistan. Unless timely and sustainable strategies are put in place to engage youth and secure their future livelihoods, young people risk becoming marginalised and will be unable to contribute to broader development.

15. Pakistan hosts 1.3 million registered **Afghan refugees** and 600,000 undocumented Afghans - the largest protracted refugee situation in the world. Some 34% live in 54 refugee villages, while the remaining 66% reside in urban and rural host communities. Many refugees have lived in Pakistan for over 37 years. In fact, the majority (72%) are second or third generation refugees, born in Pakistan. As they have never lived in Afghanistan, they have nothing to “go back to”. Women and children represent an estimated 70% of the total refugee population.

In 2016, 381,275 Afghan refugees and over 250,000 undocumented Afghans returned to Afghanistan from Pakistan. UNHCR and its partners have continued to facilitate a repatriation process that safeguards the rights of returning populations. The Government of Pakistan recently extended the validity of identity documents held by registered refugees - “Proof of Registration” (PoR) cards - until the end of 2017. Overall, it is likely that a significant number of Afghan refugees will remain in Pakistan for the foreseeable future.

16. A Taliban-led armed insurgency in KP and FATA triggered the **displacement** of 303,791 families. 145,781 families remained displaced in late 2016. As with refugees, some 70% of displaced persons are women and children. The movement of temporarily displaced persons has contributed to swelling urban populations, most notably in Karachi.

Overall, the beneficiary case load for **humanitarian assistance** in 2016 encompassed 3.6 million people. It included 1.54 million refugees, 1.2 million Temporarily Displaced Persons (TDPs), 0.6 million recently returned TDPs, and some 184,000 people affected by severe drought in Sindh.

17. Pakistan’s key dilemma concerns **social development**. This was clearly articulated by Professor Ahsan Iqbal, Minister of Planning, Development and Reform, in his Preface to the document **Pakistan 2025: One Nation – One Vision**: *“In terms of economic indicators, Pakistan is a middle-income country but in social indicators it falls amongst the least developed countries.”* Thus, the poorest and most marginalised segments of Pakistan’s population – including women, children and minorities – remain woefully under-served. Social development indicators belie extremely limited progress in recent years.

18. The country also experienced limited **progress in terms of meeting the MDGs**. In 2013, Pakistan was on track to meet the targets of only 10 of the 34 indicators on which the country reported progress under the MDGs (Planning Commission, 2013).

Most population-related targets remained significantly out of reach. These included the mortality rate for children under the age of 5; the infant mortality rate (IMR); full immunisation of children aged 12-23 months; the immunisation of children under the age of 1 against the measles; the coverage of Lady Health Workers (LHWs); the maternal mortality ratio (MMR); the proportion of births attended by skilled birth attendants; and the contraceptive prevalence rate, which was supposed to reach 55% by 2015; and the percentage of pregnant women who attended at least one antenatal consultation. By 2015, Pakistan was on track to achieve the targets of only 9 indicators, whereas its progress on 24 indicators was off-track.

19. The **underlying causes** of Pakistan’s relatively minor progress on many economic and social indicators relate to significant structural problems. Chief among these are traditional economic structures, especially in rural regions; increasing rural-urban migration, largely of unskilled workers; cultural patterns which under-value women’s potential and are compounded by high-levels of violence against women; under-investment in human development, especially in terms of education and health; and under-investment in family planning.



IV. Cross-Cutting Themes

The SDGs and Agenda 2030 highlight a number of cross-cutting issues which must be taken into account with respect to Pakistan's current development situation:

I. Human Rights: Pakistan has signed and ratified various covenants and treaties whose principles are derived from the *Universal Declaration of Human Rights* (UDHR). These include:

- The *International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights* (ICESCR);
- The *International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights* (ICCPR);
- The *Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women* (CEDAW);
- The *Convention against Torture* (CAT);
- The *Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Racial Discrimination* (CERD);
- The *Convention on the Rights of the Child* (CRC); and
- The ILO's Conventions on the fundamental principles and rights at work.

Despite its stated commitment to these international agreements, Pakistan has made limited progress on many human rights issues, most notably those related to gender, children and minorities. All of the Sustainable Development Goals are directly related to international human rights norms, standards and instruments. Thus, achieving the SDGs will require progress on implementing the myriad commitments that Pakistan has undertaken.

In 2017, the UN Human Rights Council will undertake Pakistan's *Periodic Universal Review*, involving a detailed assessment of specific advances and challenges with respect to each human right norm.

The **human rights standards relevant to each SDG** are outlined in the following **table**:



SDG 1: End poverty in all its forms everywhere

- **Right to an adequate standard of living** [UDHR, article 25; ICESCR, article 11; CRC, article 27];
- **Right to social security** [UDHR, art. 22; ICESCR, art. 9; CRPD, art.28; CRC, art. 26];
- **Equal rights of women in economic life** [CEDAW, arts. 11, 13, 14 (2)(g), 15 (2) and 16(1)].



SDG 2: End hunger, achieve food security and improved nutrition and promote sustainable agriculture

- **Right to adequate food** [UDHR, art. 25; ICESCR, art. 11; CRC, art.24(2)(c)];
- **International cooperation, including ensuring equitable distribution of world food supplies** [UDHR, art. 28; ICESCR, arts. 2(1) and 11(2)].



SDG 3: Ensure healthy lives and promote well-being for all, at all ages

- **Right to life** [UDHR, art. 3; ICCPR, art. 6], particularly of women [CEDAW, art. 12] and children [CRC, art. 6];
- **Right to health** [UDHR, art. 25; ICESCR, art. 12], particularly of women [CEDAW, art. 12] and children [CRC, art. 24];
- **Special protection for mothers and children** [ICESCR, art. 10];
- **Right to enjoy the benefits of scientific progress and its application** [UDHR, art. 27; ICESCR, art. 15(1)(b)];
- **International cooperation** [UDHR, art. 28; DRtD, arts. 3-4], particularly in relation to the right to health and children's rights [ICESCR, art. 2(1); CRC, art. 4].



SDG 4: Ensure inclusive and equitable quality education and promote lifelong learning opportunities for all

- **Right to education** [UDHR, art. 26; ICESCR, art. 13], particularly in relation to children [CRC, arts. 28 and 29], persons with disabilities [CRC, art. 23(3); CRPD, art. 24] and indigenous peoples [UNDRIP, art. 14];
- **Equal rights of women and girls in the field of education** [CEDAW, art. 10];
- **Right to work, including the right to technical and vocational training** [ICESCR, art. 6];
- **International cooperation** [UDHR, art. 28; DRtD, arts. 3-4], particularly in relation to children [CRC, arts. 23(4), 28(3)], persons with disabilities [CRPD, art. 32] and indigenous peoples [UNDRIP, art. 39].



SDG 5: Achieve gender equality and empower all women and girls

- **Elimination of all forms of discrimination against women** [CEDAW, arts. 1-5] and girls [CRC, art. 2], particularly in legislation, political and public life [CEDAW, art. 7], economic and social life [CEDAW, arts. 11 and 13], and family relations [CEDAW, art. 16];
- **Right to decide the number and spacing of children** [CEDAW, arts. 12 and 16(1)(e); CRC, art.24(2)(f)];
- **Special protection for mothers and children** [ICESCR, art. 10];
- **Elimination of violence against women and girls** [CEDAW, arts. 1- 6; DEVAW, arts. 1-4; CRC, art. 6.1 (right to life); CRC, art. 19 (right to protection from violence); CRC, art. 24(3) (harmful traditional practices); CRC, art. 37 (torture); CRC, art. 38 (international humanitarian law); CRC, art. 39 (rehabilitation from violence)];
- **Right to education** [CRC, art. 28];
- **Right to play** [CRC, art. 31];
- **Right to just and favourable conditions of work** [ICESCR, art. 7; CEDAW, art. 11];
- **Equality of opportunity and treatment** [ILO Conventions 100 and 111].



SDG 6: Ensure availability and sustainable management of water and sanitation for all

- **Right to safe drinking water and sanitation** [ICESCR, art. 11];
- **Right to health** [UDHR, art. 25; ICESCR, art. 12];
- **Equal access to water and sanitation for rural women** [CEDAW, art. 14(2) (h)].



SDG 7: Ensure access to affordable, reliable, sustainable and modern energy for all

- **Right to an adequate standard of living** [UDHR, art. 25; ICESCR, art. 11];
- **Right to enjoy the benefits of scientific progress and its application** [UDHR, article 27; ICESCR, article 15(1)(b)].



SDG 8: Promote sustained, inclusive and sustainable economic growth, full and productive employment and decent work for all

- **Right to work and the right to just and favourable conditions of work** [UDHR, art. 23; ICESCR, arts. 6,7 and 10; CRPD, art. 27; ILO Core Labour Standards, as per the ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work];
- **Freedom of association** [Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organize Convention, 1948 (ILO Convention, No. 87); Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention, 1949 (ILO Convention, No. 98)];
- **Prohibition of slavery, forced labour and trafficking of persons** [UDHR, art. 4; ILO Convention, No. 29 and its Protocol of 2014 ; ILO Convention, No. 105; ICCPR, art. 8; CEDAW, art. 6; CRC, arts. 34-36];
- **Equal rights of women in relation to employment** [CEDAW, art. 11; ILO Conventions, No. 100 and No. 111];
- **Prohibition of child labour** [CRC, arts. 19 and 32; ILO Conventions, No. 138 and No. 182];
- **Equal labour rights of migrant workers** [CMW, art. 25]; indigenous people, employment policy.



SDG 9: Build resilient infrastructure, promote inclusive and sustainable industrialization and foster innovation

- **Right to enjoy the benefits of scientific progress and its application** [UDHR, art. 27; ICESCR, art. 15(1)(b)];
- **Right of access to information** [UDHR, art. 19; ICCPR, art.19(2)];
- **Right to adequate housing, including land and resources** [UDHR, art. 25; ICESCR, art. 11];
- **Equal rights of women to financial credit and rural infrastructure** [CEDAW, arts. 13(b) and 14(2)].



SDG 10: Reduce inequality within and among countries

- **Right to equality and non-discrimination** [UDHR, art. 2; ICESCR, art. 2(2); ICCPR, arts. 2(1) and 26; CERD, art 2(2); CEDAW, art. 2; CRC, art. 2; CRPD, art. 5; CMW, art. 7; DRtD, art. 8(1)];
- **Right to participate in public affairs** [UDHR, art. 21; ICCPR, art. 25; CEDAW, art. 7; ICERD, art. 5; CRPD, art. 29); DRtD, art. 8(2)];
- **Right to social security** [UDHR, art. 22; ICESCR, arts. 9-10; CRPD, art.28],
- **Promotion of conditions for international migration** [CMW, art. 64];
- **Right of migrants to transfer their earnings and savings** [CMW, art. 47(1)].



SDG 11: Make cities and human settlements inclusive, safe, resilient and sustainable

- **Right to adequate housing, including land and resources** [UDHR, art. 25; ICESCR, art. 11];
- **Right to participate in cultural life** [UDHR, art. 25; ICESCR, art. 15; ICERD, arts. 5 and 7; CRPD, art. 30; CRC, art. 31];
- **Accessibility of transportation, facilities and services, particularly for persons with disabilities** [CRPD, art. 9(1)], children [CRC, art. 23], and rural women [CEDAW, art. 14(2)];
- **Protection from natural disasters** [CRPD, art. 11].



SDG 12: Ensure sustainable consumption and production patterns

- **Right to health, including the right to a safe, clean, healthy and sustainable environment** [UDHR, art. 25(1); ICESCR, art. 12];
- **Right to adequate food and safe drinking water** [UDHR, art. 25(1); ICESCR, art. 11];
- **Right of all peoples to freely dispose of their natural wealth and resources** [ICCPR; ICESCR, art. 1(2)].



SDG 13: Take urgent action to combat climate change and its impacts

- **Right to health, including the right to a safe, clean, healthy and sustainable environment** [UDHR, art. 25(1); ICESCR, art. 12; CRC, art. 24; CEDAW, art. 12; CMW, art. 28];
- **Right to adequate food and to safe drinking water** [UDHR, art. 25(1); ICESCR, art. 11];
- **Right of all peoples to freely dispose of their natural wealth and resources** [ICCPR; ICESCR, art. 1(2)].



SDG 14: Conserve and sustainably use the oceans, seas and marine resources for sustainable development

- **Right to health, including the right to a safe, clean, healthy and sustainable environment** [UDHR, art. 25(1); ICESCR, art. 12; CRC, art. 24; CEDAW, art. 12; CMW, art. 28];
- **Right to adequate food and to safe drinking water** [UDHR, art. 25(1); ICESCR, art. 11];
- **Right of all peoples to freely dispose of their natural wealth and resources** [ICCPR; ICESCR, art. 1(2)].



SDG 15: Protect, restore and promote sustainable use of terrestrial ecosystems, sustainably manage forests, combat desertification, halt and reverse land degradation and halt biodiversity loss

- **Right to health, including the right to a safe, clean, healthy and sustainable environment** [UDHR, art. 25(1); ICESCR, art. 12; CRC, art. 24; CEDAW, art. 12; CMW, art. 28];
- **Right to adequate food and to safe drinking water** [UDHR, art. 25(1); ICESCR, art. 11];
- **Right of all peoples to freely dispose of their natural wealth and resources** [ICCPR; ICESCR, art. 1(2)].



SDG 16: Promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels

- **Right to life, liberty and the security of one's person** [UDHR, art. 3; ICCPR arts. 6(1) and 9(1); ICPEd, art. 1] **including freedom from torture** [UDHR, art. 5; ICCPR, art. 7; CAT, art. 2; CRC art.37 (a)], **and including for minorities** [ICCPR, art. 27; Labour Inspection Convention, C018];
- **Protection of children from all forms of violence, abuse or exploitation** [CRC, arts. 19 and 37(a)], **including from trafficking** [CRC, arts. 34-36; CRC, Optional Protocol 1];
- **Right of access to justice and due process** [UDHR, arts. 8, 10; ICCPR arts. 2(3) and 14-15; CEDAW, art. 2(c); CRC, arts. 12(2), 37 and 38];
- **Right to legal personality** [UDHR art. 6; ICCPR art. 16; CRPD, art. 12; CRC, arts. 7 and 8];
- **Right to asylum** [UDHR, art. 14; CRC, art. 22(1)];
- **Right to participate in public affairs** [UDHR, art. 21; ICCPR, art. 25];
- **Right of access to information** [UDHR, art. 19; ICCPR, art.19 (1)].



SDG 17: Strengthen the means of implementation and revitalize the global partnership for sustainable development

- **Right of all peoples to self-determination** [ICCPR and ICESCR, art. 1(1); DRtD, art. 1(1)];
- **Right of all peoples to development and international cooperation** [UDHR, art. 28; ICESCR, art. 2(1); CRC, art. 4; CRPD, art. 32(1); DRtD, arts.3-5];
- **Right of everyone to enjoy the benefits of scientific progress and its application, including international cooperation in the field of science** [UDHR, art. 27.1.; ICESCR, art. 15(1)];
- **Right to privacy** [UDHR art. 12; ICCPR art. 17], **including respect for human rights and ethical principles in the collection and use of statistics** (CRPD, art. 31(1)).

Source: OHCHR, 2015.



II. Gender: The spectre of gender inequality looms large in Pakistan. Exclusion and violence related to gender are among the most significant challenges facing the country. In part, these trends are prompted by traditional patriarchal social patterns, related aspects of tribal cultures and, more recently, the strengthening of conservative Islamic social norms. While gender equality is the specific concern of SDG 5, gender cuts across all of the SDGs. As such, gender equality concerns are referenced throughout this document. Achieving gender equity will be absolutely essential for Pakistan to make progress on all of the Sustainable Development Goals and bring about significant economic growth.

III. Inequality/Exclusion: Exclusion based on gender, ethnicity, religion, age, abilities and geographical factors is another key challenge which Pakistan must strive to overcome. In order to achieve the SDGs, it will be essential to first identify excluded groups and accurately document their situations. Based on this improved understanding, the country will have to accelerate action to ensure that excluded groups fully enjoy their human rights and truly benefit from the fruits of development.

IV. Impediments to Achieving the SDGs: Pakistan is extremely vulnerable to the calamitous effects of natural disasters, including those related to climate change. Chief among these are droughts, floods, earthquakes and cyclones. Alongside the devastation they wreak in terms of loss of life and damage to infrastructure, natural disasters are a leading driver of internal migration.

The country is also highly affected by regional geopolitical issues, conflicts and refugee crises. So too is it beset by the impacts of internal separatist movements and associated security or terrorism threats. Achieving the SDGs will require concerted action to reduce the risks of natural disasters and “human-induced” crises. In tandem, the country will have to respond to these challenges in ways which protect the most vulnerable and excluded members of society.

V. Social Development: Although Pakistan is increasingly investing in critical social development issues such as health and education, its efforts remain inadequate to ensure significant progress towards the SDGs. Social development is simultaneously impeded by corruption, crime, contraband, narcotics, and entrenched elites co-opting state policies and resources. As internal migrants, refugees and displaced persons gravitate towards Pakistan’s larger cities, even greater social investments are necessary in these areas.

Rural-urban migration potentially offers a context for modernising social attitudes and accelerating development in the medium- and long-term. However, in the short-term, internal migration sometimes prompts oppressive feudal behaviour prevalent in rural areas to be “imported” or transferred to urban industrialists and elites.

VI. Policy Reforms: While Pakistan has drafted and approved new policy reforms, many of these are not sufficiently based on evidence gleaned from successful policies or interventions. The country also has difficulties in translating international conventions and treaties into national laws. Similarly, it struggles to implement laws in practice.

VII. Making Progress on the SDGs: Achieving the SDGs will require a reorientation of public policies and budget allocations towards inclusive approaches for women and girls. In tandem, public policies and budget allocations will have to be reoriented to:

- a. Leverage existing successful initiatives;
- b. Address the social, cultural and political factors which currently constrain progress, including the risks posed by extremism;

- c. Effectively build social and community resilience to internal and external shocks or crises; and
- d. Foster increased and strengthened partnerships – supported by international cooperation – among national, provincial and district governments, as well as with the private sector, academia and civil society.

National Development Goals (*Vision 2025*)

20. While Pakistan’s provinces have their own independent development strategies and plans, the country’s principle national planning instrument is **Vision 2025**. Prepared by Pakistan’s Planning Commission in 2014, with UN support, this strategic national plan was based on extensive consultations. It also takes into account lessons learned from other emerging economies. In essence, Vision 2025 fulfils four basic functions:

- It is a compilation of the views of national and international stakeholders regarding the direction of Pakistan’s future development;
- It sets goals for the future and outlines expected outcomes. These serve as a useful roadmap, providing a strategy for the country’s human, social and economic development;
- It provides a conceptual platform for Pakistan to become a developed nation and be associated with other countries of high-income status; and
- It assists Pakistan to reach globally-agreed targets for development, including the SDGs.

21. The seven pillars **Vision 2025** are: “people first”, “growth”, “governance”, “security”, “entrepreneurship”, the “knowledge economy”, and “connectivity”. These pillars reflect the key drivers of Pakistan’s long-term development trajectory and transformative growth. Alongside these pillars, **Vision 2025** highlights a range of key enablers, namely: a shared vision; political stability and the continuity of policies; peace and security; the rule of law; and social justice. The Planning Commission is authorised to monitor **Vision 2025’s** implementation through a Performance Delivery Unit, which tracks progress against key performance indicators (KPIs).

22. **Vision 2025** recognises that greater intra-governmental coordination is needed to achieve long-term development objectives in the wake of devolution. It highlights plans to strengthen forums like the Council of Common Interests and the Ministry of Inter-Provincial Coordination, in a bid to improve coordination between the provinces and the Federal Government. However, limited progress has been made in establishing working relations with the CCI and presenting coordinated budgets.

Vision 2025 explicitly articulates the goal of making Pakistan “the new Asian tiger”. It identifies human and social capital as key drivers of this process. Thus, putting the “people first” is its first pillar. At the plan’s launch, the Government committed to investing US\$ 14 million to reform Pakistan’s bureaucracy in pursuit of **Vision 2025**. Furthermore, Pakistan’s vision to end poverty recognises that:

“The core of social development policy and [a] poverty reduction strategy must lie in the recognition of the state’s responsibility to ensure that basic needs of its citizens are met. These are seen in terms of indicators such as rates of morbidity and mortality, especially infant and maternal mortality rates, illiteracy and malnutrition. It is equally important to take into reckoning the wider poverty indicators which relate to self-esteem, vulnerability to internal and external risks, exclusion from the development process, and lack of social capital.”



23. The Government envisaged concerted efforts to ensure that provincial Development Strategies and Annual Development Plans are fully aligned to **Vision 2025**. However, much more needs to be done to make this a reality. Punjab's Growth Framework is perhaps the only example of a provincial strategy seemingly well-aligned to **Vision 2025**.

24. It is important to note that, since 2000, Pakistan has articulated three different "visions" and a blueprint for economic growth. This **Framework of Economic Growth/New Growth Strategy** was abandoned in 2013 when the government changed hands. **Vision 2010** was produced in 1998, under the PML-N Government; **Vision 2030** was developed in 2007 by the Musharraf Government; and the **Framework for Economic Growth** was created in 2011 by the PPP Government. Over the years, the quality of these planning mechanisms has increased, accompanied by shifts from more general ideas to greater specificity and increasing reliance on quantitative and qualitative research.

25. Although **Vision 2025** pre-dates the formal adoption of the Sustainable Development Goals by UN Member States in September 2015, its seven "pillars" are aligned with the SDGs. Links between **Vision 2025** and the SDGs are mapped within the document:

| Vision 2025 Pillars | | Linkage with SDGs |
|---------------------|--|---|
| 1 | People First: Developing social and human capital, and empowering women. | SDG 1 (Poverty), SDG 3 (Health), SDG 4 (Education), SDG 5 (Gender) and SDG 8 (Decent Work). |
| 2 | Growth: Sustained, indigenous and inclusive growth. | The target is virtually identical to SDG 8 (Inclusive and Sustainable Economic Growth and Decent Work). It is also aligned with SDG 10 (Inequalities), SDG 12 (Sustainable Consumption and Production), SDG 13 (Climate Change), SDG 14 (Oceans) and SDG 15 (Terrestrial Ecosystems). |
| 3 | Governance: Democratic governance, institutional reform and the modernization of the public sector. | The language is similar to SDG 16 (Peaceful Society). |
| 4 | Security: Energy, water and food security. | SDG 2 (Zero Hunger), SDG 6 (Water Security), SDG 7 (Energy Security) and SDG 11 (Urbanization) |
| 5 | Entrepreneurship: Private sector and entrepreneurship-led growth. | SDG 9 (Innovation and Industrialization). |
| 6 | Knowledge economy: Developing a competitive knowledge economy through value addition. | SDG 9 (Innovation) and SDG 4 (Education). |
| 7 | Connectivity: Modernizing transport infrastructure and regional connectivity. | SDG 9 (Infrastructure) and SDG 17 (Partnership). |

Source: *Vision 2025*, p. 10.

26. The National Development Goals articulated within **Vision 2025** are generally positive and in line with the SDGs. However, Pakistan will face significant challenges in achieving the SDGs given three overarching factors:

- a. Pakistan achieved insufficient progress on most of the MDGs;
- b. The starting point in Pakistan for the SDGs is far below the “end-point” of the MDGs; and
- c. The SDG targets are even more challenging than those set by the MDGs.

27. Given the intricate linkages between the SDGs, significantly more inter-institutional cohesion and coordination will be needed. It is clear that no single agency, authority or sector will be able to deliver on any of the 17 SDGs if it acts alone. Pakistan’s National Planning Commission and its Provincial Planning and Development Departments are currently formulating their 2017 plans and budgets with UN technical support. This process is taking stock of the need to include specific steps towards SDG targets, as well as the need to improve inter-institutional coordination.

28. There has been significant political ownership of the SDGs in Pakistan. This was clearly reflected in October 2015 when the country became one of the first in the world to adopt the SDGs as its own “National Development Goals”. In February 2016, the National Assembly unanimously adopted the 2030 Agenda. The Speaker of the National Assembly established a Parliamentary Task Force at the federal level to oversee and support legislation related to the SDGs, alongside a SDG Secretariat to aid this process. The Government’s resolve to achieve the SDGs is also apparent in its growing realisation that strengthening data systems is critical, in line with the data imperatives highlighted in Agenda 2030 and the SDGs.

Pakistan is now taking steps to localise the SDGs with the support of the UN, including commitments to impressive cost-sharing. However, beyond the rhetoric, it is important that the localisation of results and their prioritisation effectively influences annual work plans and increases budget allocations for agreed priorities. While Pakistan’s efforts are moving in the right direction, the lack of a National Census since 1998 creates tremendous uncertainty with regard to the current status of many indicators. A Census is tentatively planned for early 2017, however whether it will be undertaken remains unconfirmed. Concerted efforts and investment are sorely needed to establish a credible baseline system for the SDGs.

29. The longevity and political ownership of Pakistan’s current national development goals ultimately depend on the outcome of the next general elections, at the national and provincial levels, in 2018. Many analysts predict that the current Government will be re-elected at the federal level and in the province of Punjab. 2018 also be the first year in which the new UNPPF is implemented, alongside the new country programmes of several UN agencies. The fact that **Vision 2025** is closely aligned with the SDGs will likely mitigate the risk of substantial changes in the country’s priorities, even in the event of political changes.

This should also ensure the future political ownership and validity of the priorities for UN assistance for the 2018-2022 UNPPF, which will be established in 2016-2017. Developing the new UNPPF and its provincial Operational Plans in close coordination with provincial governments will help to ensure that the UN planning caters to both national and sub-national priorities, while ensuring ownership at both levels.



V. People



Poverty (SDG 1)

30. Ending poverty is the first of the 17 Global Goals that comprise the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. Poverty is a **multi-dimensional phenomenon**, with numerous facets of deprivation affecting people’s overall well-being – running the gamut from an inability to access health care, to a lack of quality education and poor housing. While Pakistan’s national poverty rates declined from 64.3% in 2001/2002 to 29.5% in 2013/2014, levels of deprivation remain uneven across the country (*Multidimensional Poverty Index*, 2016). Significant rural-urban disparities

exist, with a far higher proportion of people living in multidimensional poverty in rural areas (54.6%) than in urban centres (9.4%). Disparities also abound between Pakistan’s provinces and administrative areas. For example, rates of multidimensional poverty are highest in Balochistan (71%) and lowest in Punjab (31%).

31. Although the measurement of **child poverty** in Pakistan is limited by the indicators which are currently available, it is imperative to conceptualise child poverty as distinct from general household poverty given its far-reaching and inter-generational impact. At present, over half of Pakistan’s total population comprises children and adolescents – from newborns to youths of 19 years of age – while over 41% of the population is under the age of 14.

32. Despite some gains, Pakistan’s **low levels of human development** undermine the productivity of its labour force and its overall economic growth. Pakistan ranks 147th of the 188 countries listed in the 2015 *Human Development Index* (HDI). Its human development indicators are far lower than those of most countries in South Asia. In addition to these challenges, the effects of natural disasters – notably of the devastating 2005 earthquake and severe floods in 2010 and 2011 – have had tremendously negative impacts on the country’s economy.



33. Recent policies and programmes have focused on economic growth, increasing employment and poverty reduction. Nevertheless, the **benefits of these policies have not been not equitably distributed**. Holistic policies that focus on both economic and social development are needed to reduce regional and rural-urban disparities in Pakistan’s poverty levels.

34. While provisions in the Constitution guarantee **social security** and the basic necessities of life for all citizens (cf. Article 38), Pakistan spends only 1.3% of its GDP on public social protection – one of the lowest rates in the Asia Pacific region. The country’s social protection system comprises a range of programmes and schemes which fall into three overarching categories: a) social insurance; b) social assistance; and c) labour market programmes. Federal and provincial governments have initiated various short- and long-term social protection initiatives offering different kinds of benefits. Nevertheless, social protection coverage remains limited. In 2008, it was estimated to cover a mere 3.33% of the population.

Social protection systems in Pakistan are characterised by limited capacity, coordination and cooperation among service providers. They are marked by inefficient service delivery; disarray in terms of targeting; inappropriate service packages; weak monitoring; and a lack of graduation mechanisms. Specific initiatives to address poverty, like the *Benazir Income Support Programme* (BISP), are also constrained by their scale and access factors. These include access to identity cards, which are a prerequisite for BISP and many other social services. BISP’s approach – which the World Bank approves of – involves identifying eligible families via a “Poverty Scorecard”, which assesses households by surveying their assets and expenses. BISP’s *Second Impact Evaluation Report 2015* points to the programme’s progress in alleviating the worst effects of food, fuel and financial crises on the poor. Yet, the overall poverty status of eligible families, based on which they receive cash payments, depends on how the money is used (i.e. sharing the transfer, using it to pay debts, etc.). Thus the value of payments may be too small to make a considerable difference.

Efforts are underway at various levels – both strategic and tactical – to overcome these difficulties and foster a social protection system which is responsive to needs of all, particularly the most vulnerable. These efforts aim is to establish a well-coordinated, integrated, cost-effective and efficient system that brings about desired changes in the lives of the poorest and most vulnerable segments of Pakistan’s society. Such change will do far more than reduce poverty – it will help Pakistan address associated challenges of hunger (SDG 2), health (SDG 3), education (SDG 4) and inequalities (SDG 10).

35. The country’s **progress in reducing poverty** is partly related to overall economic advances. Nevertheless, poverty reduction has been constrained by many of the same factors that hamper economic growth. Foremost among these is the fact that traditional elites and the more modern sectors of the economy tend to exclusively reap the benefits of growth. Other pivotal factors include the structural marginalisation of the country’s most excluded groups. In order to achieve true progress, well-coordinated, integrated, cost-effective and efficient policies and programmes are needed to bring about lasting positive change in the lives of the poorest and most vulnerable.



Inequalities (SDG 10)

Pervasive inequalities across Pakistan make the aim of “reaching the unreached” a significant challenge for future policies and their implementation.

36. **Significant gender disparities** mean that Pakistan is nearly in last place internationally in terms of gender equality. Such disparities are a major impediment to economic and social development, as well to upholding human rights in general.

The country's scores 0.726 on the *Gender Development Index* (GDI), which measures gender inequalities across three basic dimensions of human development: health (measured by female and male life expectancy at birth); education (measured by the expected years of schooling for women and men, as well as the mean years for adults aged 25 and older); and command over economic resources (measured by the estimated Gross National Income per capita which women and men enjoy).

Its rating by the *Gender Inequality Index* (GII) is a mere 0.536, with Pakistan ranking 121st of 155 countries. The GII reflects gender-based inequalities across three dimensions: reproductive health, empowerment and economic activity.

Women's extremely low participation in economically productive activities is a prominent example of gender disparity with an adverse effect on the country's economic growth. Only between 22-26% of Pakistani women are active in the workforce, a predicament discussed by the section on gender. The only exception to this trend is the sphere of agriculture, in which women are more actively involved. Yet, as the subsequent chapter on Prosperity notes, this is the only sector of the economy currently experiencing negative growth. As discussed in the sections on gender and justice, violence against women is prevalent, culturally accepted by both men and women, and rarely punished. Only 13% of loans are accessed by women, while the remaining 87% are accessed by men. Moreover, only 2% of the women in Pakistan own land.

37. Ethnic and religious disparities, which are sometimes related to geographic disparities, are compounded by social factors and widespread discrimination. They are also complicated by a lack of political will and government capacity to address these issues, especially in more remote or culturally conservative areas. Religious minorities, such as the Shias, Ahmadis, Hindus and Christians, tend to be over-represented among the poorest members of society, even when they are not geographically isolated. Persecution of ethnic minorities is also a significant driver of migration.

38. High levels of **social discrimination against the lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender (LGBT) community**, as well as against persons living with HIV/AIDS, leads to their exclusion. Scarce data is available on these population groups, making it difficult to fully analyse their situation or to develop appropriate social policies to reach them. More research is needed to assess their predicament, develop evidenced-based policies and implement these measures to improve the well-being of such minorities.

39. Notable disparities are evident between **rural and urban areas** in terms of social development. Poverty in urban centres is 9.4%, compared to a staggering 54.6% in rural areas. Deprivation in terms of education is the greatest contributor to multidimensional poverty (43%), followed by living standards (32%) and health (26%). These statistics are stark illustrations of Pakistan's weak progress on social indicators, despite reasonable advances with respect to economic indicators.

40. Provincial disparities also relate to population size, natural resources, access to markets and, in some cases, security concerns which constrain access. Accounting for 50% of Pakistan's total population, Punjab is a strong political constituency which receives significant attention and investment from both the public and private sectors. On the other hand, Balochistan, which accounts for 45% of Pakistan's territory but only 5% of its population, receives less attention and investment. These trends are exacerbated by areas within the province which are especially difficult to access due to security concerns.

Similarly, KP and FATA are both physically remote and affected by security concerns. Such access constraints make it significantly more challenging to reduce inequalities in these areas. This is especially problematic as Balochistan, KP and FATA host large populations of refugees and temporarily displaced persons. Despite international funding to alleviate the challenges of hosting vulnerable populations, their presence strains national and provincial resources which could otherwise be used to "reach the unreachable".



Multidimensional poverty is highest in FATA (73%) and Balochistan (71%), and lowest in Punjab (31%). The distribution of donor funding risks exacerbating or even creating disparities, as most funding in recent years has targeted KP, FATA, Punjab and Sindh. By contrast, funding for Balochistan and Pakistan Administered Kashmir (PAK) has been extremely limited, given security concerns in the case of Balochistan, and due to donor sensitivity regarding PAK's international status.

41. **District disparities** appear to follow patterns similar to those of provincial disparities. The 20 districts which the *Multidimensional Poverty Index* identifies as the “poorest” in the country are affected by similar factors: population size, natural resources, access to markets and access constraints. Many of Pakistan's poorest districts are in Balochistan, KP and FATA, usually on the border with Afghanistan. Others are in southern Punjab and northern Sindh, where factors related to exclusion are socio-economic – including issues of land tenure – but do not appear to derive from geographic isolation.

42. **Addressing disparities** constitutes a major challenge for Pakistan. Disparities and discrimination on the basis of gender, religion, ethnicity, abilities, sexual orientation or geography are all too often ignored or inadequately addressed in policies and programmes. Insufficient data is collected to highlight the situation of groups who experience disadvantages on these grounds. Even when political will is forthcoming, a lack of accurate data impedes effective programming to benefit these segments of the population.

43. These **disparities have serious implications for Pakistan's ability to achieve the SDGs**. The factors which provoke disparities, discrimination and pervasive inequality all pose significant challenges to achieving the targets set by SDG 1. These include: increasing the growth of incomes for the bottom 40% of the population; social, economic and political inclusion; equal opportunities; reducing discrimination; providing social protection; and enhancing the voice and participation of the most marginalised.



Nutrition and Food Security (SDG 2)

44. Pakistan faces significant problems in terms of the quality of its population's diet (**nutrition security**) and the adequacy of the food they consume (**food security**). Wasting rates are above emergency levels, indicating acute nutritional issues. Nearly half of the country's children under the age of five suffer from stunting, revealing the prevalence of chronic issues. Well over half of the children in Pakistan are affected by either nutrition or food insecurity, or both insecurities simultaneously. In many cases, their very survival is at risk. Those who survive face substantial rates of moderate to severe development and growth issues.

According to the *Global Hunger Index (GHI) 2016*, Pakistan's performance in terms of eradicating hunger is one of the worst in the world. It ranks 107th of 118 developing nations, with especially dire performance when compared to other South Asian countries.

45. **Food security** affects a significant portion of Pakistan's population given challenges related to:

- a. National policies, especially in terms of inappropriate policies and incentives for agriculture and irrigation, as explored in the chapter on Prosperity;
- b. The related effects of problems in other sectors, notably WASH and education;
- c. Access to credit and land tenure, alongside cultural practices which dictate food allocation within households; and
- d. Transient but recurring environmental phenomena, such as floods and droughts.



46. Pakistan's population critically lacks an adequate **intake of all the key vitamins and minerals** necessary for optimal growth and survival. The 2011 *National Nutrition Survey* (NNS) reveals extremely high levels of stunting (43.7 %), a physical manifestation of insufficient, poor quality diets over extended periods of time. Breaking down this average reveals even more alarming trends – half of all stunting is severe, a fact that distinguishes Pakistan from other countries in the region. Anaemia is prevalent and the population suffers from a significant lack of Vitamins A and D, zinc, iron, folic acid and calcium.

47. Most nutrition initiatives have focused on treating acutely malnourished children, a move that alleviates the symptoms of malnutrition **without addressing its root causes**. The *Scaling Up Nutrition* (SUN) framework, in which Pakistan has been fully engaged since late 2013, has shifted the focus to include prevention. SUN also reinforces the importance of action in sectors which affect nutritional status, including WASH, agriculture, health and education.

48. **Nutritional disparity** is related to deep-rooted patriarchal norms and practices. These foment gender-based discrimination in food distribution. They also affect the knowledge, attitudes and practices of women, in particular, and of caregivers in general, in terms of child and adolescent food intake and well-being. Maternal nutritional status is inextricably linked to the nutritional status of children. Pervasive nutritional deficiencies among children are unsurprising given that women suffer from high-levels of anaemia and deficiencies in calcium and Vitamin D.

49. Pakistan's level of **acute malnutrition** (16%) constitutes “an emergency” by international standards. While this is partly caused by arid conditions and occasional drought in some areas, it is more broadly provoked by **food insecurity** which affects those who are economically and socially disadvantaged, whether or not they reside in regions suffering from drought. Similarly, levels of chronic malnutrition or “stunting” (43.7%) are also at “emergency levels” according to international standards. Chronic malnutrition is prompted, by issues of access to adequate food or vitamin and mineral supplements, in terms of availability and cost. It also relates to limited awareness of proper nutrition practices within families and at the community level. Malnutrition – whether acute, chronic or in terms of obesity – is common in both rural and urban areas, linked to under-nutrition and food insecurity that spans the rural-urban divide. Obesity is becoming a critical problem in Pakistan, which ranks amongst the top nine most obese countries of the world. This critical problem can be overcome through nutrition programmes and awareness of balanced diets.

50. The **failure to address issues of malnutrition** has direct adverse effects on Pakistan's human capital and future economic outlook. For example, chronic malnutrition provokes severe health problems and disabilities. It is caused by factors like maternal malnutrition; limited access to Maternal, Neonatal and Child Health (MNCH) services; insufficient breastfeeding; weaning practices; food insufficiency; a lack of simple household hygiene practices; unsafe water supplies; and a lack of required micro-nutrients. Even where the effects of chronic malnutrition are not easily observable, they can negatively affect brain development in young children. As such, malnutrition detrimentally impacts health and well-being (SDG3), learning achievement (SDG 4), productivity (SDG 8), and exacerbates inequalities (SDG 10). This combination of factors, in turn, makes it significantly more difficult to eliminate poverty (SDG 1).



Health (SDG 3)

51. **Situation Overview:** Although Pakistan's health indicators have improved over the past decade, notable challenges persist at the national and provincial levels.

I. The burden of **communicable disease** presents a serious challenge. Pakistan is one of only three countries in which polio remains endemic. Its prevalence is directly tied to poverty, inadequate education, limited supplies of clean water and poor sanitation. It is equally linked to the inadequate coverage and quality of health services, insufficient political will and social impediments.

II. **Non-communicable diseases** are responsible for over half of Pakistan's preventable mortality and morbidity. Despite this, no integrated programme is in place to prevent or control such diseases, although efforts are now being initiated. Pakistan recently became the third country in the world to place pictorial warnings on 85% of tobacco packs. Yet, tobacco taxation remains insufficient and tobacco consumption is on the rise. There are estimated 22-25 million smokers in the country; 55% of households have at least one member who smokes (*Pakistan Health Education Survey, 1991, 1999*). Around 36% of adult males and 7% of adult females use tobacco products, yielding a male to female ratio of 5:1 (*National Health Behaviour Survey, 2012*).

III. In recent years, Pakistan has made marginal progress in improving **neonatal and child health**. The mortality rate for children under the age of 5 is 89 per 1,000 live births. The infant mortality rate is 74/1,000 live births (*Pakistan Demographic and Health Survey, 2013*). Neonatal mortality has stagnated at 55 per 1,000 live births over the last three decades, warranting increased focus on this highly crucial segment of newborns at a high risk of dying. Acute respiratory infections, malnutrition and diarrhoea are the main causes of death among children under 5, while haemorrhages and puerperal infections are the leading causes of maternal deaths. Only 54% of children under 5 receive all their basic vaccinations, a low rate which contributes to high levels of disability, mortality and morbidity.

IV. Pakistan's **maternal mortality ratio (MMR)** decreased from 431 per 100,000 live births in 1990 to 178 per 100,000 in 2015, an impressive decline of 59% (World Bank). On average, the country's maternal mortality ratio fell by 3.5% annually. Yet, due to uncertainty surrounding accurate measurements of its MMR, the confidence range for this figure is between 1.8% and 5.1%. While Pakistan has clearly been making progress, it did not reach its target of 130 maternal deaths per 100,000 live births by 2015. Some 8,000 women die each year from causes related to pregnancy and childbirth. Rates vary widely between provinces, for instance Balochistan's maternal mortality ratio is 3.5 times higher than that of Punjab.

V. Pakistan has a high rate of **disabilities**, partly due to inadequate nutrition, insufficient preventive health services, and the prevalence of marriage between close relations. In 2012, 56% of all marriages in the country were between first and second cousins.

VI. Inadequate access to, and use of, **reproductive health services** abounds across Pakistan. As the population increases, national and family resources are under increasing strain in this respect, particularly among the poorest and most excluded segments of society. Early pregnancy is common among groups who marry early, and is correlated to poverty, illiteracy and limited understanding of sexual and reproductive health.

Only 35% of married women use any form of birth control, a mere 10% of married women between the ages of 15 and 19 use contraceptives, and only 7% use modern methods to prevent pregnancy. The contraceptive prevalence rate in Pakistan has increased gradually – rising from 12% in 1990/1991 to 30% in 2006/2007 and 35% in 2012/2013. The rate for modern methods climbed from 9% to 22% and 26% over the same period. However, this is far below the rates attained in Bangladesh, India, Iran and Indonesia at roughly the same time (2012) – which were 52%, 49%, 57% and 58%, respectively.

VII. Human resource disparities pose significant challenges to the health and well-being of Pakistan's population. Despite heavy government subsidies for educating health professionals, the development and distribution of human resources for health is skewed towards doctors and urban areas. The public sector is struggling with absenteeism and dual practice. The coverage of the *Lady Health Workers Programme* has remained stagnant since devolution beginning in 2010.

Lady Health Workers appear to be deviating from their original intended roles, since the salary bill for these health workers is too high to be sustained by the provinces. While all of Pakistan's provinces have endeavoured to fill vacant posts, efforts to increase staff have not been integrated into comprehensive human resources plans.

VIII. Pakistan is among four countries in the Asia Pacific region where the estimated number of new **HIV infections** has increased each year since 1990. Pakistan now has the highest rate of growth in estimated new infections for the 2005-2015 period. While there were 1,600 estimated new infections in 2000, this rose to 16,500 in 2016. Vulnerabilities to HIV/AIDS are multi-layered and closely linked to gender inequalities, stigma and discrimination against people living with HIV/AIDS. There are an estimated 100,000 people living with HIV (PLHIV) across the country, 72% of whom are men and 28% are women. 2.5% of those affected are children under the age of 14. A large number of women are in need of prevention services to reduce parent-to-child HIV transmission.

The vast gap between the number of people estimated to be living with HIV (100,000) and the number who are registered with health services (16,000) is tied to high-levels of stigma and discrimination against the key populations most affected by HIV. Specifically, people who inject drugs, sex workers and transgender individuals. In turn, this stigma is provoked by a lack of education on sexual and reproductive health within Pakistan's education and health curriculum, which consequently fails to prevent risky sexual and health behaviour.

IX. Pakistan also suffers from significant **disparities in health service delivery**. Following devolution, no major disruptions or visible improvements were noted in terms of service delivery. Positive trends include a steady increase in the rate of deliveries assisted by skilled birth attendants since 2008, across all provinces. However, vaccination coverage has decreased in Sindh and Balochistan and plateaued in KP. Punjab alone has been able to sustain an increasing vaccination coverage rate.

X. Social investment in health (approximately 0.8% of GDP) remains extremely low. Current levels are inadequate to secure progress and achieve the SDGs. To an extent, this is linked to a lack of available government funds, particularly in light of low tax collection. Yet, it also relates to political will. Even within existing resources, there is a tendency to focus government and donor attention on the formal health system – e.g. on doctors and hospitals – rather than on preventive health care. Such an approach would include, for example, increasing family and community capacity to prevent and manage health risks and related factors. While provincial governments are assigning increased resources to health, they also tend to focus on infrastructure projects rather than on prevention.

XI. Social attitudes, particularly among certain marginalised or excluded rural populations, also constrain health programmes. For example, parents rejecting vaccinations for their children posed a serious obstacle in the drive to eradicate polio by "reaching the unreached". Although such trends are gradually declining, these issues clearly reveal the need to address a variety of issues, including poverty and a lack of awareness, in order to significantly advance towards SDG 3's targets on health.



XII. Health information systems in Pakistan remain inadequate. While online provincial monitoring dashboards have been established, the quality of data is problematic. Challenges are also posed by the lack of a clear link with purchasing decisions and provider performance as a means of improving accountability and efficiency in the health system. Beyond primary healthcare indicators, the provinces have to streamline data from vertical programmes. They must establish information systems for hospitals, human resource management, insurance and the regulation of providers. Thus far, there has been little effort to develop a reporting mechanism for private providers.

XIII. Like nutrition challenges, **health problems** hamper economic growth (SDG 8), poverty reduction (SDG 1), education (SDG 5) and gender equality (SDG 5). The causes of health problems are intimately linked to poverty (SDG1), poor nutrition (SDG 2), a lack of education (SDG 4), gender inequality (SDG 5) and inadequate water and sanitation (SDG 6). Unless Pakistan makes significant progress on health by 2030, it will not be able to achieve a host of other SDGs. Without improving the health and well-being of its population, the country cannot hope to harness the vast potential of its human capital and enhance productivity.



Education (SDG 4)

52. Situation Overview: Pakistan faces multiple, complex challenges in terms of education. Recent years have witnessed significant steps towards advancing the right to education. A key legislative milestone was the adoption of Article 25-A in the 2010 Constitutional Amendment, committing the country to educate all girls and boys between the ages of 5 and 16. This was followed by the promulgation of compulsory education laws in most, but not all, of Pakistan's provinces and administrative areas.

The governments of Pakistan's provinces and regions are making headway, developing Education Sector Plans as roadmaps to guide their education reform agendas in a coordinated manner. Unfortunately, progress has been uneven. The aspiration of getting all of Pakistan's children into school remains unfulfilled. Government statistics estimate that 24 million children aged 5-16 are out of school, of whom 6.1 million are of primary school age. Some 51.2% of 4-year olds in the country's four provinces do not attend pre-school.

Most children who attend school receive poor quality education. Quality issues across the field of education are linked to social and cultural barriers alongside significant institutional bottlenecks. The *National Education Assessment Report (2014)* reveals that the performance of an average Grade 4 student is "basic" with respect to science and reading English, but falls below "basic" when it comes to writing in English. Only a small proportion of students scored in the proficient or advanced ranges, whereas an exceptionally large proportion scored in the "below basic" range for several subjects. Equitably enabling all children to acquire basic skills is another area which faces immense challenges.

53. Several key points should be noted in terms of **access to education** in Pakistan:

I. Early Childhood Education (ECE) requires far greater attention. A critical aspect of education, it lays the foundation for effective learning and children's holistic growth. As a significant school readiness measure for primary education, ECE can ensure effective school participation and retention. For years, Pakistan has informally offered one-year pre-primary education ("*katchi*") in public sector schools, albeit without the allocation of teachers or other resources.

The Constitution of Pakistan does not guarantee Early Childhood Education (“pre-primary”), although it is strongly promoted by the *Convention on the Rights of the Child* (CRC) and SDG target 4.2. Pakistan’s *National Education Policy* (NEP) 2009 recognises the importance of ECE for children between the ages of 3 and 4. Although it identifies clear policy actions, implementation has proved difficult. The country’s provinces are increasingly incorporating ECE in their Education Sector Plans, while developing provincial early learning policies and standards. Private sector provision of ECE, coupled with the engagement of dedicated teachers, is growing in significance.

II. Primary education coverage is increasing but remains uneven across the country. Despite relatively greater investments in primary education, access continues to be a major challenge. Overall, an estimated 34.4% of children of primary school age are out of school. The principle factors behind this trend relate to gender, rural-urban residence, geographic residence (province/administrative area) and economic status. 38.9% of girls do not attend primary or secondary schools, while the figure is 30.2% for boys. Boys are more likely than girls to be “over-age” for the level of education they attend – 9% of boys are older than the intended age group for their class, a figure which is 8.1% for girls.

While primary education is free in Pakistan – entailing no enrolment, textbook or uniform fees – access issues abound in rural areas. Initial primary school enrolment shows some disparities related to gender, which become steadily more pronounced after the primary level. For instance, many rural families would prefer that their daughters attend “girl-only” schools, which are not always available within their communities. A number of related issues influence the choice to withdraw girls from primary school, including the lack of toilet facilities for girls. This dearth of facilities is perceived to expose girls to unacceptable risks, such as the threat of sexual assault.

III. Access to secondary education is highly uneven, particularly for girls. As secondary schools are often farther away from their homes than primary schools, many families feel that their daughters will be at risk during transit – given inadequate transportation facilities – or at school. Many are also reluctant to permit girls to pursue their education due to the widespread perception that education is ultimately “unnecessary” for girls, as they will marry and become home-makers at an early age.

IV. Access to tertiary education in Pakistan remains extremely limited, despite an increasing number of higher education facilities across the country, including in smaller urban centres. In recent years, the Government has cracked down on a plethora of fraudulent tertiary institutions. Thus, Pakistan faces an additional challenge – not all tertiary education is legitimate, even when students leave with a diploma or degree.

V. Overall, access to vocational training and skills development is fairly limited. The provision of training tends to be seen as a government responsibility. Thus, adequate partnerships have not been fostered with the private sector, which ultimately has the greatest interest ensuring the development of a well-trained labour force. Many youths, especially young women, find themselves unable to access training since a secondary school certificate is often required to enrol in vocational schools.

54. Across all grades, **retention rates in Pakistani schools are alarmingly low.** Only two-thirds of students enrolled in schools complete their primary education. A comparative analysis of enrolment data over a ten year period, from 2004/2005 to 2014/2015, reveals that just 28% of “enrolled children” completed their secondary education in public secondary schools.

55. Various studies affirm that Pakistan is experiencing a **learning crisis.** The quality of education tends to be poor at both the primary and secondary levels. Low levels of learning achievement and weak learning outcomes are evident across the country.

Most schools emphasise rote-learning and employ curricula that are not adequately geared towards localised or contextual realities. Since the 1980s, school curricula have increasingly included ideological and religious content, which may be contributing to falling levels of social tolerance – both towards minority religions and ethnicities. Such alarming tendencies pose serious obstacles to achieving the objectives of SDG 16 (Peaceful and Just Societies).

This learning crisis is ultimately caused by ineffective governance, low levels of national investment in education, deficient accountability measures and limited technical and professional capacity. Stakeholders broadly agree on the need to upgrade the quality of education in Pakistan. Yet, no consensus exists on how to define “education quality.” In an effort to mitigate this dilemma, the Federal Ministry of Education has developed *Minimum Standards for Quality Learning*. However, benchmarks remain ambiguous. For instance, it is unclear what children are expected to learn in primary and secondary schools, and exactly what they should learn at each grade/age level.

56. The low quality and relevance of education prompts high drop-out rates. A national study of learning achievement found that only 50% of fifth-grade students in public primary schools can read or do arithmetic at a second-grade level. Many families deem the “opportunity cost” of education too high to keep children in school. That is, they feel it would be more useful for their children to work and earn an income, as opposed to studying. This sentiment is especially acute when parents perceive school curricula to be irrelevant, or when those in excluded communities feel that an education is unlikely to lead to greater job opportunities.

57. Family support for children’s learning is largely inadequate. The fact that 43.7% of children are affected by chronic malnutrition severely limits their ability to learn effectively and contributes to high drop-out rates. Successful models do exist in Pakistan, which have addressed the complex issues affecting children’s educational achievement in an exemplary manner – ranging from children’s nutrition status to dropout rates, gender disparity among school children and among out of school children. However there is limited capacity and political will to replicate these models on a broader scale.

58. While investment in the education sector is rising, marked by encouraging trends at the provincial level, the Government is still far from realising its commitment to invest 4% of GDP in education by 2018. The figure has historically remained around 2%, with the education budget in 2016 totalling 2.8% of GDP.

Following the 18th Constitutional Amendment which devolved responsibility for education to the provinces, provincial governments have considerably increased resource allocations for education in their annual budgets. The overall national education budget increased by 27%, from US\$ 5.5 billion in 2013/2014 to US\$ 6.9 billion in 2015/2016. Over the same period, provincial budget allocations for education increased by 8.4% in Sindh, 12% in KP, 19% in Balochistan and 21.4% in Punjab. Nevertheless, the effective use of resources remains a challenge, with the provinces returning funds earmarked for education each year. Structurally, the situation is characterised by poor implementation and enforcement of commitments, legislation and policies.

59. To develop localised targets and indicators for SDG 4 (Quality Education) at the national and provincial levels, a series of **national and provincial consultations** were held in early 2016, with the support of UNESCO and UNICEF. Draft “*SDG 4 Roadmaps*” have already been prepared for Balochistan and Sindh, while roadmaps for other provinces are forthcoming. The Ministry of Education and Training established an SDG 4 Cell to set targets and indicators, as well as to monitor progress on the implementation of SDG 4, including progress on refugee education.

60. There is a need to build on existing good practices, taking stock of the insights these cases offer for expanding equitable access to quality education, improving learning environments and reducing drop out rates. These insights can be used for scaling-up, leveraging, and advocacy.



For instance, they could be used to devise innovative mechanisms for gauging the levels of social cohesion amongst young people. They could also be employed to reach out to especially vulnerable children and adolescents through alternative learning programmes (ALPs), Child Protection Centres (CPCs), *madrassas* and other institutions.

61. A number of further steps are required for the future:

- I. Expand Early Childhood Education (ECE), while improving access to, and the quality of, overall education;
- II. Expand alternative forms of education by strengthening education in *madrassas* and other institutions, thereby increasing access to education;
- III. Continue evidence-based advocacy to support excluded groups to enjoy their right to free and compulsory education. This must include improving the capacities required to gather, analyse and use data for advocacy;
- IV. Introduce innovative education practices, including the promotion of social cohesion through education for peace-building; the effective use of learning technologies; developing alternative pathways to learning, such as accelerated learning or distance education for adolescents; and improving emergency preparedness and response (Disaster Risk Reduction);
- V. Ensure that, as part of quality education, learners also acquire the knowledge, skills, attitudes and awareness to promote key elements of sustainable development. These include sustainable lifestyles, human rights, gender equality, a culture of peace and non-violence, cultural diversity and global citizenship;
- VI. Strengthen skills and knowledge at the family/community levels, equipping key-players to appropriately manage health, nutrition, sanitation and other central aspects of human development. It will also be necessary to focus on such issues within school curricula;
- VII. Strengthen teaching on diversity and tolerance in the education curriculum, ensuring that teachers instil these values and do not contribute to fostering intolerance among their students; and
- VIII. Significantly strengthen steps to protect Pakistan's rich cultural and historical heritage. In addition to its value as a global public good, the country's heritage stands to be a significant driver of national pride, national identity, and domestic and international tourism. Thus, it can play a vital role in reducing poverty (SDG 1), increasing economic growth and expanding decent work (SDG 8).



Gender Equality (SDG 5)

62. Situation Overview: Gender inequality is the most pervasive **human rights concern** in Pakistan, which directly affects half the population, as well as many male children and youth. Pakistan ratified the *Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women* (CEDAW) in 1996. Two decades later, however, it has yet to implement the Convention effectively.

Pakistan is ranked 121st of 155 countries by the *Gender Inequality Index (GII)*. The *Global Gender Gap Index* ranks Pakistan 144th of 145 countries. Only 19.3% of women in the country attain a secondary education, as opposed to 46.1% of men; similarly women's participation in the labour market is estimated at 22-26%, compared to a participation rate of approximately 67.8-83% for men.

63. Social and religious norms, relations and traditions are powerful causes of women's exclusion and lack of empowerment in Pakistani society, particularly in impoverished and/or rural areas. Traditional attitudes which are harmful to women are rooted in entrenched social, educational and economic structures. While such attitudes stem from conservative norms prevalent in rural or tribal societies, increased migration from rural areas to urban centres is helping to "transplant" these attitudes to urban zones, at least in the short-term. This is especially true of burgeoning peri-urban settlements, home to scores of rural migrants.

A lack of government resources for tackling harmful gender norms, high levels of poverty, and low levels of education have yielded a society in which few women are aware of their rights. In tandem, these factors make it extremely difficult to implement the reforms needed to improve the current situation. Despite progress on education for women and girls, and women's increasing involvement in political and administrative roles, Pakistan lags behind other countries in terms of substantially advancing women's rights.

64. Gender disparities are evident across key indicators – poverty, health, maternal mortality, education, employment, access to resources, decision-making within households and communities – clearly demonstrating that gender is a cross-cutting concern. Data from the *Pakistan Social and Living Standards Measurement (PSLM)* survey 2010/2011 sheds light on notable disparities in education. 78% of boys aged 10-14 were found to be in school, compared to 63% of girls. Similarly, while 47.1% of boys aged 15-19 were pursuing an education, this figure fell to 35.5% for girls. Pakistan's Population Council estimates that over 4 million adolescent girls are out of school, are not in "paid employment", and are not married. The low social status accorded to such young women exposes them to a range of vulnerabilities.

65. Pakistan has a **high total fertility rate** of 3.8 children per woman, a rate which rises to 4.2 in rural areas (*Pakistan Demographic and Health Survey, 2012/2013*). Adolescent fertility is similarly high, at 44 births per 1,000 women between the ages of 15 and 19. Although it has decreased fairly slowly, the maternal mortality ratio (MMR) declined by 59% between 1990 and 2015. While this is encouraging, far more remains to be done. Addressing these complex issues requires significant investment of state resources. However, as noted above, less than 1% of Pakistan's GDP (approximately 0.8%) is used to finance the health sector.

66. These overarching factors lead to gender disparities and inequalities in a number of areas:

I. Health: The incidence of illness is higher among women across all income quantiles in Pakistan. Nearly 12% of the disease burden is due to reproductive health problems. Maternal malnutrition is high, estimated at 26%. Despite progress since 1990, the maternal mortality ratio (MMR) remained high in 2015, with 178 maternal deaths per 100,000 live births. This is closely linked with inadequate nutrition, rising expenses and a lack of education, alongside inadequate coverage of quality obstetric and emergency obstetric services. Approximately 21% of women in Pakistan aged 20-24 were married before the age of 18. An estimated 14.2% of girls aged 15-19 are currently married, with much higher figures in rural areas. These trends compound risks associated with early pregnancy, as well as risks like girls dropping out of school.

II. Political Participation: Although many prominent women stand out in Pakistani history, including Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, women are generally accorded much lower status than men in Pakistani society. In 2002, 54 women ran for seats in the National Assembly, a figure which rose to 161 in the 2013 election. Women legislators play an increasingly active role, conducting 60% of all parliamentary business in the National Assembly.

Nonetheless, few women serve in elected roles, either in national or local governments, or even within their own political parties. Pakistan has among the lowest proportions of women in public service in South Asia, currently only 5%. The overwhelming majority of public servants are men (95%).

III. Violence against Women and Girls: Gender-based violence is widespread in Pakistan, illustrating the urgent need to transform social attitudes and behaviours in order to evoke progress at the policy-, legal-, and administrative levels. Crimes against women increased by 21% between 2013 and 2014. On average, every day in Punjab 6 women are murdered or face a murder attempt, 8 women are raped, 11 are assaulted, and 32 abducted. Despite these alarming figures, the conviction rate for such crimes is an abysmal 1% - 2.5%.

In line with the findings of the *Pakistan Demographic and Health Survey (PDHS) 2012/13*, statistics indicate that 32% of women between the ages of 15 and 49 have experienced physical violence. 19% were found to have experienced physical violence during the previous 12 months. The prevalence rates for experiencing violence varied according to the backgrounds of each cohort. Generally, women and girls aged 15-24 are less likely than older women to have experienced physical violence since the age of 15. Nevertheless, adolescent girls aged 15-19 are more likely than older women to have experienced physical violence within the previous 12 months. In addition, women and girls in rural areas are more likely to have experienced physical violence than their urban counterparts (34% vs. 28%), and to have experienced physical violence during the past 12 months (21% vs. 16%). Women in the lowest wealth quintile are also more susceptible to physical violence than those in the higher wealth quintiles – for instance, 25% of the former experienced physical violence during the previous 12 months, compared to 11% of the latter.

The *Child Marriage Restraint Act* of 1929 remains the primary piece of legislation in Pakistan to curb the harmful phenomenon of early marriage. The issue of women's forced marriage is also addressed under Section 498B of the Pakistan Penal Code, a significant but little-used provision. Overall, data indicates that rural adolescent girls are at far greater risk of child marriage.

IV. Gender Discrimination and the Wage Gap: Pakistan's female labour force participation rate is estimated at 22-26%, compared to a rate of between 67.8% (*Labour Force Survey, 2014-2015*) and 83% for men. Women earn 23% less than men for equivalent work – while the average monthly income for women is PKR 9,760, it is PKR 15,884 for men. Extremely few women (0.3%) hold managerial positions. Overall, more women are employed in rural areas than in urban centres – only 12% of women in urban areas are employed.

The gender wage gap derives from a range of factors, including stereotypes, levels of education, unpaid care work, and direct or indirect gender-based discrimination. Women bear a burden of unpaid work which is globally estimated to be three times greater than that of men. Such trends are exacerbated in Pakistan, where time use surveys and research – including a 2016 study by UN Women – reveal that, for every 10 hours that women spend on unpaid care work, men spend 1 hour.

V. Educational Attainment: Of the 24 million children who are out of school in Pakistan, the majority are girls. The combined federal and provincial allocations for education total PKR 734 billion, approximately 2.8% of the country's GDP. This limits the investments required to ensure that more girls pursue an education, which is ultimately also contingent on changing social norms. Of the women who do attain an education at the tertiary level, a significant number do not go on to practice their professions. For example, some 70% of medical school graduates are women, yet a large proportion marry and become home-makers rather than going on to become practicing medical professionals. Only 6 women – compared to 66 men – currently serve as vice-chancellors of universities in Pakistan.



VI. Accountability: Women's institutions exist at both the national and provincial levels. Prominent among these are the National Commission on the Status of Women (NCSW), Provincial Commissions on the Status of Women (PCSWs), Gender and Child Cells, Women Protection Cells, Punjab's Women Development Department (WDD) and an Inter-Provincial Ministerial Group. The NCSW is responsible for monitoring the implementation of CEDAW and reporting to the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women. Pakistan's civil society also encompasses a number of prominent women's organisations, including the End Violence against Women and Girls (EVAW-G) Alliance and *Insani Haqooq Ittehad*. These organisations play a key role in challenging the lack of implementation of laws and policies to uphold women's rights.

VII. Women's Sexual and Reproductive Rights: Guaranteeing women's enjoyment of their sexual and reproductive rights through increased access and quality service delivery poses a key institutional challenge for Pakistan. Without such increased services, alongside related changes in societal norms, the country will be unable to reduce its high population growth rate. As noted throughout this CCA, a rapidly growing population will significantly jeopardise Pakistan's ability to achieve the SDGs, reduce poverty (SDG1), promote equitable economic growth and create decent employment (SDG8).



Water, Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH) (SDG 6)

67. Pakistan is among the 10 countries in the world with the greatest number of people (16 million) without access to safe water, including drinking water. While this situation is gradually improving, a recent report by the Pakistan Council of Water Resources Research (PCRWR) noted that up to 82% of the country's drinking water resources are biologically contaminated. Unsafe water is a critical hazard, with adverse effects on health, nutrition, and effective learning days in school.

68. Environmental factors pose an increasing threat to the availability of water in Pakistan. These include a deepening water table in Balochistan caused by the overuse of subsidised tube wells; increased salinization of water tables in Sindh; and agricultural and urban contamination. The lack of an effective solid waste management system across the country means that the environment is absorbing untreated waste, with dire consequences. As such, Pakistan urgently requires an integrated water resource management system.

69. While **adequate sanitation** is slowly improving, Pakistan remains among the five countries in the world with the highest number of inhabitants (25 million) who practice open defecation. This particularly problematic given that faecal sludge and solid waste management systems are virtually non-existent. Open defecation – related both to a lack of facilities and a lack of awareness – constitutes a major challenge to health (SDG3), nutrition (SDG2), education (SDG4), women's well-being (SDG 5), sustainable communities (SDG 11) and the environment (SDG 13).

70. Women are especially vulnerable to harassment and violence in the absence of adequate WASH facilities, especially when travelling long distances to fetch water, using shared toilets, or practicing open defecation. Women and girls often wait until nightfall to defecate, which increases the risk of assault. The shame and indignity of defecating in the open also affects women's self-esteem, as does a lack of water for washing clothes and personal hygiene.

71. Even in urban areas, WASH challenges remain significant. Many rural migrants to urban areas continue to practice **open defecation** in their peri-urban communities. While significant progress has been made in reducing open defecation – which fell from 49% in 1990 to 13% in 2015, an annual decline of 3.9% – 25 million people still resort to this practice.

Open defecation provokes severe health problems, most notably diarrhoea and acute respiratory illness. Both ailments are leading contributors to high mortality rates. Approximately 53,000 children die each year from diarrhoea alone. In addition, the lack of sewage treatment facilities in most urban areas means that raw sewage and other solid waste is simply dumped into waterways. This is incredibly hazardous as most of these waterways are used for agriculture and as sources of drinking water, often with little or no treatment. Ageing and poorly-maintained urban infrastructure results in leaks along water pipes. As these often run next to sewage lines, this leads to toxic cross-contamination.

72. Pakistan has made steady progress in **latrine construction**. As of 2015, 83% of the country's households had "flush" (74%) and "non-flush" (9%) latrines. 13% were without latrines, while the remaining 4% used shared latrines (*Pakistan Social and Living Standards Measurement (PSLM) survey, 2014/2015*). Communities in many areas lack an understanding of hygienic latrines. The construction of adequate septic tanks in urban and peri-urban areas is especially challenging. Here, most latrines are connected to covered or open drains. 55% of rural areas lack waste disposal systems. While 87% of Pakistan's population has access to improved water sources, only 81% have access to water within their homes. A mere 26% of the population has access to a "piped" water supply, which is assumed to be properly treated before it is dispensed to houses via a system of water pipes.


73. Water and sanitation **policies have yet to be effectively implemented** at the national and provincial levels, despite the fact that the WASH sector has proved the most systematically devolved following the 18th Constitutional Amendment. This is principally due to weak coordination across the WASH sector which, in turn, hinders coordination and integration with other relevant sectors.

74. When **tensions between India and Pakistan** flared over Kashmir in 2016, the international dimensions of the water challenges facing Pakistan came to the fore. Not only will Pakistan be affected by decreased water flows in the Indus river system as glaciers recede, but water flow could also be reduced in the event of international incidents. Given Pakistan's complete dependence on water from the Indus river system, the impacts of geopolitical tensions on its water supply pose a serious risk.

75. **Improving WASH in schools**, particularly in terms of enhancing sanitation, has been a focus of provincial education reforms and the development agenda over the past two years. Provincial *Education Sector Plans* identify WASH as a critical component for enhancing the quality of education and boosting retention. Only 64% of primary schools have usable water, while a mere 66% of girl's primary schools have functional latrines (Ministry of Federal Education and Professional Training, 2015). Institutional monitoring mechanisms set up by provincial governments – most notably in Punjab and KP – have begun to include reporting on the availability of water supplies and latrines. A UNICEF study revealed that most schools are not properly equipped with menstrual hygiene management (MHM) facilities, nor do they offer pupils information on this key issue.

76. Pakistan's water resources face four major **challenges to water quality**: bacteriological contamination (68%); arsenic (24%); nitrate (13%); and fluoride (5%) (PCRWR, 2005/2006). Examination of 357 diverse water sources revealed that only 13% were "safe", signifying that the remaining 87% were "unsafe" for drinking purposes. Only 8% of Pakistan's population uses appropriate treatment methods for drinking water.

WASH challenges hamper health (SDG 3), which is threatened by the consumption and use of contaminated water. They also impact freshwater ecosystems (SDG 13) and inequality in access to clean water (SDG 10).



Decent Work (SDG 8)

77. Situation overview: The term “decent work” sums up people’s aspirations in their working lives. It involves: a) opportunities for work that is productive and delivers a fair income; b) security in the workplace and social protection for families; c) better prospects for personal development and social integration; d) freedom for people to express their concerns, organise and participate in the decisions that affect them; and e) equality of opportunity and treatment for all women and men.

Productive employment and decent work are key to achieving fair globalisation, poverty reduction and equitable, inclusive and sustainable development. The decent work agenda entails job creation, worker’s rights, social protection and social dialogue. Gender equality is a cross-cutting objective. By contrast, deficits of decent work adversely affect people’s ability to live decent and secure lives.

78. Vision 2025 refers to a number of relevant elements which will contribute to poverty alleviation and achieving decent work across Pakistan. These include the bolstering female workforce participation rate, while addressing issues of labour, productivity, skills and decent jobs. However, labour market analyses reveal substantial deficits with respect to **decent work** in Pakistan. If these are not effectively addressed, they could become structural barriers to the attainment of *Vision 2025*, especially the targets under Pillar 1, “Putting People First” and “Developing Human and Social Capital”.

79. Six out of every ten Pakistani employees are **vulnerable to, or at risk of, a lack of decent work**. In 2012/2013, 75% of Pakistan’s female workers and 55% of male workers were in vulnerable employment (*Pakistan Employment Trends Report*, 2013). Almost nine out of every ten workers in the agricultural sector are considered to be vulnerable. Challenges persist in urban and rural settings in terms of reducing long-term unemployment; job insecurity; informal labour; working poverty; and gender imbalances. Young people are disproportionately affected by these trends. The rural economy is characterised by low productivity; informality; the weak enforcement of laws; insecure property rights; ineffective organisation; and low levels of participation by rural workers in decision-making which affects their lives.

80. Given Pakistan’s rapidly growing labour force, the **lack of comprehensive, coherent national or provincial labour market policies** may prevent the development of an effective supply-demand labour market. Adequate policies are sorely needed to address issues of employment, job creation, skills and entrepreneurship. Notable challenges include under-resourced labour market institutions, alongside insufficient availability or access to entrepreneurship and business development services.

Youth unemployment is a particular concern in light of the country’s growing population of young people. If they remain outside the labour market, their exclusion would pose significant social and economic risks. Several million Pakistanis have also chosen to emigrate in search of employment, a trend which often exposes them to exploitation. As the economy becomes steadily more dependent on remittances, Pakistan is even more vulnerable to external shocks. This was starkly evident when low petroleum prices in 2016 provoked a decline in remittances and the return of large numbers of migrant workers.

81. Exploitative labour practices, often in the form of child labour or bonded labour, remain pervasive in both the formal and informal economy. While exploitative practices are assumed to be declining, virtually no reliable, comprehensive data exists to accurately assess child labour or the worst forms of forced or bonded labour in Pakistan. The 2013 *Labour Force Survey* indicates a child labour rate of 10% for children between the ages of 10 and 14, which increases to 15.8% when the age range is extended to 17.

Unpaid family work and work in the agriculture sector engage the greatest share of child workers, involving over 70% of child workers between the ages of 10 and 14, and over 61% of those between 15 and 17 year of age. Within both age groups, girls are more likely than boys to be involved in agriculture and non-market household production. No reliable statistics exist on bonded labour. Gender inequality and other discriminatory practices are generally considered to be widespread.

82. Poor occupational safety and health (OSH) conditions at workplaces are frequently reported. These are assumed to be widespread, especially among micro-, small- and medium-sized enterprises and informal businesses. Such enterprises are typically unaware of hazards and risks, while lacking the capacity or the will to effectively address OSH issues. In 2012, a devastating fire in Baldia Town, Karachi, killed over 250 workers. This tragedy clearly showcased the pressing OSH issues prevalent among businesses involved in the global supply chain. While data is limited, reports of workplace accidents suggest that the sectors of construction, mining and power supply – and potentially the agricultural and fisheries sectors – face the most significant OSH challenges. These challenges are aggravated by low levels of social protection coverage, which stood at a mere 3.3% in 2008.

83. Wages in Pakistan remain relatively low, with per capita income estimated at US\$ 1,513 per annum. The unskilled minimum wage across all provinces is currently set at PKR 14,000 per month, equivalent to approximately US\$ 140. However, Pakistan's *Labour Force Survey* indicates that a significant proportion of the workforce earns less than minimum wage. As discussed above, a highly significant gender pay gap exists throughout the country.

84. Existing labour laws are complex, encompassing several pieces of legislation which creates both gaps and overlaps. Current laws do not extend coverage to the entire labour force, notably leaving workers in the informal sector without recourse to legal protection. Sectors which are not covered by existing legislation are, therefore, not subject to labour inspection. A number of the country's labour laws pre-date devolution, with some dating back to before 1947. As such, a great deal of labour legislation on the statute books does not reflect modern working patterns and technology.

Following devolution, the provinces have sought to develop new laws and regulations. However, the pace of progress varies greatly given limited capacity, a lack of resources and coordination challenges. Weak compliance with current laws and regulations, coupled with inadequate enforcement, erodes workers' rights, contributes to poor working conditions and yields unsafe and unhealthy workplaces. Working conditions in many areas put the lives, health, freedom, human dignity or security of workers at risk.

85. What can be done: To move towards decent work for all, Pakistan must make effective use of the mechanisms already at its disposal. Several key mechanisms are institutionalised in Pakistan. These include collective bargaining agreements; tri-partism; and social dialogue on employment and labour issues between the Federal Government, provincial governments and social partners, including employers' and workers' organisations. However, the effectiveness of these mechanisms is limited by low rates of unionisation, low levels of membership among employer organisations, and limited capacity among social partners.

Decent work is intimately tied to the SDG agenda. The absence of decent work detrimentally affects sustainable consumption and production (SDG 12) and, in turn, makes it far more difficult to eliminate poverty (SDG 1) and inequalities (SDG 10).



VI. Planet

86. Current **patterns of resource use** prioritise the needs of Pakistan's present generation to such an extent that they are eroding the country's ability to meet the needs of future generations. Forecasts of the potential impact of climate change on short-term and long-term development are not encouraging. Pakistan is among the ten countries in the world most vulnerable to the impacts of climate change. Vast investments will be required to cope with its effects. The country's exposure and heightened vulnerability to naturally induced disasters further stretches strained resources and ecosystems, posing enormous challenges for its human and economic development.

87. Pakistan's **natural resource base is under stress**. This, in turn, threatens to undermine the country's growth prospects. Conservative estimates (Ministry of Climate Change, 2015) suggest that environmental degradation costs the country at least 6% of its GDP annually, approximately PKR 365 billion per annum. Alternative estimates show that the cost has already reached around PKR 450 billion (US\$ 5.2 billion). These devastating costs fall disproportionately upon the poor, and especially affect women.

88. The wide-ranging **effects of environmental degradation in Pakistan** will affect its achievement of many SDGs. For example, goals on health (SDG 3) are jeopardised by illnesses and premature mortality caused by indoor and outdoor air pollution. Targets on nutrition (SDG 2), clean water and sanitation (SDG 6) are undermined by diseases provoked by inadequate water supplies, including diarrhoea, polio and typhoid. Similarly, goals on terrestrial ecosystems (SDG 15) and economic growth (SDG 8) are hampered by reduced agricultural productivity due to soil degradation.

89. These **direct social costs** add to the overall challenges posed by rapid population growth and rapid urbanisation, such as hazardous solid waste. This chapter outlines the current situation with respect to energy (SDG 7), sustainable consumption and production patterns (SDG 12), oceans (SDG 14), terrestrial ecosystems (SDG 15), climate change (SDG 13) and natural disasters.



Energy (SDG 7)

90. The challenge of attaining sustainable development **strains the energy requirements** of a growing economy. There is a close nexus between energy and development for several reasons. First, modern energy services are required to effectively provide modern health services; improve agricultural productivity through increased value-added product processing; enhance education systems; support democratic governance through communication with citizens; and build an economic base that can participate in today's globalised economy.

Second, there is a direct link between energy and achieving many of the SDGs, from poverty eradication to gender equality, which ultimately depend on equal access and opportunities for women and men. Similarly, in the case of health, ensuring access to clean energy at all levels, including within households, is necessary to protect the environment and prevent pulmonary or ophthalmological diseases. Finally, access to basic needs such as water and healthcare are intrinsically linked to the availability of energy.

91. As **energy efficiency** has not been a priority in mainstream policy development, Pakistan's "energy intensity" remains high. The country uses 15% more energy than India for each dollar of GDP, and 25% more than the Philippines. Savings through energy efficiency could reach 18% of the total energy consumed in Pakistan. According to the National Energy Conservation Centre (ENERCON), annual energy savings of up to 25% are possible in all sectors, totalling annual savings of US\$ 3 billion and a 51% reduction in oil imports. These are attainable gains which can be achieved by investing in energy efficiency. Recent initiatives by the Government to promote solar and wind energy are steps in the right direction. However, the installation costs associated with renewable energy are fairly high. As a result, the sector has now been opened up to domestic and international investors.

92. One key **area for improvement is the field of renewable energy**. In 2006, a policy for the *Development of Renewable Energy for Power Generation* was introduced, Pakistan's first energy policy specifically aimed at promoting renewable energy. Despite this, the share of renewable energy was only 1% in 2010. This is expected to increase gradually, following a recent surge in solar panels and wind energy projects. However, the country evidently did not meet its goal of ensuring that renewable energy technologies (RETs) provide 10% of Pakistan's "energy supply mix" by 2015. Electricity from renewable sources was reported at a mere 438 megawatts (MW) (Pakistan Economic Survey, 2015/2016).

Nevertheless, Pakistan has immense renewable energy potential – including 50,000 megawatts from hydro-power, 40,000 megawatts from wind energy, and vast opportunities in terms of solar power. It should be noted that heavy reliance on hydroelectric power carries risks, due to the anticipated pressures that climate change will place on national water resources. As of 2016, Pakistan's medium-term national plans are to strengthen non-renewable energy sources, such as coal. This is problematic given its attendant negative impacts on both the environment and renewable energy investment.

93. The **unexplored opportunities** offered by renewable energy and greater energy efficiency, coupled with the challenges inherent in the current context, have prevented universal access to energy in Pakistan. Patterns of exclusion partly relate to rural-urban disparities. Compared to urban centres, rural areas have more limited access to power, and experience longer and more frequent power cuts. Social priority sectors such as health, law enforcement, and emergency services are badly affected. So are the poorest and most marginalised segments of society. If Pakistan avails itself of the unexplored opportunities offered by renewable energy, this will lead to positive changes in sustainable consumption and production patterns (SDG 12), resulting in the increasing – but, crucially, sustainable – use of energy and natural resources.



Urban populations also suffer from the impacts of limited energy, both in terms of its impact on heavy industry, smaller businesses and everyday life. Energy scarcity elicits deprivations which seriously impede the path towards sustainable development and people's enjoyment of their inalienable rights. As such, these deprivations are far more significant than the lack of energy itself.



Sustainable Consumption and Production Patterns (SDG 12)

94. Ensuring that development is sensitive to Pakistan's future needs depends upon the **sustainable use of environmental, natural and energy resources**. Although current policy frameworks highlight the need to integrate environmental and energy concerns into sectoral policies, little progress has been made in practice.

As noted above, environmental degradation costs Pakistan heavily, at least 6% of GDP annually. This heavy toll is due to: a) illnesses and premature mortality caused by indoor and outdoor air pollution, amounting to nearly 50% of the total damage cost; diarrhoeal diseases and typhoid provoked by inadequate water supplies, sanitation and hygiene, representing 30% of the total cost; c) and reduced agricultural productivity due to soil degradation, accounting for 20% of the damage cost. These **burdens are compounded** by problems such as hazardous solid waste, the loss of forest cover, desertification, soil erosion and a decline in soil fertility.

95. Pakistan urgently needs to **invest in natural resource management and planning**. It requires incentive-based regulatory policy regimes, and must support industries in enacting voluntary environmental protection initiatives. The national industrial strategy and related policies will have to be reviewed to better incorporate environmental-sensitivity and the efficient use of resources as key considerations.

96. **Water conservation management techniques** are required across the agricultural sector to address the root causes of water pollution and water scarcity. Such techniques include community participation; the separation of municipal wastewater from industrial effluent; a regular monitoring programme to assess the quality of surface water and groundwater; the treatment of sewage and industrial effluent; clear guidelines for groundwater abstraction; and adequate budgetary resources commensurate with policy goals.

97. **Vital natural resources like water and energy** are cornerstones of economic development and essential for the survival and livelihoods of all Pakistanis, particularly of low-income groups. Despite increasing water shortages in the past decade, Pakistan still uses over 1,000 litres per dollar of economic output, whereas the regional average is closer to 200 litres. Clearly, there is a pressing need to improve the ways in which these scarce resources are managed. This is equally important from both an environmental and an economic perspective. Overall, Pakistan has significant potential to successfully improve natural resource management.

98. The state's "**obligation to protect**" requires it to ensure that robust standards of environmental and industrial hygiene are maintained. Proper regulatory frameworks and monitoring mechanisms must be put in place to guarantee that private actors behave within the law. This involves policy formulation; the provision of resources; public reporting; capacity development; monitoring standards; offering incentives; and ensuring accountability. The state's "**obligation to fulfil**" requires the Government to take appropriate steps to promote the realisation of people's rights. For instance, by introducing environmental and industrial hygiene standards into national legislation. Civil society stakeholders should be involved in decision-making and oversight related to environmental protection and energy concerns.

99. **Environmental change** will accelerate in parallel with economic growth. At present, Pakistan experiences a shortfall of up to 5,000 megawatts of electricity. 30% of the population has no access to electricity, while 80% has no access to piped gas. Furthermore, heavy reliance on energy imports threatens the overall economy. The *Doing Business 2016* report found that up to 34% of business revenue is lost as a result of power cuts. Evidently, Pakistan’s inadequate energy supply is a tremendous constraint.

Alongside challenges in finance, institutional coordination and industrial vision, **unreliable energy supplies** have rendered many productive activities uncompetitive in domestic and international markets. As a result, a number of SMEs have been forced to close and several industrial plants have relocated to other countries.

Energy sector deficits are holding back growth. Therefore, energy efficiency is a key priority that must be backed by improved capacity, legislation, management and investment. Analysing these factors reveals a deeper crisis in energy policy-making, governance and regulation. Only by fully and successfully addressing such governance issues can Pakistan resolve the fundamental problems of its energy crisis.

100. In an effort to operationalise SDG 12 (Responsible Consumption and Production) the Government of Pakistan chose to revise its **National Sustainable Development Strategy** (NSDS) in August, 2016. These revisions seek to incorporate the imperatives of sustainable consumption and production within the strategy, in order to minimise negative environmental impacts and promote a better quality of life for all.

101. To promote environmentally sustainable energy efficiency, individuals must be regarded, and regard themselves, as **genuine stakeholders** – both as rights holders and as responsible duty bearers. The state has an obligation to prevent entrenched elites from “capturing” or co-opting environmental and energy-related policies for their own ends.

Instead, these should involve broad-based participation and must enable impoverished or excluded groups to claim and exercise their rights. While Pakistan has committed to upholding international treaties and conventions in a bid to protect these rights, greater attention must be paid to procedural rights. Foremost among these are the right to information, the right to participation and the right to judicial redress. These rights are discussed further in subsequent sections of this document.

102. Pakistan’s **marine resources are a direct source of livelihood** for over 1 million people, having supported fishing communities for generations. However, the development of “marine capture fisheries” is constrained because of the sector’s poor knowledge base. There is a dearth of knowledge on monitoring methods for commercial fishery operations and up-to-date assessments of fishery stocks. In parallel, the fisheries sector suffers from a lack of qualified human resources and training institutions.

103. **Marine fishing activities** are largely confined to the intensive exploitation of in-shore resources along the coasts of Balochistan and Sindh. Consequently, most fishing is concentrated in shallow coastal waters, mainly in Sindh, and focuses on shrimp resources. Reports suggest that these have now been fully exploited. A *Fisheries Resources Appraisal* conducted by FAO and the Government of Pakistan confirmed ecological changes linked to the pressure of excessive fishing.

104. A drastic **reduction in the area covered by mangrove forests** is another major concern. These have declined from 400,000 hectares in 1945 to a mere 70,000 today. Mangrove forests play a major role in shielding the coastline from erosion caused by tides and storms. They have been devastated by the dredging of port channels and the increased volume of untreated industrial and domestic wastewater, especially from Karachi and its surrounding areas.



Inefficient production and post-production technologies and processes are the principle underlying cause of **coastal contamination**. The underlying cause of degradation provoked by dredging is a glaring capacity gap which prevents the implementation of international dredging standards. This lack of capacity means that government agencies responsible for enforcing standards are under-staffed and under-equipped. Further environmental degradation awaits if Pakistan does not urgently bridge capacity gaps among the regulatory agencies responsible for controlling marine pollution and dredging.

105. Most households in coastal zones are directly or indirectly linked to fishing. **Women play a central role** in the preservation, conservation, and income from the fishing industry. Household fuel consumption patterns reveal that nearly two-thirds of coastal communities do not use mangroves at all. However, this may change if the economic returns from fishing decline due to overuse.

Over-harvesting of fish resources is a crucial problem for biodiversity within mangrove ecosystems. The degradation of mangrove forests at the national level is ultimately provoked by environmentally-unfriendly industrial, trade, and conservation policies. Centralised growth, with subsidies inefficient production technologies, leads to increased marine pollution. Trade **policies** frequently overlook the protection of ocean resources, instead emphasising export expansion to reduce trade deficits and revenue gaps. These trade policies need to be aligned with conservation policies to guard against the over-harvesting of fish resources in shallow waters. Tax and water pricing policies are also needed to discourage the inefficient use of water.

The sustainable use of environmental, natural and energy resources is essential for improving health (SDG 3) by ensuring that the resources used are not hazardous to human well-being. It is also imperative for effective WASH solutions (SDG 6); for safeguarding marine life from damaging pollution (SDG 14); and for promoting clean energy (SDG 7). Sustainable resource use also helps to reduce hunger (SDG2) via sustainable food production systems; promotes sustainable lifestyles (SDG 4); drives growth and employment (SDG 8); and enhances the sustainability of infrastructure and industrialisation (SDG 9).



Terrestrial Ecosystems (SDG 15)

106. Pakistan's **landscape is diverse**, with significant variations in terms of topography and climate. As a result, the country boasts a range of ecosystems, from alpine to sub-alpine, forest, wetland, agricultural, desert, deltoid, coastal and marine ecosystems. Each, in turn, is home to a rich array of species.

These ecosystems play a crucial role in meeting the needs of local communities, as well as in economic development. Most are represented within Pakistan's "protected areas" system. Alarming, Pakistan's ecosystems are under heavy strain, facing rapid degradation due to expanding human and livestock populations, anthropogenic pressure and climate change.

107. Biodiversity is the source of assets that are crucial to the well-being of Pakistan's society. For instance, key assets include clean water, pure air, pollination, soil formation, crop pest control, and the provision of foods, fuel and fibres. However, these assets are not widely recognised or valued in economic or social terms. A reduction in biodiversity, including the local extinction of species, gravely affects the core assets of any ecosystem. The sustainability of ecosystems ultimately depends on the "buffering capacity" offered by a rich, healthy diversity of genes, species and habitats. In this respect, biological diversity is like economic diversity: it is essential for long-term survival and represents a sound investment in the future.

108. Pakistan has a **wide network of protected areas**, encompassing national parks; wildlife sanctuaries; game reserves; wildlife parks and refuges; and other unclassified protected areas. While the Government is improving its conservation efforts, a number of obstacles prevent efficient conservation at the national and provincial levels. Chief among these is the lack of sound scientific data on the status of biodiversity in Pakistan. This is largely because the collection, storage, analysis and dissemination of such data is scattered across a number of institutions.

To ensure efficient conservation, the designation and classification of protected areas needs to be further enhanced. Similarly, it will be crucial to enforce existing wildlife conservation laws both within protected areas and in adjacent territories.

109. **Community involvement** is essential for the management of protected areas. In recent years, collaborative management has gained pace. Efforts have been made to raise awareness and offer both incentives and deterrents. However, in order for such measures to be truly effective, a fine balance must be maintained between needs of communities and the needs of biodiversity conservation.

110. **Not all of Pakistan's major ecosystems are adequately represented and protected** within the country's "protected area" system. For example, desert ecosystems in Balochistan and Sindh are notably absent. Only a few categories of protected areas defined by the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) are present in Pakistan. Evidently, this situation is inadequate for contemporary conservation needs. To translate policies on protected areas into effective action on the ground, conservation professionals require further training.

Federal and provincial governments are the most important stakeholders in conservation processes. It is their overall responsibility to provide an adequate policy and legal framework; enforce regulations; build capacity; offer incentives; and provide funds to conserve biodiversity. Provincial departments currently responsible for wildlife, forest and environmental protection lack the capacity to fulfil their duties effectively, often due to insufficient funding. Most protected areas in Pakistan lack comprehensive management plans. Where plans exist, they are not fully implemented.

111. The environmental challenges facing Pakistan have certain **common causes**. These include limited investment in natural resource management, and a lack of proper planning in relation to natural resources. Existing regulations are frequently flouted due to the dearth of effective, incentive-based regulatory policies and systems, alongside the absence of support for voluntary environmental protection initiatives by industrial stakeholders.

Issues of environmental protection and the efficient use of resource need to be incorporated within industrial strategy and policies. The sector cannot continue to rely on "end-of-pipe" remedies – i.e. solutions which seek to address pollution at the point where its impact becomes apparent. A lack of knowledge about alternative, preventive solutions worsens existing pollution.

112. A mere 5% of national industries conduct **environmental assessments**. As such, no comprehensive environmental profile of Pakistan's industrial sector is available. Industries find such assessments to be "capital-intensive" while yielding little or no financial returns. Moreover, there are no effective platforms through which citizens can voice their concerns. Effective conservation is hindered by the failure to use the vast knowledge of local populations on the ecosystems in which they live. This is especially true in the absence of a structured, systematic and sustained effort to scientifically chart ecosystems.



113. Pakistan's **high deforestation rate** is driven by a number of factors. Alongside natural hazards like forest fires, these include the excessive exploitation of forest resources for commercial and subsistence purposes; encroachment; the increasing use of land for crop cultivation; overgrazing by livestock; and unplanned urban and industrial expansion. Forest ecosystems are also degraded as a result of the uncontrolled use of pesticides, diseases and damage by insects.

The root causes of deforestation, moreover, include rapid population growth; inequity; unemployment; insecure land tenure; a lack of awareness; and poverty. All of these issues are provoked by limited commitment; inadequate investment; poor planning; unrealistic forest work plans; and the weak implementation of forest protection laws. For instance, resources are over-harvested in private and community forests due to widespread poverty, population pressure, a lack of fuel-wood alternatives, and a lack of awareness about sustainable methods of resource use.

114. Increased surface run-off causes soil erosion which, in turn, is provoked by reduced levels of natural vegetation. This decline is due to deforestation, overgrazing and improper land use. Failing to tackle deforestation with adequate mechanisms would exacerbate climate change (SDG 13). In essence, forests play two major roles in mitigating climate change. When managed sustainably, they produce wood fuels that can serve as a benign alternative to other fossil fuels. Most importantly, they absorb carbon emissions.



Climate Change (SDG 13)

115. Pakistan is among the ten countries in the world most **vulnerable to the impacts of climate change**. Its vulnerability has profound implications for several socio-economic sectors, including health, food production, energy consumption, security and natural resource management.

116. According to recent estimates, over the next 40-50 years it will **cost** Pakistan US\$ 10.7 billion each year to adapt to climate change. The country has consequently adopted a *National Climate Change Policy* (2012), and its *Framework for Implementation*, to guide all climate-related interventions.

117. As **glaciers melt in the Himalayas**, flooding is projected to increase substantially. In the coming decades, this will severely affect Pakistan's water resources. Moreover, as glaciers recede over the longer-term, the country will have to cope with the challenges of decreased river flows. The availability of freshwater, for instance from underground aquifers, is also expected to decrease. This will lead to the loss of biodiversity and highly limited supplies of freshwater for human use, agriculture and industry.

Monsoon rains may become heavier as climate change increasingly affects patterns of rainfall, thus provoking alternating floods and droughts. Rising temperatures have begun to melt glaciers in the Hindu Kush, Karakoram and Himalayan mountains in northern Pakistan, creating 3,044 glacial lakes in GB and KP. Some 33 of these lakes are hazardous and likely to result in glacial lake outburst floods (GLOFs). Such outbursts have occurred in the past, releasing millions of cubic metres of water and debris in just a few hours. Unsurprisingly, they wreak devastation in their wake – causing loss of life, the destruction of property and infrastructure, and severe damage to livelihoods. The coastal areas of southern Pakistan along the Arabian Sea face the greatest risk of increased flooding, both from the sea and, in some cases, from rivers.



118. Pakistan faces the threat of increased **climate-related disasters**. An increase in floods, droughts and cyclones would take a heavy toll on human populations, infrastructure and livelihoods. The effects of the current extended drought in Sindh's Tharparkar district – which may be a manifestation of permanent climate change – could be greatly exacerbated by climate change and may even spread to other regions of the country. Located in the sweltering heat of the Thar desert, Tharparkar already has an alarmingly high incidence of acute and chronic malnutrition due to extended periods of drought. These effects could become more widespread, a distressing prospect in a country with one of the highest stunting rates in the world. As noted above, climate change is provoking heavier monsoon rains and rapidly melting glaciers. Such conditions may cause floods as catastrophic as those Pakistan experienced in 2010.

119. As Pakistan's population rapidly grows and urbanises, and as climate change causes agricultural yields to decline, the **risk of hunger and food insecurity will remain high**. Endemic morbidity and mortality, caused by diseases associated with floods and droughts, are expected to rise. Increasing coastal water temperatures would exacerbate the incidence of cholera.

The impact of climate change will also aggravate existing social inequalities in resource use. This could intensify social factors that trigger instability, conflict, displacement and changes in migration patterns. Female headed households will likely be most affected by displacement, perpetuating their marginalisation by adding the trials of displacement to their triple burden of work – reproductive work, care work and economic production.

120. Pakistan is almost **completely dependent on glacier-fed rivers** for the water it uses for human consumption, irrigation and industry. The flow of glacier-fed rivers will gradually decline as glaciers recede due to climate change, and as countries further upstream continue to use their share of this water to meet their own needs. This is likely to trigger geopolitical tensions. For instance, tensions flared between India and Pakistan in 2016 regarding the possibility of revoking the *Indus River Treaty*. Such disputes could have serious repercussions on the well-being of communities and ecosystems across national borders, thus compounding the detrimental impacts of climate change.

121. As climate change gains pace, Pakistan will face immense challenges in adapting to these changes. **Adaptations will require significant investment** in alternatives – both alternative energy sources and extensive water conservation and management – as well as in protecting people and infrastructure. Problematically, such investments are not being made today. As the frequency and duration of major climate change patterns accelerates, this could reduce economic growth, particularly in Pakistan's vitally important agricultural sector, on which millions of people depend. This would fuel an unprecedented degree of rural-urban migration, far beyond current rates, while placing catastrophic strain on resources and infrastructure.

Addressing these challenges is crucial for preventing irreparable damage to terrestrial ecosystems (SDG 15); meeting the WASH needs of affected communities (SDG 6); and mitigating the poverty (SDG 1) caused by the loss of assets in the immediate aftermath of disasters.

Naturally Induced Disasters

122. Pakistan is among the countries **most vulnerable to “naturally induced” disasters – both climate-related and seismic**. Climate change has already brought about a considerable increase in the frequency and intensity of extreme weather. For example, monsoon rains are increasingly erratic, often triggering intense floods or drought. Periodic cyclones in coastal areas may become more frequent, threatening significant loss of life and damage to infrastructure, particularly in large coastal cities like Karachi.

123. Pakistan's *2017 Humanitarian Needs Overview* (HNO) highlights the country's acute vulnerability to disasters due to its geographical location, topography, hydrological configuration, extended fault-lines and overall under-development. The HNO calls for livelihood training and capacity building on *Community-Based Disaster Risk Reduction* (CBDRR). Both are essential components of long-term solutions. They equip communities with the skills needed to withstand natural hazards, thus preventing these phenomena from becoming full-fledged "disasters".

124. Pakistan's national capacity to plan for, and respond to, disasters has improved significantly in recent years. Nevertheless, the impact of potential hazards – cyclones, floods, droughts and earthquakes – could easily overcome the nation's response capacity. While Pakistan has a *Disaster Management Plan* and an overarching policy, **inadequate resources** are in place to implement wide-ranging disaster preparedness, especially at the provincial and district levels.


125. **Increasing urbanisation** means larger urban populations inhabiting peri-urban, marginal and at-risk areas. Thus, vulnerability to disasters is growing in both urban and rural areas, placing ever more lives and livelihoods at risk. The fact that urban planning rarely makes effective provisions for disaster management renders urban areas especially vulnerable.

126. In rural areas, excluded populations frequently **inhabit at-risk areas** – for instance informal settlements located on steep slopes, along river banks, or in flood plains. This exposes marginalised groups to exceptional danger. The low quality of housing in informal settlements means that buildings often do not comply with disaster resilience standards. A lack of space in such settlements also exacerbates the risk of environmental degradation caused by improper waste management and the contamination of water from wells.


127. Pakistan is categorised as a "high stress" country in terms of **water resource management**. Moreover, the incidence of drought in different parts of the country over the past 20 years has been particularly harmful for communities whose access to water was already limited. It has wrought havoc on the livelihoods and food security of rural communities living in drought-prone areas.

128. **Disasters have a disproportionate impact on women and children**, who comprise 70% of disaster-affected populations. Due to cultural norms, women and children – particularly girls – face greater risks of ill-health in the wake of disasters. They are also less likely to safely access assistance. As women are not sufficiently included in community consultations and decision-making processes – both before and after disasters – their needs are often not met, and their concerns are not adequately addressed.

129. **Interventions are sorely required to address these challenges**. There is a need to invest in the resilience of vulnerable families and communities through targeted recovery support. This would reduce the demand for costly emergency interventions in response to small- and medium-scale disasters. Employing Disaster Risk Reduction techniques when responding to hazards, or when rebuilding after a flood or earthquake, equips households and communities with the skills they need to withstand future disasters.



VII. Prosperity



Sustained, Inclusive Growth and Employment (SDG 8)

130. Pakistan's economy is **semi-industrialised**, with most of its major growth centres located along the Indus river. The diversified economies of cities like Karachi, Lahore and Punjab's urban centres co-exist with less developed areas in other parts of the country, particularly in rural or remote regions. In 2015, Pakistan's estimated nominal per capita GDP was US\$ 1,513 and its purchasing power parity (PPP) was estimated at US\$ 4,744. According to World Bank categories, the

country rose from "low income" to "lower middle income" status in 2008.

131. Pakistan's **economic growth has been uneven** throughout its history. Between 1960 and 2010, growth averaged 5.2% per year. This may be considered respectable, but well below Pakistan's potential. According to Amjad and Burki (2015), long-term problems which hold back Pakistan's economic growth include:

- a. High levels of spending on defence;
- b. High levels of rapid population growth;
- c. Neglect of human resource development;
- d. A low savings rate, and
- e. A steady decline in governance.

Since 2000, a series of economic reforms have successfully lowered poverty levels. However, the economy cooled from 2007, with inflation reaching 25% in 2008. Economic growth was exceptionally low in 2009 and 2010, before recovering in recent years. Between 2011 and 2015, growth averaged slightly below 4% per annum, reaching 4.71% in 2015. This relatively slow growth is not substantial enough to provide adequate job opportunities for the vast number of young people entering the labour market each year.

The World Bank predicts that Pakistan will only achieve GDP growth of between 4.8% and 4.9% by 2020. Even without external shocks and in spite of positive economic growth, the fact that Pakistan's population is growing by 2% each year – forecast to rise from an estimated 180-202 million in 2016 to a colossal 350 million by 2050 – implies that GDP per capita will only increase slowly, at less than 3% per annum.

132. Pakistan's labour market is the tenth largest in the world. Nevertheless, scores of workers are forced to find work overseas, contributing US\$ 19.3 billion to the economy through remittances in 2015. Due to a slump in global petroleum prices, however, remittances have declined in recent years. This is likely to continue as it will take at least another five years before petroleum prices return to their 2013/2014 levels.

In the wake of rapid urbanisation, many new jobs will need to be created in urban settings. In tandem, there is an urgent need for improved job opportunities in rural areas, which are currently suffering from negative growth in the agricultural sector. This is essential to dissuade unskilled and uneducated rural youths from flocking to urban centres in desperation. Such migration would place an increasing burden on urban infrastructure and social services, which are already far too fragile and inadequate to effectively meet the needs of urban inhabitants.

133. The structure of Pakistan's economy is gradually shifting away from agriculture. In 2010, agriculture accounted for only 21% of the country's GDP. Nonetheless, the agricultural sector remains exceptionally important. Pakistan currently produces more wheat than the entire continent of Africa. Agriculture employs half of the country's labour force and constitutes the largest source of foreign exchange earnings. Raw materials like animal hide and cotton – of which Pakistan is the world's fourth largest producer – are an important component of the nation's manufactured exports. Pakistan also possesses substantial reserves of coal and natural gas, and considerable unexploited hydroelectric potential. However, its potential for generating hydroelectric power is likely to be negatively affected by climate change in the coming decades.

134. Industrial growth is on the rise. Manufacturing – particularly large-scale manufacturing – accounts for 19% of Pakistan's GDP and 13% of total employment. The cement industry is growing rapidly. However, it is the textile industry which occupies a pivotal position, contributing 8% of GDP and employing 15 million people, roughly 40% of the industrial labour force. Unfortunately, the textile sector has remained stagnant over the past decade. Textiles are mainly sold to China, the United States and the United Kingdom. While China only purchases cotton yarn and cotton fabric, the United States imports manufactured textiles.

The service sector, which accounts for 58% of GDP and provides over 30% of total employment, has emerged as the main driver of Pakistan's economic growth. The information technology (IT) sector is also expanding at pace. Its concentration in urban centres is a key contributing factor to rural-urban migration.

135. Long-standing structural constraints continue to hinder economic growth, as does the **limited competitiveness of the private sector**, which is consequently unable to access global markets. According to the World Bank (2016), "*deep improvements in governance are needed to unleash Pakistan's growth potential.*" In terms of "the ease of doing business", the World Bank's *Doing Business Report 2017* ranks Pakistan 144th of 190 countries – and 36th of 52 lower middle income countries.

Similarly, the World Economic Forum's *Global Competitiveness Report 2015-2016* ranks Pakistan 126th of 140 countries, noting that Pakistan is one of the least competitive economies in the world. The difficulties inherent in securing reliable electricity, registering property and trading across borders are identified as the greatest obstacles to doing business in Pakistan.

136. Despite low wages, entrepreneurs in Pakistan report **high costs of production** which prevent them from competing with international market prices. They are burdened by high import duties on technological equipment and face high costs when importing raw materials. Overall, the private sector complains of high tax, customs burdens, and the complicated tax system. For instance, the average Pakistani entrepreneur makes 47 annual payments to the Government and spends 311.5 hours per year filing out their tax returns – compared to 163.4 hours in higher income member countries of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (World Bank, 2016). Corruption and an inefficient state bureaucracy are also frequently cited as hindrances to doing business in Pakistan (World Economic Forum, 2016).

137. The **availability and cost of electricity** is the greatest constraint to Pakistan's economic growth (World Bank, 2014). It takes an average of 180.7 days to obtain a permanent electricity connection (World Bank, 2016). Pakistan has not invested in sufficient capacity for electricity generation to keep pace with economic growth. Moreover, where investments have been made, they focus on coal-powered and hydro-electric capacity, both of which will face immense challenges as a result of climate change. The Government has initiated a plan to phase out inappropriately targeted electricity subsidies, redirecting them only towards the poorest and most vulnerable segments of society.

138. Alongside the positive trends highlighted by the IMF, it is worth noting that certain challenges persist. For instance, growth is somewhat constrained by a **lack of access to financing** and relatively **low levels of foreign investment**. Investors' morale is fairly low. In part, this is due to the perception of a volatile security situation and inadequate law and order in Pakistan. It also relates to perceived instability in terms of the state and its policies, which discourages private and foreign investment.

Alongside difficulties in obtaining venture capital and private equity, there are certain limitations in the credit market. The number of Development Financial Institutions (DFIs) in Pakistan has decreased, while extensive government borrowing has limited the capacity of commercial banks to lend to private businesses. The availability of small credit schemes and seed funding is also an issue for SMEs and start-ups.

139. Productivity is low at all levels. Agriculture suffers from low water productivity, while the country's highly protectionist agricultural trade policy stifles competition and innovation. Overall, Pakistan has the lowest labour productivity among its regional competitors. The situation is exacerbated by widespread corruption and the country's vulnerability to climate change. Growth is also constrained by women's low levels of participation in the labour force, estimated at 22-26%.

There are extreme differences in productivity between urban and rural areas. The urban economy contributes 78% to the country's GDP although it is home to only one-third of the total population (World Bank, 2014) and one-third of the labour force. These disparities in productivity are reflected in the differences in earnings between rural and urban areas, thus providing strong economic incentives for rural-urban migration.

140. Pakistan's **foreign trade has declined** in recent years. Exports of goods and services fell significantly, from 13.3% of GDP in 2013 to 10.9 % in 2015 (World Bank). As a result, Pakistan's trade deficit surged to US\$ 23.96 billion (6.2% of its GDP) during the 2015/2016 fiscal year, the highest it has been in 35 years. In tandem with high custom duties, other trade barriers abound. These include the high cost and the substantial time required for border and documentary compliance – as well as the additional time and costs required for obtaining, preparing, processing, presenting and submitting documents.



For example, the costs associated with documentary compliance for imports are over twice as high as the South Asian average, and 30 times higher than the average for high income OECD countries. Port charges in Karachi are nine times higher than those in Dubai and Singapore, and shipping container “dwelling times” are three times longer than in East Asia. As a result, foreign business partners criticise the inability of Pakistani companies to meet their delivery deadlines. These constraints to doing business, coupled with the high costs of production, have forced the private sector to scale-down production for export purposes.

141. Despite the challenges, Pakistan also has **several opportunities** at its disposal. The World Bank points to the country’s rich natural resource base and strategic location. Both can be equitably exploited for sustainable development, particularly if regional economic cooperation is increased. Although the informal economy’s large share in the overall national economy reflects low productivity, it fosters economic resilience. Substantial remittances from migrant workers raise consumption among the rural poor and reduce income inequality. Remittances also contribute to housing improvements, primary school enrolment and investments in small businesses. Increasing women’s participation in the economy, particularly in the formal sector, will bolster economic growth and reduce social disparities. Currently, most of women workers are confined to the informal economy, as the *Women’s Economic Equity Status Report* demonstrates.

142. In 2014, Pakistan was awarded GSP+ status, a significant milestone since the European Union’s **Generalized Schemes of Preference (GSP+)** allows developing countries to pay little or no duties on their exports to the EU. Having ratified all relevant Conventions, including core labour standards, Pakistan is now able to export 20% of its goods with “zero tariffs” to the EU’s 28 member countries, while 70% of its exports are subject to a preferential rate policy. This is especially significant since the European Union is Pakistan’s second largest trading partner after the United States.

Ultimately, Pakistan will reap the benefits of accessing the EU market only if it successfully caters to consumer demand within the EU, both in terms of reliable export volumes and quality. This will require greater efficiency in production, coupled with investments in technology and skilled labour. It will also depend on Pakistan’s ability to cope with the defensive or offensive actions of its competitors. Potential threats to Pakistan’s GSP+ status relate to human rights, particularly Pakistan’s use of the death penalty and the prevalence of prosecutions for blasphemy.

143. **Small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs)** contribute US\$ 86 billion to Pakistan’s GDP each year. However, the SME sector in Pakistan is beset by challenges. It requires sustained assistance and an enabling environment to secure its development and reach its full potential. Most SME owners lack awareness of how to properly manage their businesses beyond the basic operational model. They also have limited exposure to global good practices in production, quality and design. Most do not engage the skilled labour force required to be globally competitive. Constraints also exist in terms of supply, as commercial banks have reduced their investments in the SME sector. Specific policies to assist the SME sector will harness its potential to contribute towards inclusive economic growth.

144. **Globalisation** presents Pakistan with both challenges and opportunities. In 2015, 16 kinds of exports totalled US\$ 21.98 billion. Exports to the EU – which are either tariff free or subject to preferential rates, as discussed above – amounted to US\$ 6.732 billion, increasing by 3.71% in one year alone. However, overall exports decreased by 8.76% compared to 2014/2015. Decreases were experienced in key sectors, including food, textiles and manufacturing. By contrast, exports of ready-made garments and surgical goods rose.

Pakistan’s formal sector, mainly located in Sindh and Punjab, supplies the bulk of its exports. The informal sector also feeds into global supply chains via exports to China, the Far East and Gulf countries. While many American and European brands and retailers source from Pakistan, the country’s share of global supply is fairly small. It is limited by concerns related to security, stability and reputational risk. Calamities like the 2012 Baldia Town fire and the 2016 Gadani shipyard tragedy increase concerns in the global market.



While challenges affect economic growth, the substantial opportunities are worth stressing. As the quote above by the IMF Managing Director illustrates, Pakistan has made impressive progress and stands to reap substantial economic gains. Used effectively, these opportunities will have a positive impact on sustainable consumption and production (SDG 12) and gender equality (SDG 5), while reducing inequalities (SDG 10).



Infrastructure, Industrialisation and Innovation (SDG 9)

145. At present, the Government's priority for **infrastructure investment** relates to regional peace and integration initiatives through South-South cooperation. These include the *China-Pakistan Economic Corridor* (CPEC) agreement; the *Central Asia-South Asia Electricity Power Project* (CASA 1000); the *Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India Natural Gas Pipeline* (TAPI); and the *Turkmenistan-Uzbekistan-Tajikistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan* (TUTAP) electricity transmission line.

146. Current **patterns of investment** in infrastructure and industrialisation engage relatively small numbers of the available workforce, while the number of unemployed and underemployed workers continues to grow.

147. CPEC and other regional investment initiatives, particularly those spearheaded by China, could be either an opportunity or a risk for Pakistan. In terms of opportunity, Pakistan has both the industry – e.g. contractors and SMEs – and the appropriately skilled staff required to develop infrastructure as part of these initiatives. Creating the enabling environment and policies required for such initiatives would be a profitable investment for the country. On the other hand, such regional investment initiatives are also **vulnerable to unpredictable geopolitical and economic factors**. In addition, these projects tend to maintain the current focus on infrastructure investment, at the expense of investment in human capital and social services. They may also entail risks related to accelerated urbanisation and attendant social problems.

148. The relative **inaccessibility and poor quality of secondary and higher education** in Pakistan limits the numbers of qualified labourers needed for industrial expansion. It also limits opportunities for Pakistan's human capital to significantly contribute to the area of innovation. Budgetary allocations for research and innovation are markedly low, just 0.29% of GDP. This is far lower than developed countries, which spend 2-4% of their GDPs on research. Pakistan ranks 131th of 141 countries on the *Global Innovation Index 2015*.

149. **Interventions are being rolled-out to address these challenges**. The Ministry of Science and Technology has devised the *Science, Technology and Innovation Strategy 2014-2018* in a bid to spur rapid development in these spheres. The strategy's success, however, depends on whether the goals it outlines are effectively pursued during the indicated time-frame. If these goals are actively pursued, they will contribute to economic growth and decent employment (SDG 9), sustainable consumption and production (SDG 12) and reducing inequalities in the workforce (SDG 10).



Urbanisation (SDG 11)

150. **Country trends**: The United Nations Population Division estimates that, by 2025, nearly half of Pakistan's population will live in cities, compared to 38% in 2016. Other projections indicate that over half of Pakistan's population is already urban. These estimates are based on population density rather than administrative definitions, and include "peri-urban" areas adjacent to formal urban boundaries.

According to the *Agglomeration Index*, over 55% of Pakistanis lived in urban areas in 2010. As the urban population's growth rate increases, the rate of rural population growth will fall until 2025, when rural areas will begin to experience negative population growth.

Urbanisation offers both opportunities and challenges. While it encourages economic growth, innovation and interconnectivity, it also risks exacerbating political violence and placing greater strain on basic services and natural resources. Rapid urbanisation will have implications for gender equality. Greater restrictions on women's and girls' mobility are likely to prevail as they move to new areas. It may also imply the perpetuation of "tribal" or traditional rural social norms in urban contexts. As access to information and resources increases, this may lead to a spike in reported violence against women and girls.

151. City Trends: By 2025, Lahore's population, currently estimated at 7 million, will exceed 10 million, while Karachi's population will rise from an estimated 13 million to 19 million. As discussed above, however, if the higher projections for current urban populations are correct – placing Karachi's population closer to 20 million in 2015 – the challenges faced by mega-cities will be even greater. By 2030, 11 Pakistani cities will have populations of over 5 million inhabitants, compared to only two such cities in 2015.

152. Pakistan's **rapid urban growth** is driven by both economic and social factors. On the one hand, rural populations are being "pushed" out of their homes, due to high levels of population growth; limited land; a lack of opportunities; land tenure issues; security concerns; and displacement due to natural disasters. In tandem, they are also "pulled" to urban areas by better economic prospects and greater access to services.

153. As many urban centres currently lack adequate physical and social infrastructure, they are increasingly unable to meet their growing populations' **need for social services**. Burgeoning urbanisation is placing serious strain on fragile urban infrastructure and social service systems.

154. The **rapid, unplanned growth of urban areas** increases environmental degradation and contamination, largely due to inadequate sewage and garbage disposal systems. It simultaneously poses challenges for agriculture, as arable land near cities is occupied by peri-urban settlements, thus prompting the loss of productive agricultural land. These problems further heighten the risks associated with climate change and natural disasters. Many urban areas are highly vulnerable to natural disasters, notably earthquakes and flooding as a result of cyclones. Urban planning and Disaster Risk Reduction measures in urban areas often **fail to include women and girls**, despite the fact that they comprise the bulk of the populations affected.

155. Crime and insecurity are growing concerns in urban centres. Marginalised or excluded segments of the population – including women, children and LGBT individuals – bear the brunt of their devastating effects. Practical action to protect these groups has been woefully inadequate. For example, despite strengthened legislation to protect women from violence, implementation by law enforcement authorities is sorely lacking. Staffing and capacity development of female first responders remains an unmet gap.

Karachi is particularly beset by the effects of drug trafficking. It has become a "fast track city" for HIV, with some 32,000 HIV positive inhabitants, the vast majority of whom are persons who inject drugs (PWID). Drug use is rising as a result of increased opium production in Pakistan over the past 5 years, coupled with the fact that 43% of Afghan opium transits through Pakistan. Drug trafficking and drug use are both key factors in increasing urban crime, leaving urban inhabitants highly vulnerable.

Overcoming the manifold challenges of urbanisation will have an indirect impact on rural-urban inequalities (SDG 10), reduce poverty (SDG 1) and promote the sustainable use of resources (SDG 12).



VIII. Peaceful and Resilient Society



Social Trends, Movements and Tolerance (SDG 16)

156. Low levels of human development in Pakistan, coupled with high levels of poverty and inequality, contribute to increased militancy; the deterioration of law and order; and declining support for democracy, partly due to the narrative propagated by the country's military.

157. Conflict promulgated by “non-state actors” – both religious extremists and separatists – has shifted from a case of “non-state vs. state” conflict towards “non-state actors vs. civil society”, especially liberal, pro-democracy, or “westernised” segments of society. This is evident in brutal physical attacks, as well as in “trolling” or harassment via the mainstream media and social media platforms.

158. International tensions, particularly with its neighbours India and Afghanistan, will affect Pakistan's national political narrative. The rising Hindu nationalist narrative in India is likely to provoke growing nationalist narratives in Pakistan. There is also a risk of increasing migration and infiltration by terrorist organisations like the so-called Islamic State.

159. Extremism could grow in the coming years since the state's actions against extremists remain largely uneven. Intolerance and violent extremism is sinking its roots deeper within many sectors and levels of Pakistani society. Central Punjab is a notorious centre for extremist narratives.

160. As a result, the **space for civil society within Pakistani society is diminishing**. In many areas, the country is experiencing a strong reaction to change – in effect, this is leading to an upsurge in intolerance of diversity. Civil society is increasingly being targeted by social media and popular media outlets. This scenario markedly reduces the ability of women and girls to actively participate in society.



161. Narratives related to Pakistani nationalism directly affect public perceptions and can pose challenges in terms of promoting tolerance for diversity.

162. International organisations and civil society bodies are often under pressure from militants who threaten them with violence. In the past, it has sometimes proved difficult to obtain “No Objection Certificates” (NOC), which are required to travel to project areas. This can be challenging, as the areas for which it can be most difficult to obtain NOCs are often those which are most under-developed, and therefore the most in need of development interventions.

163. Growing migration from rural areas to urban centres has a twofold effect. On the one hand, it enables growing numbers of girls and women to pursue an education and gainful employment. On the other hand, migration has also “transplanted” rural values and social structures to Pakistan’s cities, rather than solely incorporating rural migrants into “urban narratives”. For example, the transfer of “rural narratives” to urban areas is leading to police in urban settings often being unreceptive to formal complaints by women. Moreover, as greater numbers of **rural women and youth** migrate to large cities – due to a dearth of adequate opportunities in rural regions – these new arrivals are sometimes seen as a threat by more long-standing rural migrants, who are still trying to establish themselves in urban and peri-urban areas.

164. Access to social media, especially among youth in urban areas, is allowing them to establish social networks and engage with one another. For instance, they are using such platforms to demand enhanced social services, such as garbage collection and security.



Peaceful and Inclusive Societies for Sustainable Development, Access to Justice, and Effective, Accountable and Inclusive Institutions (SDG 16)

165. Access to justice is far from equal for all of Pakistan’s citizens. A number of factors prevent impoverished individuals from seeking meaningful redress. They are often “disempowered” by their weak understanding of English, which continues to be the language of legislation, regulations and courtrooms (Siddique, 2014).

As a result, such litigants are often unable to effectively navigate the process of litigation, impeded from monitoring the progress of their case and the performance of their legal counsel. It also directly impacts their understanding of legal rights and remedies.

Studies reveal a direct correlation between low income, higher exposure to coercion and pressure tactics by legal opponents, and greater vulnerability to harassment by the police. Aside from the disparate translation of some laws into Urdu, little effort has been made to level the playing field for disempowered citizens. The availability of legal aid is minimal, and alarmingly few individuals (1.36% of the population) are either aware that legal aid exists, or have availed themselves of legal assistance (Siddique, 2014).

166. Issues of capacity continue to undermine the availability of accessible, rapid and inexpensive access to justice. Acute supply side constraints have resulted in a deficit of judges across all four provinces. Based on conservative estimates of provincial population sizes, there are fewer than two judges available for every 100,000 residents of a province (Siddique, 2014). Shortages also extend to the availability of lawyers, with serious implications in terms of the cost and availability of legal representation.

Such shortages could be addressed, in part, by increasing the availability of Alternate Dispute Resolution (ADR) mechanisms for civil matters. KP's Government recently introduced ADR and is working to institutionalise such mechanisms in cooperation with the police and district administrations. Nevertheless, there is a need to extend such arrangements across all of Pakistan's provinces, in close coordination with the lower courts and constitutional experts.

167. There is a **lack of reliable data** – both official and unofficial – on citizens' experiences of the formal legal system. As a result, high levels of incongruence exist between citizens' grievances and reform measures enacted by the Government. Recent studies show that up to 52.5% of reported disputes relate to land and property (Siddique, 2014). Cases are often drawn out over several years and disproportionately affect vulnerable groups, particularly women. Despite this, little effort has been made to improve the intelligibility and effectiveness of the land legislation regime.

168. Citizens' perceptions of the criminal justice system reflect a sense that the rule of law is exceptionally weak in Pakistan. A recent study conducted in Punjab discerned a growing feeling of insecurity among citizens, particularly as they perceive crime to be on the rise. They considered personal influence and influential relatives to be the factors most effective in safeguarding both one's person and property. Only 9.5% of respondents felt that the police contribute to their sense of security (Siddique, 2014).

In order to address this erosion of state-enforced law and order, there is an urgent need to engage with citizens. It will be vital to collect reliable, comprehensive data on actual levels of crime, as well as on citizens' perceptions of crime and the justice system more broadly. Only by taking such information into account can the justice system be effectively reformed in order to respond to the real concerns of Pakistan's populace. In parallel, strategies should be devised to engage citizens at the local level with crime prevention and control mechanisms. While good data is vital, it alone is not enough. Community policing and widespread citizen engagement are just as important.

169. Due to **gaps in equipment and border management**, Pakistan struggles to prevent the flow of drugs, arms, money and insurgents into the country. These constitute the very means and agents of violence, thus posing a grave threat to law and order. The security vacuum, particularly in border areas, contributes to the trade in arms and drugs, migrant smuggling and human trafficking. These phenomena are further destabilising the region, adversely affecting Pakistan's economy and threatening society's well-being.

170. Studies reveal that corruption is prevalent across Pakistan. Recent research ranked Pakistan 117th of 168 countries in terms of corruption, assigning the country a score of 30 on a scale of 0 (highly corrupt) to 100 (very clean) (Transparency International Corruption Perception Index, 2015). Corruption remains a deep-rooted, pervasive obstacle to the achieving economic growth, social development and progress on the SDGs. As noted above, corruption is also one of the most significant barriers to doing business in Pakistan.¹

171. Perceptions of corruption are alarmingly high, particularly with respect to institutions responsible for public services and which frequently interact with citizens. As many as 82% of respondents considered the police a "corrupt" or an "extremely corrupt" institution. Public officials, political parties, the judiciary and Pakistan's legislature are also widely considered to be corrupt – by 81%, 76%, 63% and 45% of respondents, respectively.² Such perceptions fuel an increasing sense of "disempowerment" among citizens. There appears to be a decline in the belief that ordinary citizens can address corruption (Transparency International Pakistan, 2014).

¹ For more detailed information, please see: <http://www.business-anti-corruption.com/country-profiles/pakistan>

² To access the survey, please see: <http://www.transparency.org/gcb2013/country/?country=pakistan>

172. In order to tackle corruption, it is crucial to address the **underlying factors** which cause the phenomenon. Persistently high levels of corruption ultimately stem from the wide-ranging discretionary powers afforded to state institutions; a lack of accountability among these institutions; the low salaries of public sector employees; and a lack of political will to implement anti-corruption laws. Political will is particularly relevant since Pakistan's current anti-corruption legal framework is fairly robust in theory, but has not yet proved to be effective in practice.

173. Pakistan is struggling to enhance the **effectiveness of its governance institutions**. The performance of these institutions – including the country's legislature, executive branch, judiciary and law enforcement agencies – remains weak in terms of executing their core functions.

174. **A lack or mismanagement of resources** is a recurring challenge. The effectiveness of law enforcement agencies is particularly compromised by limited financial, human and infrastructure-related resources. Similarly, the efficacy of Pakistan's legislature is hampered by significant resource gaps. It struggles with an acute shortage of staff able to produce well-researched background material that can reliably inform evidence-based policy-making (Transparency International Pakistan, 2014).

175. **A lack of transparency** in institutional operations further obstructs institutional effectiveness. This is especially notable in the case of the executive branch of government, notwithstanding the plethora of rules on transparency. These rules are often disregarded, as are rules concerning the dissemination of information on the executive's activities.

Other requirements are complied with superficially, with members of the executive often not complying with rules that oblige them to declare their assets and liabilities. Poor compliance with rules on transparency diminishes the quality of information which reaches citizens. In turn, this reduces their ability to hold the executive to account, while undermining their confidence in political leaders and democratic institutions.

176. Nevertheless, **greater transparency is evident in some areas**. The judiciary is foremost among a number of institutions which have become substantially more transparent in recent years. The Supreme Court now publishes detailed Annual Reports, which are made available to the public. Information on judicial appointments, promotions to, and removals from superior courts is available in newspapers and on the websites of Pakistan's Supreme Court and its provincial High Courts.

The Electoral Management Body is another institution that has significantly enhanced transparency by improving voter access to relevant information.

177. **Greater levels of accountability** are also apparent. To a degree, improvements in governance are spurred by Pakistan's increasingly diverse and vibrant media landscape. The media's engagement with a vast array of political, social and economic concerns has prompted greater accountability within state institutions responsible for these issues.

Investigative journalism has been instrumental in exposing instances of corruption and poor service delivery. The media's role in promoting more effective governance may develop further as the quality of journalists' training improves. Similarly, accountability stands to benefit as journalists increasingly follow-up on news stories and run specific programmes to inform the public about corruption.

178. The provisions of the **18th Constitutional Amendment** (2010) are a step towards a more responsive, inclusive, participatory and representative system of governance. By devolving administrative and budgetary authority to provincial governments, this amendment seeks to make decision-making more inclusive, and service delivery more responsive to the needs of citizens.

179. Several matters related to **the implementation of decentralisation** must be addressed before the full benefits of the 18th Amendment can reach citizens on the ground. Institutional capacity will have to be enhanced, especially at the sub-national level. Federal institutions and implementation mechanisms responsible for effecting devolution are either non-existent or poorly developed. The institutions responsible for inter-provincial coordination are currently ill-equipped to perform their role.

To realise the spirit of the 18th Amendment, Pakistan must foster a more responsive and inclusive dynamic between citizens and the state. While the 18th Amendment redresses the balance somewhat, by enshrining the rights to information and education as fundamental rights, more can be done to ensure that governance is fully “citizen-focused”.

Effective decentralised governance is impeded by an absence of reliable data. Pakistan’s legislature only employs four research associates and a poorly trained team of Committee Secretariat staff (Transparency International Pakistan, 2014). As such, limited background information on legislative and constituency issues reaches law-makers. Controlled political disclosure constrains the amount – and the quality – of information on governance that reaches citizens. This yields growing incongruence between citizens’ aspirations and the state’s actions.

180. **Citizens are increasingly able to voice their concerns through informal channels.** This is almost entirely due to the rise of popular and social media. The proliferation of satellite channels and radio stations, particularly those with a regional focus, provide new interactive platforms for diverse audiences (Yusuf and Schoemaker, 2013).

The media’s potential to empower people is immense, particularly as it can reach out to people at all levels – including those with low levels of education, or individuals who reside in remote, under-developed areas and conflict zones. The increasing use of mobile phones and the Internet are similarly significant. Some 16% of the population now has internet access, with social media platforms like Facebook and Twitter emerging as important avenues of political expression (Transparency International Pakistan, 2014). While the media’s potential to empower is positive, it is important to be vigilant against potential harmful effects. For instance, media discussion can also “close down” space or even threaten people.

181. Low levels of **birth registration** in Pakistan mean that some 60 million children are currently unregistered, roughly 34% of all children under the age of 5. This figure grows by some 3 million each year. The absence of a birth certificate denies children their right to an official **legal identity** and social protection. Unregistered children are more likely to suffer harrowing socio-economic conditions and to be exposed to criminal activities. They are less likely to be included in state planning, development policies or social services. Universal birth registration is, therefore, vital for the well-being of Pakistan’s children and the country’s overall sustainable development.

The multi-dimensional causes of low levels of birth registration include: a lack of family resources; weak administrative governance structures; high costs in terms of the money and time required to register a child’s birth; bureaucratic hurdles in the application process; and a general lack of knowledge surrounding required procedures. In many cases, parents and caregivers are unaware of the benefits of birth registration, and simply do not believe that registering their children is worth the effort it requires.



182. Significant steps have been taken to **improve public access to information** and promote “open government”. The right to information enshrined in the 18th Constitutional Amendment has spurred related legislation in KP and Punjab. Nevertheless, practical measures are needed to overcome delays and the pervasive bureaucratic culture of “secrecy” which often undermines citizens’ efforts to access public information. Sindh and Balochistan are lagging behind given the more restrictive nature of their respective *Freedom of Information Acts*.

183. The **unsuccessful prosecution of terrorism cases** poses a tremendous challenge for Pakistan. This is driven by insecurity; unreformed rules on criminal evidence; and the poor investigative capacity of the police. These loopholes prompted the establishment of military courts to prosecute those suspected of terrorist involvement, a decision criticized by civil society, political parties and the international community. Such moves point to dire problems with the country’s judicial system. It is imperative that Pakistan effectively overhauls its judicial system, rather than relying on *ad hoc* mechanisms.

Human Induced Disasters

Overview: Disasters induced by human actions, alongside natural disasters, have exacerbated the stresses of a weak economy, poverty, inequality, exclusion and the demands of sustainable development in Pakistan. The most marginalised and vulnerable segments of the population have suffered grievously, most notably women, children and minorities.

184. Since gaining independence in 1947, Pakistan has been affected by a series of “**human-induced**” **disasters**. The country’s population has been severely affected by partition; conflicts with India over Kashmir; the spill-over effects of the conflict in Afghanistan; recent military efforts to combat terrorism and internal separatist conflict; and ethno-political and sectarian conflicts. In recent years, the populations of Balochistan, KP and FATA have borne the brunt of these man made crises.

185. The **socio-economic vulnerability** of conflict-affected populations has been aggravated by damage to villages; the loss of livelihoods; the trauma of temporary internal displacement; and disillusionment, given the failure of support systems to respond to people’s needs. The groups most seriously impacted include women, youth (male and female), children, impoverished individuals, female-headed households, people with disabilities, the elderly, and victims of violence. An atmosphere of fear and distrust prevails among many conflict-affected communities, who often question the Government’s effectiveness and responsiveness.

Young people between the ages of 15 and 29, who comprise 27% of the population in conflict-affected areas, have been particularly exposed to militancy. The armed insurgency provoked by the Taliban in KP and FATA displaced 303,791 families, of whom 145,781 remained displaced in late 2016.

186. In Balochistan, **ethno-political and separatist conflict** has spurred an exodus of highly skilled individuals, with estimates putting their number at 100,000-200,000. Statistics gathered by Balochistan’s Home Department reveal a 37% drop in targeted killings between 2014 and 2015. Casualties fell from 275 in 2014, to 198 fatalities and 304 persons injured in 2015.

187. The impact of **ethno-political and sectarian conflicts** has been felt throughout the national economy. For instance, targeted killings in Karachi have had devastating effects since the city is the “economic engine” of the country – contributing 20% of Pakistan’s GDP, 30% of manufacturing, and 53% of the proceeds to the Federal Board of Revenue (FBR). The Federation of Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FPCCI) estimates the economic loss prompted by each day of violence at PKR 7-8 billion. This does not include intangible losses caused by a loss of investor confidence and capital flight.

While targeted killings in Karachi have claimed thousands of lives – with victims succumbing to bombings, torture, and murder by militants – the situation has begun to improve after paramilitary forces were given special powers to conduct search operations. Although the threat of violence persists, citizens’ lives and property were more secure in 2016 than they were in 2013.

188. As discussed above, Pakistan hosts one of the largest protracted refugee populations in the world, encompassing **1.3 million registered Afghan refugees**. In 2016, 381,275 Afghan refugees and over 250,000 undocumented Afghans returned to Afghanistan from Pakistan.

189. For years, Pakistan has been trapped in a vicious cycle of **conflict and poverty** which interact to undermine national development. Just as the risk of conflict is heightened by poverty, so too does conflict perpetuate poverty. Achieving poverty reduction (SDG1) ultimately requires effective conflict prevention. In practice, it is almost impossible to separate the development and security agendas. Without security, ensuring livelihoods is virtually meaningless, and vice versa. Reducing poverty yields a triple dividend by simultaneously addressing a) security considerations; b) disaster mitigation; and c) sustainable development.

190. To bring about lasting peace, **Pakistan must address all the drivers of conflict**, including prevailing nationalist narratives that underpin intolerance. Simple inequality between rich and poor has not been the main cause of violent conflict in the country. Instead, “horizontal” inequality has been key, whereby power and resources are unequally distributed between different groups. Certain characteristics tend to differentiate one group from another, such as ethnicity, religion, or language. So-called “ethnic conflicts” often occur between groups which are distinct in more ways than one. These are especially likely when groups believe themselves to be discriminated against, or when they fear losing their existing privileges.

191. Agriculture and livestock account for 97% of all livelihoods in FATA, the region which has been most affected by anti-terrorist military campaigns since 2014. Not only did security operations trigger waves of displacement affecting millions of people, but damage to the agricultural sector has severely **disrupted livelihoods**. The loss of seeds, livestock, seed storage structures, and damage to irrigation systems and infrastructure has been catastrophic. Returning populations require urgent support to resume agricultural production and rebuild their lives.

192. **Disaster Risk Management (DRM) and Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR)** require greater attention. The Government’s *National Disaster Risk Reduction Policy* recognises that awareness of risks is generally low across Pakistan. There is a need for a greater understanding and better mapping of key hazards, as well as their underlying dynamics, variability and causes, such as climate change. Pakistan urgently requires sound data and effective analysis of vulnerabilities.

Risk assessments are needed to establish the probability and possible impact of hazards on people, livelihoods and key sectors. Such assessments are also essential for diagnosing causes and identifying avenues for risk prevention and mitigation that are technically, socially and environmentally sound. To date, a small number of risk assessments have been conducted, covering a limited range of territories and hazards. The Government is developing a standard national methodology and working to improve institutional capacity to conduct multi-hazard risk assessments and vulnerability analyses. Both are essential pre-requisites for a comprehensive *National Risk Atlas*.

193. Pakistan is just beginning to **integrate Disaster Risk Management (DRM)** approaches and Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) measures **into policies, strategies and regulatory frameworks** for sectoral development. Work has begun with respect to key sectors like agriculture, education, health, infrastructure and local governance. Such approaches are necessary at all levels of development planning, including:

- a. National Development Plans and poverty reduction strategy papers;
- b. Overall development programmes, as well as projects specific to particular sectors and sub-sectors; and
- c. Building codes for construction and land-use and zoning regulations for settlement planning, as well as for the development of irrigation.

Such integration is important for both technical and institutional reasons, including:

- a. The need to raise awareness and cement commitment at the policy- and decision-making levels;
- b. The need to build dedicated capacity and resources;
- c. The absence of institutional and legal mechanisms to promote enforcement; and
- d. A current lack of monitoring, evaluation and accountability.

194. Current disaster management legislation implies the **decentralisation of core responsibilities** to the provincial/regional and district levels. However, decentralisation has not yet been matched by institutional capacity. This is especially true at the district level, ostensibly the level closest to high-risk communities under its jurisdiction. Overall, capacities are generally low at the community, union council and sub-district (*tehsil*) levels.

As the Government is increasingly reluctant to request international assistance in the wake of disasters, a flexible response mechanism is needed to meet the immediate, vital needs of disaster-affected populations, even in the absence of a national request for international humanitarian assistance.



IX. Partnerships and National Capacity

17 PARTNERSHIPS FOR THE GOALS



Government Income and Expenditures (SDG 17)

195. Pakistan has among the lowest rates of **tax collection** in South Asia, a trend which does not appear likely to change in the near future. On the one hand, this relates to the pace of overall economic growth. On the other, it is due to the taxation system itself.

Pakistan's tax base is extremely small. Emphasis remains on regressive indirect taxation rather than more progressive direct taxation. Political elites, many of whom have rural land-holdings, resist taxation in the agricultural sector. Their influence is pervasive, as they are represented in positions of power within the armed forces, the civil service and the media. Some are averse to state investment in education, in order to prevent changes in their rural electoral bases. Other more conservative elites also resist taxation in favour of *Zakat*, a form of religious alms-giving, which can prevent the state from accessing tax revenue.



Political parties may face challenges by 2030, since rapid urbanisation could undermine their traditional electoral bases. However, current paternalistic rural political systems may be replicated in peri-urban areas, as rural values are steadily being transported into such urban settings.

196. Low levels of social investment impede the effective development of the country’s human capital. Pakistan has among the lowest rates of investment in education (estimated at 2.8% of GDP) and health (approximately 0.8% of GDP). Moreover, funds allocated to social issues within the annual budget are often not fully spent. This is linked to limited capacity for planning and implementation, particularly at the provincial level and within social sectors. It is also tied to late transfers to Ministries and provincial institutions.

In light of its mandate, the UN has a responsibility to examine the extent of gender responsive budgeting (GRB) within Government planning and budgetary allocations.



Government and Other Data (SDG 17)

197. While, Pakistan has greatly improved the availability of data for development planning, **limited data availability** persists. The absence of a National Census since 1998 is a serious impediment to effective planning and achieving the SDGs. For example, at present, estimates of the national population vary between 180 million and 202 million. Estimates of provincial populations also vary significantly.

Moreover, available data sets tend not to be adequately disaggregated. A lack of data disaggregation by sex, age, ethnicity or religion makes it difficult to set SDG baselines relevant for vulnerable population groups, and to effectively monitor progress on the SDGs.

198. The lack of reliable, up-to-date data causes **inconsistencies in key national statistics**. As noted above, estimates of Pakistan’s total population range from 195 million to over 200 million. Therefore, projections of how large the population will be in 2030 also vary greatly. This has serious implications for development planning and policy-making.

199. Inconsistencies in data are especially evident at the sub-national level. For example, estimates of Pakistan’s urban population in 2016 varied wildly. Some sources claim that 38% of the population is urban, while others calculate that 55% of the populace lives in urban areas. Estimates vary both due to the availability of data and the methods used for calculations, e.g. whether figures are based on administrative areas or population density.

As a result, urban authorities effectively do not know the size of the population for which they must currently provide services. They are equally unaware of the size of population they will have to plan for in the future. Population estimates for Karachi in 2016, for example, range from 13 million to over 19 million.

200. A lack of data on those left “farthest behind” is particularly problematic. Regular surveys provide significant interim information, including the *Pakistan Demographic and Health Survey* (PDHS), the *Pakistan Social and Living Standards Measurement Survey* (PSLM) and *Multiple Indicator Cluster Surveys* (MICS). Nevertheless, as discussed above, there is a dearth of data on many segments of the population, particularly those identified as the “most vulnerable” by the SDGs. These key groups include women, children, ethnic and religious minorities, people living with disabilities, people living with HIV, and LGBT individuals.



201. Several data collection constraints exist. The need for accurate data to provide SDG baselines has precipitated a rush among donors, national organisations and international agencies to begin collecting great swathes of data. In addition to a National Census planned for 2017, a range of surveys are being undertaken – including *Multiple Indicator Cluster Surveys* (MICS), the *Pakistan Social and Living Standards Measurement Survey* (PSLM), the *National Nutrition Survey* (NNS), alongside surveys on child labour and violence against women. Meanwhile, *Pakistan Demographic and Health Surveys* (PDHS) are underway or have been simultaneously planned by different donors.

While additional data and analysis is both needed and welcome, the current scenario raises two key concerns. First, competition between organisations collecting data is clearly counter-productive. Second, Pakistan’s inadequate national capacity to gather and analyse vast quantities of data poses a serious challenge. A more coordinated approach to data collection and analysis is required to ensure that the SDGs are effectively monitored and implemented.



Global Partnerships (SDG 17)

Donor Funding Landscape

202. In 2008, when Pakistan’s status rose from that of a “low income” to a “lower middle income” country, **international donors reviewed their country programme strategies** and adjusted their cooperation accordingly.

Smaller donors are increasingly shifting away from bi-lateral assistance towards trade and investment partnerships. In tandem, however, they have begun reducing their overall engagement with Pakistan. For example, Denmark and the Netherlands recently decided to suspend their economic development programmes with Pakistan. Both countries are now focusing on “trade for aid” initiatives, which are characterised by the involvement of the private sector.

Norway, Australia and other donors who are reducing or ending their Official Development Assistance (ODA) for Pakistan may be reacting to the country’s security situation – which requires larger project portfolios to be cost-effective – as well as their own domestic policy environments.

203. In contrast, many **larger donor agencies are increasing their engagement in Pakistan**. This will lead to an overall consolidation of the donor community. Over the course of the next United Nations Pakistan Partnership Framework (UNPPF), spanning 2018 to 2022, the UN will be dealing with fewer, but larger, donors.

The diminishing donor community in Pakistan must be taken into consideration when discussing and planning future UN priorities and development assistance. Donors which have indicated their intention to increase funding for Pakistan include Canada, China, the European Union, France, Germany, Italy and the United States.

204. Official Development Assistance (ODA) to Pakistan gradually, but unevenly, increased fivefold between 2000 (US\$ 700 million) and 2014 (US\$ 3.6 billion). It is likely to continue at high rates throughout the next UNPPF cycle, given the pressing need to improve Pakistan’s infrastructure and energy sectors. It is likely that there will be greater reliance on soft loans, rather than grants.



Trends in Humanitarian Funding

205. After the 2010 floods, which prompted a vast influx of aid, **humanitarian assistance to Pakistan has steadily decreased** each year. This trend is likely to continue over the forthcoming UNPPF cycle, as long as the country is not affected by a new humanitarian crisis. Several donors have indicated that they plan to phase out their humanitarian aid gradually. In part, this is due to Pakistan's overall recent progress in development, as well as due to donors' shifting priorities in light of recent crises in the Middle East.

Donor Rankings

206. The **four leading donors in Pakistan** are the World Bank, the United States, the Asian Development Bank and the United Kingdom. Together they contribute almost 75% of Pakistan's total gross Official Development Assistance. They are followed by six medium-size donors: Japan, the European Union, Germany, the United Arab Emirates, the Global Alliance for Vaccines (GAVI) and Australia. Combined, these medium-sized donors provide 19% of Pakistan's gross ODA. Finally, there is a shrinking group of smaller donors with a combined contribution of 8% of ODA. Two additional key donors, China and Saudi Arabia, have not provided any data on their contributions.

207. **Large and medium-sized donor countries** support Pakistan via a combination of different instruments, including soft loans, grants and technical assistance. Thus far, the United States, the United Kingdom and the European Union have refrained from disbursing ODA loans to Pakistan. Instead, these donors have focused on grants. The World Bank has recently started to offer Pakistan loans on International Development Association (IDA) and International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) blended terms.

208. The top ten contributors to **humanitarian funding** in Pakistan are the United States, the European Union, Japan, the United Kingdom, Germany, Canada, Sweden, Switzerland, Denmark and Norway.

Current Sector Trends

209. **Pakistan's donor funding context is evolving.** In recent years, the donor community has adjusted its development priorities. While the largest donors continue to be involved in a broad range of sectors, several smaller donors have decided to prioritise fewer sectors for their development cooperation. The Table below illustrates the key sectors within which Pakistan's foremost donors are most active.

Pakistan faces a significant funding gap as it plans to achieve the SDGs. While international cooperation will play an important part in bridging this gap, internal funding will be especially critical. Internal funding will depend heavily, but not exclusively, on government investments – for instance, core investments in infrastructure and social sectors. It will also require greater private sector participation. Ultimately, Pakistan's private sector will have to be actively engaged if the country is to bridge gaps in Official Development Assistance (ODA) and public funding.



| Macro-Sectors | Relevant Donors |
|--|--|
| Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR/DRM) | Asian Development Bank; the European Union; Japan; Norway; Switzerland; the United Kingdom; and the World Bank. |
| Economic Growth, Private Sector Development and Employment | Asian Development Bank; Australia; Canada; the European Union; Germany; Italy; Japan; the United Kingdom; the United States; and the World Bank. |
| Education | Australia; Canada; the European Union; Norway; Japan; South Korea; the United Arab Emirates; the United Kingdom; the United States; and the World Bank. |
| Energy | Asian Development Bank; France; Germany; the Islamic Development Bank; Japan; Saudi Arabia; South Korea; the United States; and the World Bank. |
| Environment | Japan. |
| Governance and the Rule of Law | Asian Development Bank; Australia; Canada; the European Union; Germany; Switzerland; the United Kingdom; the United States; and the World Bank. |
| Health | Australia; Canada; Japan; South Korea; the United Arab Emirates; the United Kingdom; the United States; and the World Bank. |
| Human Rights | European Union; France; Germany; the Netherlands; Norway; Switzerland; and the United Kingdom. |
| Infrastructure and Transportation | Asian Development Bank; China; Japan; Saudi Arabia; South Korea; and the United Arab Emirates. |
| Rural Development, Agriculture, Nutrition | Asian Development Bank; Australia; the European Union; Japan; Switzerland; Saudi Arabia; the United Kingdom; the United States; and the World Bank. |
| Vocational Training | Germany; Canada; Norway; and South Korea. |
| Water, Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH) | Asian Development Bank; Australia; Japan; South Korea; Switzerland; the United Arab Emirates; the United Kingdom; the United States; and the World Bank. |
| Women's Empowerment | Australia; Denmark; the European Union; Japan; Norway; the United Kingdom; the United States; and the World Bank. |


Net Official Development Assistance (ODA) to Pakistan, 2000-2014.




Geographical Focus

210. KP, FATA and – to a lesser extent – **Balochistan** are priority regions for Pakistan’s donor community. The World Bank’s *Multi-Donor Trust Fund* (MDTF) in Pakistan also concentrates on these three areas. International financial institutions have a strong presence in the provinces of Punjab and Sindh. However, very few donors are active in PAK and GB.


| Province / Administrative Area | Relevant Donors |
|-------------------------------------|--|
| Balochistan | Asian Development Bank; Australia; Canada; the European Union; Saudi Arabia; the United Kingdom; the United States; the World Bank; and the Multi-Donor Trust Fund (MDTF). |
| Federally Administered Tribal Areas | Asian Development Bank; Australia; Canada; the European Union; Germany; Japan; Norway; South Korea; Switzerland; the United Arab Emirates; the United Kingdom; the United States; the World Bank; and the Multi-Donor Trust Fund (MDTF). |
| Gilgit-Baltistan (GB) | Canada; Switzerland; the United Kingdom; and the United States. |
| Islamabad Capital Territory (ICT) | South Korea; the United Arab Emirates; the United Kingdom; and the United States. |
| Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) | Asian Development Bank; Australia; Canada; the European Union; France; Germany; Japan; Norway; Saudi Arabia; South Korea; Switzerland; the United Kingdom; the United States; the World Bank; and the Multi-Donor Trust Fund (MDTF). |
| Pakistan Administered Kashmir (PAK) | France; Saudi Arabia; and the United States. |
| Punjab | Asian Development Bank; Canada; the European Union; Germany; South Korea; the United Kingdom; the United States; and the World Bank. |
| Sindh | Asian Development Bank; Canada; the European Union; Saudi Arabia; South Korea; the United Kingdom; the United States; and the World Bank. |



Top ODA (Gross) Contributors to Pakistan, 2014 (US\$ Millions)



Humanitarian Funding in Pakistan, 2015 (US\$ Millions)





Annex I: Focus Group Discussions CCA 2016 Consolidated Report

Overview

In the spirit of Agenda 2030, which states that an innovative and holistic approach should be taken to partnerships in order to achieve the SDGs, the UN in Pakistan has made concerted efforts to engage with key partners. These encompass the private sector, including small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), the full spectrum of civil society, academia, communities, NGOs, the media and all other stakeholders. As part of its strategic planning process, the UN hosted a series of meetings with stakeholder groups to explore:

- What they consider to be the main development and humanitarian challenges in Pakistan;
- What root causes underlie these challenges;
- What future trends they anticipate; and
- Which areas the UN is considered to add the most value.

A total of eight focus group discussions were conducted in Islamabad, Lahore and Sialkot. Each session lasted for two hours and comprised 8-10 participants.

Questions for the Focus Group Discussions

1. What are the major development/humanitarian challenges in Pakistan?
2. What are the root causes of these challenges?
3. What are the drivers of change (positive or negative) in each area? Do these change over time?
4. What future trends are expected over the next 2-3 years in each area?
5. In which areas can the UN best support progress? With whom should the UN partner?

Development and Humanitarian Issues in Pakistan

During the focus group discussions, the following development and humanitarian challenges were discussed, reflecting the overarching views of the participants:

Governance and Rule of Law

Governance structures are set-up to go for “low hanging fruits”, rather than to reach the most vulnerable. The accountability and justice system are not needs-based. A lack of transparency poses major challenges. Notable steps have been taken to improve transparency, for instance, passing a law on the right to information. However, this law has not yet been implemented. Complex challenges exist with respect to specialised reforms for the judiciary, law enforcement, and the civil service. The transparent functioning of all organisations which operate in the development and humanitarian sectors is of paramount importance in order to achieve progress.



Social Issues

Education was cited as the single most important challenge currently facing Pakistan. The quality of education is abysmal despite copious investments in the sector. The quality of teaching and curricula, alongside the low retention of students in primary schools, constitute the most significant factors impeding progress. The private sector's efforts to fill existing gaps has made education even more expensive.

Other problems discussed at length include water scarcity and nutrition. Stunting and wasting affect over 43.7% of the country's children. Food insecurity is prevalent because the population depends on agrarian lifestyles, which are increasingly becoming unsustainable. Rapid, unchecked population growth is another grave challenge. Pakistan's most recent Census was conducted almost two decades ago, in 1998, leading to a lack of accurate data for planning and development purposes. Overall, exponential population growth has severe implications for the economy and the ability of citizens to access vital social services.

Although the youth bulge offers a tremendous opportunity to harness Pakistan's demographic dividend, it also entails serious risks. It is critical to ensure that basic social services are provided for the country's healthy growth and development. Institutions for technical and vocational training are sorely lacking across Pakistan. As a result, the labour force is not specialised and lacks specific technical skills. A lack of gainful employment is among the foremost challenges facing Pakistan's youth, most of whom are adversely affected by the inadequate provision of basic social care throughout their lives.

Pakistan also suffers from pervasive problems like "landlordism", with feudal and elite culture deeply entrenched within society. A grave lack of women's empowerment and equality at all levels is holding back the country from making progress on all fronts.

Above all, the discussions identified poverty as Pakistan's most serious overarching problem. Poverty remains rampant, with the poor steadily becoming poorer while the rich grow richer. The division between social classes in terms of access to resources, social services, and opportunities largely determines people's quality of life. There is a stark contrast between the quality of life endured by those who are impoverished or socio-economically disadvantaged, and those who are in positions of power and privilege.

Inequality within regions and provinces adds to the country's multi-faceted challenges. Gross inequality is experienced by minorities, as different ethnic groups or groups which subscribe to different religions are far more underprivileged. Such fault-lines also exist across genders, as women are notably more disadvantaged throughout the country. Minority groups and the transgender community are unable to exercise the same rights or access services as freely as the rest of the population. Mechanisms do not exist to address the challenges faced by these marginalised groups or vulnerable communities, the majority of whom are not active participants in decision-making at any level.

Trade and Economic Growth

Pakistan is experiencing a steady reduction in exports, as a result of which the industrial sector is suffering and businesses are shutting down. The cost of production is extremely high, largely because energy costs are exorbitant. The import duties on equipment and technological knowledge raise costs exponentially. While 80% of Pakistan's economy is based on agriculture, the products it produces and exports are "raw" or "semi-finished". There is very little room for innovation or "value-addition" as this requires substantial investment.

Linkages between the private sector and academic institutions are poor. At present, the country has no adequate procedure through which to share research on new production techniques. There is also a dearth of funding for new ideas. This is largely because “doing business in Pakistan” is exceptionally difficult. Due to a lack of standardisation in the professional vendor-industry, the procurement and production process is far from smooth.

Environment

There is no consideration for environmental sustainability in planning and implementation. The absence of coordination and collaboration between humanitarian – and development – actors adds to the problem whenever a crisis unfolds. Disaster Risk Management in the country “*starts from zero every time*”.

Pakistan is a country prone to disasters, with a host of natural hazards threatening its people and infrastructure. Far greater investments are needed in disaster mitigation, resilience and response. Only in this way can the country avoid losing several years of development gains every time a disaster strikes. The rapid pace of urbanisation, coupled with a lack of formal control or planning for this phenomenon, suggests that Pakistan is in no way prepared to urbanise strategically.

Future Trends

Focus group participants identified the following drivers of change (both positive and negative) for the 2018-2022 period:

- As natural disasters are increasingly driven by climate change, Pakistan’s recent choice to invest in coal-powered energy will aggravate climate change across the country. In addition, the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) agreement and other industrial projects will increase pollution and carbon emissions.
- Synergies and partnerships between the private sector and the Government, in terms of information sharing, will improve in the wake of efforts to coordinate programmes. This is also a key opportunity for development and humanitarian partners to come together.
- In terms of positive trends, it is expected that Pakistan will be able to control terrorism. Ultimately, addressing terrorism depends on how well the country’s *National Action Plan* is implemented, including addressing the root causes of terrorist violence, such as a lack of education and the growth of extremism. While the assumption is that these problems will be addressed, if they are not, terrorism will either continue or grow. Addressing security issues and terrorism is especially pertinent for Pakistan’s international image and its potential to attract investment. Regional geopolitical issues will also be a major driver in determining whether terrorism can be overcome.
- Pakistan’s forthcoming national elections in 2018 and elections in 2023 will help to cement the roots of democracy in the country. By this time, it is expected that strengthened district governance will begin to mature.
- The provinces will continue to fare differently in terms of development indicators. Balochistan and rural Sindh are expected to lag behind, with the weakest governance and the worst social indicators. Nevertheless, Sindh may be able to advance and improve administrative links between the broader province and the economic hub of Karachi. Punjab also faces challenges with respect to gas and internal water distribution. The provinces must pay more attention to the “orientations of various groups”. The future outlook for KP, meanwhile, is largely positive.

The UN's Comparative Advantage

The focus group discussions highlighted the following areas in which the United Nations could leverage its comparative advantage:

- The UN has the convening power necessary to work with the **corporate sector** on inclusive corporate social responsibility (CSR) strategies. It can engage private sector stakeholders as agents for change while working specifically with **youth and women** to foster “protective” factors. Ultimately, all key issues revolve around Pakistan’s youth. Therefore, it is critical to involve young people from all walks of life. UN capacity development will be critical for improving services, in collaboration with the Government and institutions like universities. Special programming is required which focuses on young children and youth.
- A key thematic area which the UN must consider is the entire **value-chain of employment**: labour laws, vocational training, trade unions and related elements.
- Comprehensive **research** could be commissioned to pinpoint gaps in **governance structures** and identifying how to strengthen of the rule of law. If accurate, reliable information is made available, challenges in the sphere of governance could be effectively addressed by working closely with the Federal and provincial governments. Creating synergies and improving coordination will enable the UN and its partners to join forces, devise tailored solutions and localise good practices for Pakistan’s specific context. In this way, many of the challenges rampant in Pakistan can be effectively addressed.
- By focusing on new modes of delivery, reaching out to the people on the periphery, and becoming an incubator for new ideas, the UN can act as a catalyst for change. This could encompass seed funding projects for **innovation** in the social sector.
- The UN can partner with national NGOs in a joint effort to enhance **urban governance** and **social inclusion**. At present, the urban poor experience chronic exclusion and often cannot access social services. It will be necessary to change systems in order to redress such disparities, through mobilisation, greater awareness and social inclusion. Crucially, this will not require vast resources.
- The UN needs to focus on **adding value**. This will not be achieved through funding, but instead by focusing on redressing the low-cost, structural and social root causes of the challenges facing Pakistan. **Changing systems** is imperative. Moreover, the UN should stop working on issues that the Government should be tackling, which it would be able to do if it raised its tax base.
- The UN must leverage its **advocacy** power for key public campaigns, for instance on water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH), or its *Global Ambassadors* campaign. Advocacy has immense power, as the cornerstone of changing attitudes and addressing social concerns. In tandem, advocacy must be supported by action in the field. Collaboration between the UN and non-UN actors should be harnessed. Suggested areas for UN advocacy include population control, WASH and inclusive finance.
- The UN is ideally placed to support the pre-conditions for **large-scale structural and policy change**. While the UN takes the lead on global issues, national-level policy responses are required to implement change on the ground. It would be more valuable if the UN focused on issues with global implications, such as climate change mitigation and adaptation, the enforcement of regulations, population growth, migration and resilience in the wake of disasters.
- The UN should help to strengthen **transparency and accountability**. Two key issues in this regard are civil service reform and police reform.
- A lack of up-to-date **data** is a fundamental challenge for Pakistan. For instance, the country suffered due to insufficient data when preparing CPEC implementation plans. The UN is well placed to work with academia to strengthen data collection and analysis as a basis for policy-making. It should use its expertise to identify areas where data is missing. For example, recent census data is only available from 1998, and transport data was last collected in 2005. There is a need to identify areas where the UN can help the Government undertake surveys and collect vital information.
- The provision of data by UN agencies, such as the Multi-Dimensional Poverty Index, is unique in Pakistan. It offers unparalleled input for improving governance, decentralisation, and social sectors at the local government level.



Annex 2: Analysis of UN Pakistan Futurescaper Surveys

November 2016

1. Introduction

In 2016, the UN Country Team in Pakistan began elaborating the United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) 2018-2022, which articulates the collective response of the UN system to Pakistan's national development priorities. In order to make its country analysis – an important basis for the development of the UN Pakistan Partnership Framework (UNPPF) – a more inclusive and consultative process, the UN Resident Coordinator's Office complemented the analysis of existing information with a “wisdom of crowds” approach.

In July 2016, the United Nations in Pakistan began developing a crowd-sourcing tree for “unlocking voices”. This sought to provide an analytical basis for its Common Country Assessment (CCA) as part of a new UNDAF generation to feed into *Vision 2030*. This approach helped to generate alternative perceptions on key issues, their causes, effects and priorities for the future.

For the purposes of this exercise, two online surveys were undertaken. One addressed the CCA, while the other concerned the new generation of the UNDAF. These can be coupled together for the purposes of *Vision 2030*. In the context of the CCA, the survey allowed respondents to analyse existing conditions and identify the current political, economic and social trends and drivers affecting Pakistan's development and humanitarian situation. In the context of the UNDAF's formulation, a second round of questions enabled respondents to prioritise the most important implications, in order to combine them into relevant scenarios for the UNDAF.

The online crowd-sourcing component of UN Pakistan's UNDAF preparation process was made possible by its successful application to the UNDAF *Design Innovation Facility* of the UN Development Operations Coordination Office (UN DOCO). It was carried out in cooperation with the crowd-sourced strategy company **Futurescaper**, which specialises in participatory scenario planning and foresight. Its tools combine analytics and visualisation, helping organisations to uncover the drivers and dynamics that their stakeholders think are most important, understand why they think this, and explore what implications these have for the future. Futurescaper has already worked on multiple UN projects across the globe, providing insight and guidance at innovation workshops and conferences, while assisting country teams and regional offices to develop forward-looking plans with their stakeholders.

The overall spirit of the responses is captured in the Figure below, which shows the top 10 most popular factors and an indicative “soundbite”³ from an actual participant, reflecting this respondent's take on the issues. Corruption was the factor with the greatest “popularity” at all levels of the survey.

³ It should be noted that these views are completely unedited (other than spelling corrections to facilitate reading), and therefore should not be taken as representative of the analysis as a whole. This summary report is intended to serve only as a guide and signpost in terms of exploring the responses gathered within UN Pakistan's Futurescaper dataset. Thus, it does not comment on the content of any responses, nor does it present an exhaustive view of all the data collected.




Figure 1: Top 10 most popular factors identified in Surveys 1 and 2, with an example of a “soundbite” from a survey participant for each factor (see the Appendix to this Annex for the complete text of this soundbite).

2. Survey 1: Pakistan Common Country Assessment (CCA)

The initial survey concerned the 2016 Common Country Assessment (CCA), including an assessment of what is happening in Pakistan, and why it is happening.

Survey Participation

Survey 1 received a total of 989 responses, with 893 unique users. 81.6% of the survey participants were identified as members of the “public at large”. UN staff comprised 6.2% of the respondents. Data on the level of participation by stakeholder groups was collected via the link circulated through the UNCT-driven engagement campaign.







| Respondent | Number of Respondents/ Unique Users (%) |
|------------------------------------|--|
| International Development Partners | 98 (11%) |
| Civil Society | 40 (4.5%) |
| Government | 2 (< 1%) |
| The Public (General Link) | 735 (82.3%) |
| UN Staff | 55 (6.2%) |

| Age | |
|---------|-----|
| 15-24 | 24% |
| 25-34 | 32% |
| 35-44 | 18% |
| 45-54 | 7% |
| 55-64 | 4% |
| Over 65 | <1% |
| N/A | 14% |

| Gender | |
|-------------------|-----|
| Female | 18% |
| Male | 67% |
| Transgender | <1% |
| Prefer not to say | <1% |
| N/A | 15% |

| Province | |
|--|-----|
| Balochistan | 4% |
| Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) | 1% |
| Gilgit-Baltistan (GB) | 1% |
| Islamabad Capital Territory (ICT) | 18% |
| Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) | 17% |
| Pakistan Administered Kashmir | 5% |
| Punjab | 23% |
| Sindh | 18% |
| N/A | 13% |

| Location | |
|----------|-----|
| City | 70% |
| Village | 16% |
| N/A | 14% |



The English versions of the survey received 869 responses (87.9%), with the remainder in Urdu. Demographic information was also collected on the participants, including their age, gender, province and urban/rural location. The demographic profile of participants is summarised in the Tables and Graph below.

Top 10 Most Urgent Issues

Figure 2, below, illustrates the top 10 most urgent issues facing Pakistan today, as identified by survey respondents. Chief among these are corruption; quality education and vocational training; (poor) governance; employment and the economy; and the rule of law. The distribution of issues as selected by respondents is presented in the chart overleaf. Figure 3 demonstrates the percentage frequency with these top 10 factors were chosen, compared to the percentage frequency with which the next 30 factors were chosen.




Figure 2: Top 10 “Most Urgent Issues”, CCA Survey (Survey 1).



Figure 3: Distribution of the 10 most popular urgent issues, compared to the next 30 most popular urgent issues (the percentage refers to the frequency with which a factor was chosen by respondents).

The size of each circle simply represents the popularity of that issue for respondents, not its importance. The arrows between the different factors show the causal relationships identified between them. The thicker the arrow, the more frequently a factor was identified to be causing another, in the view of respondents. Notably, “no interest in making society better” and a “lack of accountability” were urgent issues that were not initially identified by the UNCT in the multiple choice questionnaire. These arose from user input.

Top Story-lines of Causality and Inter-Connection

Figure 4 presents the top five “story-lines” of causality and inter-connection of factors, as selected by all survey respondents. The impact cascade analysis is automatically generated, and identifies the most important factors in the dataset, before linking them with their most important effects. For example, “no interest in making society better” is perceived overwhelmingly as a (root) cause; “unemployment” as an (intermediate) cause; and “security” as an issue. By contrast, “corruption”, “governance” and “the environment” are seen as both issues and causes, to varying degrees.

Impact cascades are highly condensed visualisations that illustrate all the possible linear ways in which factors were causally connected. The colour coding in the impact cascade analysis shows the extent to which a factor was identified as an urgent issue (dark blue), intermediate cause (light blue), or root cause (green). The larger the circle, the more systemically important the factor was found to be. Similarly, the thicker the arrow, the more frequent the causal linkage between these factors (according to the number of times a particular pair of factors was mentioned as linked). The way to correctly read the following cascade is, therefore, to:

- First look at the green segment in a factor to see a root cause;
- Then look at the factors which the arrows, which originate from that root cause, point towards;
- Concentrate only on the light blue segments of these factors to see the intermediate causes;
- Then look at the factors which the arrows, which originate from each intermediate cause, point towards; and
- Finally, concentrate only on the dark blue segments of these factors to see the urgent issues.



For instance, the narrative in Row 5 could be expressed as: “no interest in making society better” is seen as the root cause of, firstly, a “lack of accountability” which leads to issues around “security” and “the environment”. Secondly, it is considered to cause a “lack of political will” which, in turn, undermines “food security”.




Figure 4: An impact cascade for the top five story-lines, Survey 1, all respondents.



Some factors that were created by survey respondents while they were taking the survey include “poor governance”, “no interest in making society better”, a “lack of accountability”, the “absence of merit”, “social fabric”, and a “lack of the rule of law”.

Figure 5 illustrates the impact cascade of the top five story-lines as identified by excluding the public at large (who were the largest contributors in the previous figure), in order to showcase the views of, potentially, more expert contributors. The issues identified are similar, but a “lack of accountability” is revealed to be the most important root cause of issues around “poor governance”, the “rule of law” and “employment and the economy”.




Figure 5: Top five story-lines of causality and inter-connection of factors, as selected by excluding the public at large from among survey respondents.



3. Survey 2: United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF)

Survey 2 specifically pertained to the time period of the new generation of the UNDAF, from “the next five years” (up to 2022) through to 2030. There were 316 responses from 170 unique users. Fewer responses compared to the first survey are due to lower public participation (38%), since this second survey was targeted more towards experts. Over 50% of respondents were UN staff members or international development partners. In addition, Survey 2 was “live” for a considerably shorter period of time, and its completion required far more complex reflection by respondents.

Starting from the main issues identified by respondents in the first survey, the second survey asked participants to identify which issues the UN should focus on during the next five years; the main benefit of involving the UN; the effects of involving the UN in the challenges identified by respondents; and further effects which these issues could lead to.

The top 10 major trends identified by survey respondents are illustrated in Figure 6. The colour of the arrows corresponds to the colour of the originating node. The directions of the arrows indicate causality (i.e. the arrow “comes” from a cause) across all time-frames.




Figure 6: Top 10 major trends, UNDAF Survey (Survey 2).



Once again, the unanticipated factors that emerged among the top 10 trends specifically identified by survey respondents included: “absence of merit”; a “lack of accountability”; “poor governance”; a “lack of political will” and “no interest in making society better”.

Impact cascades were also produced for the UNDAF survey. The colour coding in the impact cascade analysis shows the extent to which a factor was identified as an issue for the UN to focus on (dark blue), intermediate effect (light blue), ultimate effect (green), or the result of prioritising improvement therein (pink/yellow). In order to read this cascade, it is important to:

- First look at the dark blue segment in a factor to identify issues for “UN focus”;
- Then, look at the factors which the arrows, which originate from each issue, point towards;
- Concentrate only on the light blue segments of these factors to see the intermediate effects;
- Then, look at the factors which the arrows, which originate from each intermediate effect, point towards;
- Concentrate only on the green segments of these factors to see the ultimate effects;
- Then, look at the factors which the arrows, originating from each ultimate effect; point towards; and
- Finally, concentrate only on the pink/yellow segments of these factors to see the results of prioritising improvement.




Figure 7: An impact cascade for the top story-lines, Survey 2.

Respondents also identified key stakeholders which they recommended the UN work with on these top 10 trends. Figure 8 illustrates which groups the respondents collectively suggested that the UN should collaborate with on each factor.

Almost all issues are clearly multi-group challenges that require extensive cross-stakeholder collaboration. An exception is the issue of “no interest in making society better”, where only academics and the Government are identified as key stakeholders. Overall, for example, while NGOs are highlighted as the foremost collaborator for “quality education and vocational training”, another seven groups also have a role.




Figure 8: Recommended stakeholders for the top 10 trends.



4. Data Analysis for Vision 2030

The second survey can be broken down into the UNDAF period (up to 2022) by examining the issues highlighted for “UN focus” and their intermediate effects, as seen in Figure 5. The subsequent period, leading up to 2030, can be examined through the ultimate effects and the results of prioritising improvement therein. Therefore, latter is especially useful in analysing data for *Vision 2030*.

This section is structured according to the *Vision 2030* note, in line with the *Interim UNDAF Guidance* (UNDAF, 2016, p. 24):

1. The UN's working assumptions in terms of longer-term development trajectories over the duration of the 2030 Agenda;
2. The role that the UNCT envisages for the United Nations in Pakistan for the duration of the 2030 Agenda;
3. The ways in which the assessment and analysis of the CCA, and the outcomes of the UNDAF, represent logical steps in longer-term result areas. These are areas which the UNCT anticipates will define its primary contribution in supporting the attainment of the Agenda 2030 in Pakistan.

1. The UN's working assumptions in terms of longer-term development trajectories over the duration of the 2030 Agenda

The longer-term development trajectories over the duration of Agenda 2030 may be understood to follow the end of the current UNDAF period, i.e. spanning 2022 to 2030. Therefore, as described above, these can be mapped to the ultimate effects and the results of prioritising improvements therein. This assumes the successful achievement of the UNDAF, as understood by respondents.

Accordingly, Figure 9 illustrates the cascade for this development trajectory, which may be summarised as:

- Pakistan is paying attention to corruption and poor governance, and focusing on these phenomena as “issues”.
- With improved governance, and the rule of law at its core, merit and accountability can arise.
- As a result of addressing corruption; poor governance; quality education and vocational training; and the absence of merit, employment and the economy can flourish;
- The rule of law also flourishes in this scenario, which, in turn, can help to control corruption.
- Evidently, this is no utopia. Corruption still exists but, overall, it is being taken seriously and controlled through these measures. The future now looks brighter.




Figure 9: Impact cascade, Survey 2, illustrating the ultimate effects addressed during the UNDAF period (green) and the resulting prioritised improvements within *Vision 2030*'s trajectory (yellow).

2. The role which the UNCT envisages for the United Nations in Pakistan for the duration of the 2030 Agenda

As this question will be determined by the UNCT internally, it falls outside the scope of this exercise. However, Figure 7 above, on recommended stakeholders, may be used to understand the relative role of the UN in collaboration with other development actors.

3. The ways in which the assessment and analysis of the CCA, and the outcomes of the UNDAF, represent logical steps in longer-term result areas. These are areas which the UNCT anticipates will define its primary contribution in supporting the attainment of Agenda 2030 in Pakistan

The link between CCA, UNDAF and *Vision 2030* can be encapsulated in an impact cascade, as represented in Figure 10. This stretches from current issues for the UN to focus on (CCA), to the effects of focusing on them (during UNDAF), with a view to resultant improvements (towards 2030).

It is important to note that:

1. The factors identified in the column to the far left were identified chiefly as issues for the UN to focus on (dark blue), representing the current situation (CCA).
2. The second and third columns contain intermediate effects (light blue), representing areas of work to be addressed via the UNDAF.
3. The top row and column on the far right were factors identified, overall, as ultimate effects (green), representing potential progress towards *Vision 2030*.




Figure 10: Impact cascade, Survey 2, showing the UNDAF period (light blue) and the resulting 2030 environment.



5. Futurescaper Surveys Appendix

Survey Questions with Explanations and Corresponding Figures

Survey 1

| | Questionnaire Wording | Explanatory Comment | Figure(s) |
|-----|--|--|-----------|
| 1.1 | If you were to ask your friends what is the most urgent issue that Pakistan faces today, what would they choose? | Respondents selected issues from multiple choice options, or entered new issues. These became the factors shown as urgent issues in the graphs. See Figure 2. | 2 |
| 1.2 | Can you recall an important example or story that you have recently seen or heard on {X}? | {X} is the issue selected previously. Examples of such stories are illustrated in Figure 1. | 1 |
| 1.3 | What are the main causes for the challenge described in the previous example? | Respondents entered causes which are linked to the issues they previously selected. These become the factors shown as intermediate causes in the graphs. | 4, 5 |
| 1.4 | Looking deeper, what causes each one of the below? | Respondents entered causes which are linked to the intermediate causes they previously entered. These become the factors shown as root causes in the graphs. | 4, 5 |

Survey 2

| | Questionnaire Wording | Explanatory Comment | Figure(s) |
|-----|---|---|-----------|
| 2.1 | In a previous survey, the following issues were identified by Pakistanis as being the most urgent. Which of these issues do you think the UN should focus on in the coming 5 years? | Respondents selected issues from multiple choice options. These became the factors shown as urgent issues in the graphs. | 6 |
| 2.2 | What would be the benefit of involving the UN to address {X}? | {X} is the issue selected previously, in line with point 1.2. | 1 |
| 2.3 | What are the main effects of addressing the challenge described in the previous example? | Respondents entered effects which are linked to the issues they previously selected. These became the factors shown as intermediate effects in the graphs. | 7 |



| | | | |
|-----|--|---|---|
| 2.4 | Looking deeper, what further effects could each one of the below lead to? | Respondents entered effects which are linked to the intermediate effects previously entered. These became the factors shown as ultimate effects in the graphs. | 7 |
| 2.5 | Looking at the factors below, please select two where you would most like to see positive change by 2022. | Respondents selected two ultimate effects from all the factors contributed by respondents. | 7 |
| 2.6 | What will happen when the two items below interact? | Respondents entered the result of the positive change for the two previously selected ultimate effects. These became the factors shown as results of priority improvement in the graphs. | 9 |
| 2.7 | In order to make a positive change to improve the situation about... | The respondents were shown the factor previously entered as a result of priority improvement. | 9 |
| | What do you think should be done to improve the situation by 2022? | This was captured as detailed text of the recommendations, similar to point 2.2. | 9 |
| | How can the UN best support Pakistan to achieve this positive change, thus helping the country progress towards the Sustainable Development Goals? | | |

Figure 1 Sound-bites

The following text is an indicative “sound-bite” from an actual participant who responded to Survey 1. As explained above, these views are completely unedited, with the exception of spelling corrections to facilitate reading.

Corruption

Corruption has its roots in almost every sector. All previously mentioned issue[s] are interlinked and lead to one problem, that is corruption. Almost every sector has people that are more interested in their well-being, rather than the whole organisation. Health, electricity etc. cannot work while there is [“]red-tapism[”] and corruption[,] the working of each sector is affected; and as long as corruption is there, no sector can improve its working and produce effective output.

Quality Education and Vocational Training

Yes, Danish school project by Punjab Govt. and there is a girl in Karachi who teaches poor children in Karachi. The story is also featured in CNN but I forget her name.

Poor Governance

Having an efficient governmental system would ensure trust in public, causing a snowball of change in all other areas and systems.



Governance

For [the] past few years, every sector [is] governed by LOW MORALE. Political leadership has turned into crises, for example health, education, energy, industry, [the] economy. On the other hand, security-wise Pakistan [has] shown a great progress as under the leadership of patriotic and honest security leadership.

Employment and the Economy

Unemployment is the root cause of all crimes which lead to health issues, corruption and major crimes.

Rule of Law

Among enormous, the most intensive issue Pakistan is facing is rule of law. All other challenges including corruption, nepotism, terrorism, extremism can be neutralised if there is implementation of law in the country. The notorious criminals and corrupt people are holding almost all the resources and powers in the country because of which prosperity at the grassroots level is a dream. There is no tangible process of accountability for the elite class of the society. [The] Judiciary itself cr[ies] for justice. All other relevant departments are ridden with incompetent, corrupt and hypocrit[ical] officials. Rule of law is the only way to become a flourishing, thriving, prosperous and dominant state in the world.

Absence of Merit

The education system is old fashioned.

Lack of Accountability

Current Ministers, Government along with [the] former President with the entire gang of thieves ruled Pakistan for 5 years under the name of so-called democracy, with a law of making unlimited money, i.e. by hook or by crook and safely handing over to another gang who makes the most expensive metro bus service and other developing projects such as the most expensive electricity production, etc.

No Interest in Making Society Better

Because the implementation of law and order is disobedient, there is no appl[ication] of law and order in any department and in anywhere in the whole Pakistan. When there is law, there must be justice, but all we seek is law not the implementation of law and neither any order of law. A guy on [his] bike is breaking traffic signals in [a] daily routine, a V.I.P have got security but [the] poor are dying every day because of terrorism. A poor [person] ha[s] got no money for education but he can get a labour job on low money easily, which is the failure of law and order. We must take a look over all. There is causes in every sector and even corruption in it. I wish I could get the words to explain.

Lack of Political Will

A country is run through effective and efficient performance of its different institutes. These institutes, due to many reasons, have either stopped doing their job[s] at all, or are not doing [their jobs] as they should.

